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ANTI-CORRUPTION IN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
MANAGEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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RÉSUMÉ

Les projets de développement international (PDI) sont devenus très complexes avec une plus grande diversité d'acteurs pour leur mise en œuvre. La gestion des projets (GP) et ses méthodes sont mises au défi, car les statistiques montrent la faible efficacité relative de ce type de projets. Cela même si les acteurs de l'aide au développement ont mis en place des méthodes de GP et de programmes de pointe, souvent alignés sur la perspective occidentale de la profession.

Une hypothèse importante pour expliquer cette situation est que la corruption serait négligée par la GP, et ainsi rendant incapable la discipline d'agir pour la gérer, la prévenir, la contourner et/ou la contrer. Notons qu'il faut aller au-delà des tabous et préjugés, et que la corruption peut survenir à divers niveaux et dans divers pays tout au long de la chaîne de valeur de l'aide au développement.

Compte tenu du manque de recherche sur ce phénomène, la présente étude tente d'apporter une nouvelle perspective sur la lutte contre la corruption sous l'angle du « contexte » des projets de développement. Cela permet de focaliser sur les dimensions culturelles, politiques et institutionnelles qui influencent les processus et méthodes de GP, et qui peuvent empêcher d'atteindre pleinement les objectifs des projets entrepris. Par conséquent, la question de recherche suivante est l'objectif de la thèse : Comment la corruption, dans les pays en développement, combinée à la mauvaise gouvernance, empêchent les projets de développement international (PDI) d'atteindre de manière significative, leurs objectifs, notamment en Afrique sub-saharienne?

L'étude procède par la méthode de la théorie ancrée, fondée sur trente (30) entrevues avec des experts internationaux du développement. L'échantillonnage opportuniste tente d'équilibrer la représentation des répondants venant des pays donateurs et des pays bénéficiaires, ainsi que des gestionnaires de projet de l'aide internationale ayant travaillé dans des organisations bilatérales, multilatérales et des ONG en coopération internationale. Les données qualitatives sont analysées à l'aide d'une méthode de tri conceptuel à l'aide du logiciel NVivo. Sur la base de l'analyse, un ensemble de quatre-vingt-seize (96) extraits d'entrevues représentatifs qui sont rapportés.

Dans le respect des principes de la théorie ancrée, l'interprétation est menée après l'analyse, sans influence théorique préalable. Elle est basée sur quatre fondements théoriques pour relier les données obtenues au sein d'un modèle cohérent : la théorie des intérêts organisationnels, la théorie du principal-agent, la théorie culturaliste et la théorie institutionnelle. Le modèle émergeant de cette recherche sert à identifier le contexte des personnes qui sont parties prenantes et de mieux savoir en quoi, où et comment la corruption empêche la GP et les PDI d'être efficaces.

Les résultats et le modèle sont discutés dans le contexte de trois ensembles de constructions théoriques. Tout d'abord, le modèle du contexte des PDI peut être lié aux théories existantes en matière de GP pour ces projets et des études anti-corruption. Deuxièmement, ce contexte est relié à la littérature émergente en développement international, à savoir le cadre théorique du néo-patrimonialisme. Troisièmement, un ensemble de facteurs au niveau de la gouvernance peuvent avoir un impact sur l'efficacité de la lutte contre la corruption, y compris dans les méthodes de GP.

La conclusion tire des leçons pour la pratique de la GP dans les PDI. Elle identifie aussi les faiblesses de l'étude, tout en apportant une série de propositions pour des recherches futures.

ABSTRACT

International development projects (IDPs) have become very complex with a greater diversity of actors for their implementation. Project management (PM) and its methods are challenged, as statistics show the relative low efficiency of this type of projects. This is even though development aid actors have put in place state-of-the-art PM methods and programs, often aligned with the Western perspective of the profession.

An important hypothesis to explain this situation is that corruption would be neglected by PM, and thus making the discipline unable to act to manage, prevent, circumvent and/or counter it. It should be noted that one must go beyond taboos and prejudices, and that corruption can occur at various levels and in various countries throughout the development aid value chain.

Given the lack of research on this phenomenon, this study attempts to bring a new perspective on the fight against corruption from the angle of the "context" of development projects. This makes it possible to focus on the cultural, political, and institutional dimensions that influence the processes and methods of GP, and which can prevent the objectives of the projects undertaken from being fully achieved. Therefore, the following research question is the focus of the thesis: How corruption, in developing countries, combined with poor governance, prevents international development projects (IDPs) from meaningfully achieving their objectives, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa?

The study follows the grounded theory method, based on thirty (30) interviews with international development experts. Opportunistic sampling attempts to balance the representation of respondents from donor and recipient countries, as well as international aid project managers who have worked in bilateral and multilateral organizations and NGOs in international cooperation. Qualitative data is analyzed using a conceptual sorting method using NVivo software. Based on the analysis, a set of ninety-six (96) representative interview excerpts are reported.

In accordance with the principles of grounded theory, the interpretation is carried out after the analysis, without prior theoretical influence. It is based on four theoretical foundations to link the data obtained within a coherent model: the theory of organizational interests, the principal-agent theory, the culturalist theory and the institutional theory. The pattern emerging from this research serves to identify the context to better understand what, where, and how corruption prevents PM and IDPs from being effective.

The results and model are discussed in the context of three sets of theoretical constructs. First, the IDP context model can be linked to existing PM theories for these projects and anti-corruption studies. Second, this context is connected to the emerging literature in international development, namely the theoretical framework of neo-patrimonialism. Third, a range of governance-level factors can impact the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts, including within PM methods.

The conclusion draws lessons for the practice of PM in IDPs. It also identifies the weaknesses of the study, while providing a series of proposals for future research.

STRUCTURE DE LA THÈSE

Dans le chapitre 1 - Introduction - Dans la section 1.1, nous présentons d'abord un aperçu de la thèse, introduisant le lecteur à certaines des questions qui seront au cœur de cette thèse : la complexité des projets de développement international (PDI), leur manque relatif de succès quant au développement macroéconomique des pays en développement depuis le début de leur application, notamment dans la région de l'Afrique subsaharienne, qui reçoit environ 37 % de l'aide publique au développement (APD) (S. Brown, 2017, p. 153).

Nous procédons ensuite, dans la section 1.2, au plan de thèse, pour informer sommairement le lecteur sur le contenu de chaque chapitre. Dans la section 1.3, nous présentons les projets de développement international (PDI) concernant les questions de gouvernance, leurs échecs relatifs à atteindre des résultats pour le développement économique des pays en développement, et nous soulignons l'importance de la gouvernance en tant que facteur contextuel important.

Dans la section 1.4 de ce chapitre, nous discutons des différentes définitions et types de corruption, tels que la petite et la grande corruption. De nombreuses conséquences négatives de la corruption sont évoquées : inégalités croissantes entre les classes sociales, faible croissance économique, manque de ressources dédiées à l'éducation et à la santé, et quant à la réduction de la pauvreté. Le thème de la capture de projet est présenté, et comment l'éviter en ciblant mieux les parties prenantes.

Nous avançons que la corruption et la mauvaise gouvernance sont des facteurs importants expliquant le manque de résultats probants de l'aide internationale. La capture de projet et la capture d'état sont des facteurs importants qui expliquent la situation actuelle. D'autres développements tels que la Déclaration de Paris de 2005 et les conditionnalités politiques peuvent jouer un rôle utile pour redresser la situation à l'avenir. Divers auteurs donnent des explications sur l'échec relatif de l'aide internationale et des PDI : faiblesse de la gouvernance, népotisme, rente excessive des régimes en place, pillage des ressources trouvées dans les pays d'ASS, manque de capacités administratives, etc.

Dans la section 1.5, nous présentons nos objectifs de recherche, la question de recherche, et rappelons que notre recherche est de type qualitatif et exploratoire.

Dans le Chapitre 2 - Revue de la littérature - Section 2.1 est un aperçu du chapitre 2. Dans la section 2.2 Nous examinons les dernières recherches effectuées sur les projets de développement international (PDI) : leurs racines historiques et intellectuelles, les différents types de PDI, leurs principales caractéristiques, notamment leur complexité (structurelle, technique, directionnelle et temporaire), leur taux de succès relatif pour soixante ans de pratique dans les pays en développement, les principaux défis et problèmes rencontrés, et les nouveaux enjeux avancés par les chercheurs. Certaines des nouvelles questions tournent autour du manque de fertilisation croisée entre la gestion de projet et la littérature sur le développement international, la proposition d'une nouvelle approche de gestion de projet, les questions de parité entre les sexes, le soutien au capital social, la gestion des connaissances, etc.

Dans la section 2.3 de ce chapitre, nous discutons des différentes mesures anti-corruption prises jusqu'à présent, notamment par la Banque Mondiale et l'Organisation des Nations Unies, leur relative absence d'impact, due principalement aux stratégies d'évitement imaginées par certains régimes des pays bénéficiaires de l'aide, l'importance des enjeux de passation des marchés dans la lutte contre la corruption, l'accaparement des élites en cours, la pertinence analytique du concept PSI (institutionnalisation du système des partis) pour la « régulation » de la corruption par les élites régnantes dans les pays en développement. Enfin, nous énumérons les différents facteurs à l'origine de la corruption dans les pays en développement, selon les chercheurs consultés dans cette revue de littérature.

Dans la section 2.4, nous discutons des conséquences de la corruption sur le développement, notamment la croissance économique et la réduction de la pauvreté, certaines des mesures internationales qui ont été prises pour lutter contre la corruption, telles que le gouvernement électronique (e-government), l'importance de mieux cibler les bénéficiaires de l'aide pour mieux assurer la responsabilisation et pouvoir réduire la captation des projets, l'importance de la gouvernance, et enfin certaines caractéristiques de « l'industrie du développement » qui ont des effets divergents sur la lutte contre le phénomène de la corruption.

Dans la section 2.5, nous discutons de certaines questions telles que la gestion des connaissances et certaines questions épistémologiques liées à l'étude de la corruption, suivies de 2.6 - la conclusion.

Dans le chapitre 3 - Méthodologie - Pour aider à développer un modèle innovant, nous proposons une méthodologie de théorie ancrée basée sur trente (30) entretiens semi-structurés avec des experts internationaux en développement de l'aide, en équilibrant la représentation des pays donateurs et bénéficiaires, ainsi que des chefs de projet du des agences d'aide internationales bilatérales et multilatérales et des ONG (Bogner et al., 2009).

Les données obtenues ont été traitées par un processus de tri qualitatif à l'aide du logiciel NVivo. Les données accumulées ont été analysées, avec des précisions sur les types de méthodes de codage utilisées.

De plus, nous expliquons comment notre analyse des données a été enrichie en recourant à quatre fondements théoriques. de relier les preuves au sein d'un modèle cohérent : la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT), la théorie principal-agent (PAT), la théorie culturaliste (CT) et la théorie institutionnelle (TI), qui peuvent aider à mieux comprendre la corruption et son impact.

Dans le Chapitre 4 - Résultats - Nous présentons un modèle théorique original qui illustre quels acteurs, événements et contextes sont liés et liés dans les efforts dynamiques pour comprendre et combattre la corruption dans les efforts de développement international. Nous avons tracé des flèches pour relier ces éléments : le cycle de l'aide étrangère, les opportunités de capture, les pressions contextuelles, les dommages personnels causés et les mécanismes de contrôle exercés. Ce modèle peut servir à interpréter diverses questions interdépendantes soulevées par nos répondants, telles que les questions politiques, les préoccupations de gouvernance, les institutions impliquées, l'aide fournie, les actes de corruption adoptés, le comportement des acteurs commerciaux, les problèmes de gestion, la population ciblée par l'aide internationale, et la culture environnante.

Nous présentons également quatre-vingt-seize (96) extraits d'entretiens réalisés avec les trente (30) experts de l'aide internationale rencontrés. Ces extraits ne sont qu'une partie des nombreux commentaires formulés par nos interlocuteurs. Nous les relions aux quatre théories pertinentes présentées dans le chapitre précédent. Nous avons également classé ces extraits en utilisant divers sujets, tels que les opportunités de capture, les problèmes de gouvernance, les institutions (telles que l'éducation, la santé, les classes sociales, l'économie, les systèmes militaire et judiciaire), la culture, les entreprises et les mécanismes de contrôle. Nous avons clôturé le chapitre par une section « quoi, où et comment » qui concerne les écosystèmes liés à la corruption, au néolibéralisme, à l'aide internationale et aux questions de gestion de projet.

Dans le Chapitre 5 - Discussion - Nous récapitulons nos conclusions et en tirons quelques interprétations pour les professionnels de la gestion de projet actifs dans les PDI. Nous nous demandons dans quelle mesure les initiatives anti-corruption peuvent tirer parti des méthodes de PM comme le suggère le modèle proposé.

Au-delà de la littérature en management de projet, nos résultats sont liés à des travaux intellectuels émergents sur le néo-patrimonialisme et les régimes de gouvernance, le concept d'États hybrides fondé sur le modèle wébérien de l'État moderne, l'influence de certains modèles culturels de patrimonialisme encore considérés comme pertinents, et contexte de la GP contemporaine et des méthodes anti-corruption. En outre, nous présentons trois constructions théoriques, qui peuvent servir à mieux comprendre comment évaluer les progrès des mesures anti-corruption : le modèle de bonne gouvernance, le modèle de prise de rente à long horizon et le modèle de gouvernance de l'État développemental. Enfin, le cas particulier du Rwanda est examiné.

Nous avançons enfin quelques apports que cette étude apporte aux praticiens et chercheurs, les limites, et quelques suggestions pour des recherches futures.

Enfin, dans le Chapitre 6 - Conclusion - Nous présentons nos principales conclusions sur le phénomène de la corruption comme étant un facteur important qui entrave les possibilités de développement de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Nous rappelons les quatre théories utilisées pour l'interprétation de notre corpus empirique, après avoir utilisé la méthodologie de la théorie ancrée

pour le traitement de l'analyse des entretiens. Nous rappelons ensuite le travail accompli pour la recherche et la rédaction de cette thèse. Nous résumons également les apports conceptuels et empiriques de notre travail. Nous avançons enfin quelques implications pour la pratique du management de projet, en prenant acte des limites de notre étude, mais aussi des possibilités de stimuler les recherches futures.

THESIS OUTLINE

In Chapter 1 - Introduction – In section 1.1, we present first an overview of the thesis, introducing the reader to some of the issues that will be at the heart of this thesis: the complexity of International Development Projects (IDPs), their relative lack of success as for the macroeconomic development of developing countries since the beginning of their application, notably in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, which receives about 37 % of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) (S. Brown, 2017, p. 153).

We then proceed, in section 1.2, with the thesis outline, to inform summarily the reader about the contents of each chapter. In section 1.3, we present international development projects (IDPs) regarding issues of governance, their relative failures to attain results for the economic development of developing countries, and we emphasize the importance of governance as an important contextual factor.

In section 1.4 of this chapter, we discuss the various definitions and types of corruption, such as petty and grand corruption. Many negative consequences of corruption are discussed: rising inequalities between social classes, low economic growth, lack of resources dedicated to education and health, and as for reducing poverty. The topic of project capture is presented, and how to prevent it by better targeting stakeholders.

We advance that corruption and bad governance are important factors explaining the lack of convincing results by international aid. Project capture and state capture are important factors that explain the present situation. Other developments such as the 2005 Paris Declaration and political conditionalities can play a useful role to redress the situation in the future. Various authors give explanations about the relative failure of international aid and IDPs: weak governance, nepotism, excessive rent-taking by the regimes in place, pillage of the resources found in SSA countries, lack of administrative capabilities, and others.

In section 1.5, we present our research objectives, the research question, and recall that our research is of a qualitative and exploratory type.

In Chapter 2 - Literature Review – Section 2.1 is an overview of chapter 2. In section 2.2 We examine the latest research done on international development projects (IDPs): their historical and intellectual roots, the various types of IDPs, their main characteristics, notably their complexity (structural, technical, directional and being temporary), their relative rate of success for sixty years of practice in the developing countries, the main challenges and problems encountered, and new issues advanced by researchers. Some of the new issues revolve around the lack of cross-fertilization between project management and international development literatures, the proposal for a new project management approach, issues about gender parity, social capital support, knowledge management, and others.

In section 2.3 of this chapter, we discuss various anti-corruption measures undertaken until now, notably by the World Bank and the United Nations Organization, their relative lack of impact, due mainly to the evasive strategies devised by some aid recipient countries' regimes, the importance of the procurement issues in the fight against corruption, the elite capture going on, the analytical relevance of the concept PSI (party system institutionalization) for the 'regulation' of corruption by the reigning elites in developing countries. Finally, we enumerate the various factors causing corruption in developing countries, according to the researchers consulted in this literature review.

In section 2.4, we discuss the consequences of corruption on development, notably economic growth and the reduction of poverty, some of the international measures that have been taken to combat corruption, such as E-gov, the importance of better targeting aid recipients to better ensure accountability and to be able to reduce project capture, the importance of governance, and finally some characteristics of the 'development industry' that have divergent effects on the fight against the phenomenon of corruption.

In section 2.5, we discuss some issues such as knowledge management and some epistemological issues related to the study of corruption, followed by 2.6 – the conclusion.

In Chapter 3 - Methodology- To help develop an innovative model, we propose a grounded theory methodology based on thirty (30) semi-structured interviews with international aid development

experts, balancing representation from donor and receiving countries, as well as project managers from the bilateral and multilateral international aid agencies, and from NGOs (Bogner et al., 2009).

The data obtained were processed through a qualitative sorting process by using the software NVivo. The data accumulated was analyzed, with clarification about the types of coding methods used.

Moreover, we explain how our data analysis was enhanced by resorting to four theoretical foundations. to connect evidence within a coherent model: Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Culturalist Theory (CT) and the Institutional Theory (IT), that can help to better understand corruption and its impact.

In Chapter 4 – Results - We present an original theoretical model that illustrates which actors, events and context are related and linked in the dynamic efforts to understand and combat corruption in international development endeavours. We have drawn arrows to link these elements: the foreign aid cycle, capture opportunities, the context pressures, the personal damages done, and the control mechanisms exercised. This model can serve to interpret various interrelated issues brought forward by our respondents, such as policy issues, governance concerns, institutions involved, the aid provided, corruption acts enacted, the business actors' behaviour, management issues, the population targeted by international aid, and the surrounding culture.

We also present ninety-six (96) excerpts from interviews done with the thirty (30) international aid experts encountered. These excerpts are only a part of the many comments made by our interviewees. We link these to the four relevant theories presented in the previous chapter. We also categorized these excerpts by using various topics, such as capture opportunities, governance issues, institutions (such as education, health, social classes, economy, the military and justice systems), culture, business, and control mechanisms. We closed the chapter with a ''what, where and how'' section that concerns the ecosystems related to corruption, neo-liberalism, international aid and project management issues.

In Chapter 5 - Discussion - We recapitulate our findings and draw some interpretations for the project management professionals active in IDPs. We ask to what extent can anti-corruption initiatives leverage PM methods as suggested by the proposed model.

In addition to project management literature, our findings are linked to emerging intellectual work on neo-patrimonialism and governance regimes, the concept of hybrid states based on the Weberian model of the modern state, the influence of some cultural models of patrimonialism still considered as relevant context for contemporary PM and anti-corruption methods. Also, we present three theoretical constructs, that can serve to better understand how to gauge the progress of anti-corruption measures: the good governance model, the long-horizon rent-taking model, and the developmental state governance model. Finally, the special case of Rwanda is examined.

We finally advance some contributions this study brings for practicians and researchers, the limitations, and some suggestions for future research.

Finally, in Chapter 6 - Conclusion - We present our main findings about the phenomenon of corruption as being an important factor that hinders the possibilities for the development of sub-Saharan Africa. We recall the four theories used for the interpretation of our empirical corpus, after having used the grounded theory methodology for processing the analysis of the interviews. We then recall the work accomplished for the research and the writing of this thesis. We also sum up the conceptual and empirical contributions of our endeavour. We finally advance some implications for project management practice, taking note of the limitations of our study, but also of the possibilities for stimulating future research.

SYNTHÈSE EN FRANÇAIS

1. Introduction

Les résultats et la qualité des projets de développement international (PDI) restent très controversés, en particulier avec la perception de la corruption par diverses parties prenantes, notamment dans la région de l'Afrique subsaharienne. Il est difficile de trouver dans les recherches antérieures des preuves à l'appui d'une théorie ou d'un modèle valable expliquant la corruption et les acteurs impliqués.

La corruption étant un phénomène complexe et multidimensionnel, elle est rarement mentionnée dans la littérature sur le développement international. Nous proposons d'adopter un point de vue transdisciplinaire pour passer en revue et synthétiser la littérature sur les enjeux théoriques, méthodologiques et épistémiques de l'étude de la corruption en tant que construit. Nous demandons également dans quelle mesure les méthodes de gestion de projet peuvent être harmonisées avec des initiatives plus larges de lutte contre la corruption dans les pays donateurs et bénéficiaires de l'aide.

Pour Sohail et Cavill (2008, p. 730) , une définition générale de la corruption est l'abus de pouvoir à des fins personnelles à son instigation ou en réponse à des incitations. Les diverses formes de corruption comprennent les pots-de-vin (paiements effectués dans le but d'obtenir un avantage ou d'éviter un désavantage), la fraude (vol par fausse déclaration), le détournement de fonds (détournement de fonds d'entreprise ou publics) et les pots-de-vin (édulcorants ou récompenses pour des décisions favorables). Les autres types de corruption sont : le favoritisme, l'extorsion, le détournement de fonds (Nystrand, 2014, p. 819) .

Selon Winters (2014) , les formes courantes de corruption comprennent les pots-de-vin pour accomplir ou accélérer les fonctions officielles, la collusion avec des fournisseurs de biens ou de main-d'œuvre pour des pots-de-vin, la manipulation des paiements de salaires qui permettent à un fonctionnaire d'empocher la différence entre les salaires déclarés et versés, et l'inflation des dépenses de main-d'œuvre ou de biens qui permettent également à un fonctionnaire d'empocher la différence entre les montants déclarés et réels (Olken, 2006 in Winters, 2014, p. 396) . Parfois, les

codes moraux sont transgressés, parfois les codes juridiques sont enfreints ; et parfois les codes moraux sont transgressés mais pas les codes légaux (Jancsics, 2014, p. 359) .

Dans la perspective de la discipline de gestion de projet, en utilisant un design de recherche qualitatif et exploratoire, nous appréhenderons la complexité de ce problème en répondant à la question de recherche suivante :

QR : Comment la corruption dans les pays en développement, combinée à une mauvaise gouvernance, empêche-t-elle les projets de développement international (PDI) d'atteindre significativement leurs objectifs, notamment en Afrique subsaharienne ?

Notre revue de la littérature montre que la plupart des auteurs ont abordé ces questions de recherche du point de vue de « quoi, qui et pourquoi » la corruption se produit chez les PDI. Nous proposons de recentrer nos recherches sur des questions telles que « quoi, où et comment » pour étudier la corruption. Nous sommes soucieux d'aller au-delà des questions qui cherchent à identifier les rôles, les positions et les acteurs responsables des corruptions. Au lieu de cela, la présente étude cherche à identifier « quoi, où et comment » la corruption entrave la gestion des PDI. Cela nous amène à formuler trois questions de recherche qui constituent tout au long de cette thèse un cadre pour guider le développement de la théorie :

QR1 : Quelles formes de corruption se produisent dans les PDI, et quelles sont les principales formes de capture et leur impact à différents niveaux dans les PDI ?

QR2 : Où les facteurs contextuels exercent-ils certaines pressions sur les acteurs dans leur interaction avec les phénomènes de corruption chez les PDI ?

QR3 : Comment les acteurs interagissent-ils avec la corruption ou sont-ils affectés par celle-ci et quels sont leurs leviers dans un contexte de PM IDP ?

Pour aider à développer un modèle innovant, nous proposons une méthodologie de théorie ancrée basée sur trente (30) entretiens avec des experts internationaux du développement, équilibrant la

représentation des pays donateurs et bénéficiaires, ainsi que des chefs de projet des agences d'aide internationales bilatérales et multilatérales, et des ONG. (Bogner et al., 2009) . Les données sont analysées à l'aide d'un processus de tri qualitatif à l'aide du logiciel NVivo. Notre interprétation est basée sur quatre fondements théoriques pour relier les preuves au sein d'un modèle cohérent : la théorie des intérêts organisationnels, la théorie principal-agent, la théorie culturaliste et la théorie institutionnelle.

Pour ce faire, nous présenterons notre problématique et développerons la complexité des méthodes de lutte contre la corruption et de gestion de projet en développement international. Nous présenterons plus loin les quatre fondements théoriques qui nous ont aidés dans notre analyse, en gardant à l'esprit qu'ils n'ont jamais été utilisés lors de la collecte de données empiriques. Troisièmement, nous présentons notre méthodologie de recherche, expliquant comment nous avons suivi un processus purement exploratoire et émergent, basé sur une théorie ancrée. Quatrièmement, nous résumons notre analyse des données et comment les résultats nous ont permis d'interpréter les avis d'experts sur l'utilisation appropriée des méthodes de MP pour atténuer la corruption chez les personnes déplacées. Cinquièmement, sur la base des théories décrites, nous interpréterons nos résultats et formulerons un nouveau cadre conceptuel et une nouvelle théorie pour aider à intégrer les méthodes de lutte contre la corruption et de gestion de projet. Notre conclusion discute des limites de notre étude, du potentiel d'un nouveau programme de recherche et de la manière dont la PM peut aller au-delà de sa nature pratique et de son orientation technique, pour saisir de nombreuses opportunités pour prévenir l'impact de la corruption sur les acteurs du projet, même dans un contexte où la lutte contre la corruption les initiatives peuvent être perçues comme moins efficaces.

2. Littérature

Selon Ika et al. (2020a) , il y a eu peu de fertilisation croisée entre le développement international et la gestion de projet. Tous deux ont atteint leur maturité au milieu du XXe siècle et partagent le même souci d'organiser le travail et d'apporter le changement (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 548) . La forme de projet est répandue dans le développement international (DI), contribuant directement ou indirectement à la réduction durable et équitable de la pauvreté et vise également à améliorer le

niveau de vie des citoyens des pays à revenu faible et intermédiaire compris dans les pays du Sud (ibid., p. 548).

Compte tenu de leur nature particulière, les PDI sont considérés comme un type spécifique de projets, bien qu'ils soient rarement présentés dans la littérature grand public sur la gestion de projet (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469) , que ce soit dans les manuels (par exemple Shenhar & Dvir, 2007) , des résumés (par exemple Davies, 2017) ou des normes.

Selon Ika (2015) , nous ne savons toujours pas grand-chose, tant dans la littérature sur la gestion de projet que sur le développement international, sur la manière dont les projets de développement international sont menés, pourquoi ils échouent, comment ils pourraient mieux réussir et quel rôle jouent les processus de gestion de projet dans leur développement. livraison, sans parler de la manière dont les projets peuvent atteindre les délais, le budget, les objectifs spécifiques et les attentes des parties prenantes (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 470) .

Alors que de nombreuses études constatent que l'aide étrangère alimente la corruption (par exemple Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016 ; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004 ; Busse & Gröning, 2009) , d'autres constatent que l'aide réduit la corruption dans les pays bénéficiaires (par exemple Mohamed et al., 2015 ; Okada & Samreth, 2012 ; Tavares, 2003) . Pourtant, d'autres universitaires ne signalent aucun effet significatif de l'aide étrangère sur la corruption (par exemple Ear, 2007 ; Menard & Weill, 2016) .

D'autres universitaires se sont penchés sur les facteurs incitatifs affectant si les dépenses d'aide sont corrompues, identifiant l'incertitude (Kangoye, 2013) , la taille des apports (Dalgaard & Olsson, 2008) , la fragmentation ethnique et religieuse (Svensson, 2000a) comme facteurs pertinents. Pourtant, d'autres soutiennent que la prolifération des donateurs et de l'aide peut diluer l'agenda de la gouvernance, créant un espace pour un comportement de dépenses discrétionnaires avec les fonds des donateurs (Busse & Gröning, 2009 ; Knack & Rahman, 2007) .

D'autres chercheurs se sont concentrés sur la modalité de distribution de l'aide. Certains chercheurs se sont demandé si l'appui budgétaire général ou l'aide aux projets était plus efficace pour soutenir

le développement (Deaton, 2013 ; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008) . Pour d'autres, l'aide multilatérale est plus efficace pour lutter contre la corruption que l'aide bilatérale (ex. Charron, 2011) .

Il a également été avancé que les incitations à la corruption dépendent des horizons temporels des élites des pays bénéficiaires (Kelsall, 2013 ; Khan, 2010 ; Rock & Bonnett, 2004 ; Wright, 2008) . Les élites avec des horizons à long terme, comme les dirigeants autocratiques qui ne sont pas confrontés à des défis importants à leur autorité politique, ou les politiciens démocrates dans une arène électorale hautement prévisible - sont incités à restreindre les activités de corruption et préféreraient investir les ressources publiques dans la croissance économique, donc que certains d'entre eux peuvent piller plus après. À long terme, les élites à court terme sont incitées à voler le plus possible avant de quitter leurs fonctions.

Parmi les nombreux facteurs permettant d'atténuer la corruption chez les déplacés internes figure l'utilisation de méthodes de gestion des connaissances (GC) plus agiles et systématiques dans la PM. Par exemple, Marquette et Doig (2004) , étudiant les performances passées de l'Union européenne (UE) dans les projets de développement, soulignent l'importance méconnue, jusqu'à présent, des registres et de la tenue des registres dans les pays en développement pour lutter contre la corruption et promouvoir la participation. Lors de l'examen de nombreux rapports d'évaluation de projets d'aide, comme c'était leur mandat, ils ont été interloqués par l'absence de traces de justification des dépenses effectuées dans divers projets financés dans un passé récent par l'Union européenne. Ils ont été consternés de constater l'énorme manque de coordination entre les pays donateurs européens quant à une évaluation efficace des projets passés qu'ils ont financés. Ils ajoutent que cela ne peut être fait si la qualité, l'accessibilité et la convivialité des documents ne deviennent pas une réelle préoccupation. En conséquence, ils recommandent à l'Union européenne d'examiner l'importance des dossiers et de la tenue de dossiers à l'appui du processus d'évaluation et de développer un processus de financement mieux coordonné. Ils soulignent également qu'une approche comparative est nécessaire, afin de pouvoir maximiser l'identification et l'utilisation de l'expertise développée dans les différents pays composant l'UE. Ils espèrent que leurs recommandations aideront les pays donateurs à se doter désormais d'une meilleure mémoire institutionnelle pour faire le point sur les expériences passées. Cela entrave, entre autres, la nécessaire vision stratégique à élaborer sur l'aide au développement dans les pays bénéficiaires.

Comme l'ont souligné les études sur la corruption dans d'autres secteurs et activités économiques, l'étude de ce phénomène chez les personnes déplacées nécessitera sans aucun doute de surmonter certains problèmes épistémologiques. Parmi d'autres auteurs, Jancsics (2014) avance que bien que l'étude de la corruption soit devenue un sujet populaire dans les disciplines des sciences sociales, il y a un manque de communication interdisciplinaire entre ces disciplines académiques à ce sujet. Passant en revue les principales approches trouvées sur la corruption, il conclut que la plupart des études sur la corruption se répartissent en trois grandes catégories : (1) les modèles d'acteurs rationnels où la corruption est considérée en raison d'une analyse coûts / avantages des acteurs individuels ; (2) des modèles structurels qui se concentrent sur les forces externes qui déterminent la corruption, et (3) des modèles relationnels qui mettent l'accent sur les interactions sociales et les réseaux (horizontaux ou verticaux) d'acteurs corrompus.

Aussi, une intéressante vision anthropologique de la « corruption » est avancée par Torsello et Venard (2016) , qui considèrent que les études managériales de la corruption ont jusqu'à présent négligé de prendre en compte la vision anthropologique de la corruption. Les anthropologues considèrent que la corruption doit être analysée de manière holistique, comme imbriquée dans des contextes socioculturels. Pour les anthropologues, la corruption est perçue différemment par diverses cultures, qui se rapportent à des morales différentes. Ils considèrent également la corruption comme un phénomène processuel, lié aux transformations socioculturelles et économiques de la société. Ils critiquent également la vision moralisatrice de la corruption qui prévaut chez la plupart des chercheurs en management, basée sur une condamnation « universelle » de la corruption, ne considérant pas que la corruption est perçue de manière diverse et différente, selon les cultures et les époques. Les anthropologues insistent sur le fait que les chercheurs doivent d'abord partir du point de vue des acteurs sociaux, selon une approche émique, tels que les gens pensent et perçoivent le monde dans lequel ils vivent.

Torsello et Venard (2016) avancent que la corruption ne peut être définie de manière universaliste et anhistorique. Cela se voit dans la région de l'Afrique sub-saharienne, et ailleurs comme en Inde, où les considérations de moralité cachée des liens mutuels, de réciprocité, d'échanges de cadeaux, de confiance interpersonnelle importent. La corruption, selon ces chercheurs, est une réalité sociale

dynamique, nécessitant donc une contextualisation. Ils concluent que la notion de morale n'a pas d'acception universelle.

Nous proposons que le programme de recherche sur la corruption chez les déplacés internes adopte une approche exploratoire plus ouverte. Dans une perspective de GP, identifier « où et comment » de la corruption dans les projets de développement nécessitera de déterminer comment les acteurs construisent leurs capacités de gestion des connaissances et de relever les défis sociaux et culturels inhérents aux projets de développement internationaux. Plusieurs lacunes dans la littérature sur la corruption doivent être comblées. Certains aspects liés à ce phénomène ont été sous-étudiés. Une approche plus transdisciplinaire peut contribuer à enrichir notre compréhension des causes et des moyens d'atténuer la corruption. Davantage d'efforts de gestion des connaissances doivent être mobilisés. Des réflexions épistémologiques doivent être abordées, en recourant à davantage de théorisation sur les questions de corruption. D'une part, l'approche anthropologique a été trop longtemps délaissée par les chercheurs en gestion.

3. Méthodologie

Cette recherche qualitative est de nature exploratoire et vise à mieux comprendre où et comment la corruption se produit en tant que phénomène administratif socialement ancré, et à étudier comment les agences d'aide étrangères, avec leurs partenaires nationaux, mettent en œuvre des initiatives de lutte contre la corruption.

Selon Babbie (2013, p. 90) : « les études exploratoires sont menées dans un triple but : (1) satisfaire la curiosité et le désir de mieux comprendre du chercheur, (2) tester la faisabilité d'entreprendre une étude plus approfondie, (3) pour développer les méthodes à employer dans les études ultérieures ». Une approche exploratoire est la mieux adaptée à nos objectifs, cherchant à identifier les problèmes survenant lors de la mise en œuvre de projets de développement international, et ainsi trouver les meilleurs moyens d'améliorer l'efficacité et l'efficience de la gestion aux niveaux opérationnels inférieurs.

Compte tenu du contexte de notre étude, une méthodologie de théorie ancrée a été considérée comme la meilleure solution pour étudier le phénomène complexe de la corruption (Corbin &

Strauss, 2015 ; Creswell, 2013, pp. 83–90) . Dans cette approche, le chercheur ne commence pas la recherche avec une liste pré-identifiée de concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 15) . La théorie ou le modèle émerge à mesure que la recherche de preuves et la collecte de données évoluent, permettant de relier les preuves aux concepts et d'atteindre un niveau de saturation permettant d'expliquer les acteurs, leurs actions, leurs réseaux et leurs processus.

Nous cherchons à identifier les facteurs liés à la corruption qui impactent le succès des projets et programmes d'aide au développement, tels qu'ils sont perçus par les répondants. Ces facteurs peuvent être techniques, économiques, politiques, sociaux, culturels et comprennent entre autres :

- La transparence du projet (ou programme) connu des différents acteurs et parties prenantes,
- Implication des principales parties prenantes aux différentes étapes du projet (ou programme),
- Niveau de connaissances et d'éducation affectant l'efficacité du projet dans la prise de décision,
- La capacité des parties prenantes à comprendre la portée et les résultats du projet (ou du programme),
- Influence du contexte culturel et institutionnel sur la capacité des acteurs,
- Sensibilisation à la redevabilité et garant des bonnes pratiques de bonne gouvernance de projet,
- Maturité organisationnelle des parties prenantes, notamment en ce qui concerne les méthodes de gestion de projet.

Bien qu'il ne s'agisse en aucun cas d'une liste exhaustive et en gardant à l'esprit les principes de la théorie ancrée, la portée des concepts et des constructions n'était liée par aucune théorie ou modèle préconçu. Des catégories et des concepts ont été laissés à émerger tout au long du projet et ont été analysés ex-post selon les méthodes prescrites par la méthodologie.

Les entretiens, en français ou en anglais, ont duré environ 90 à 120 minutes chacun, et ont été enregistrés et retranscrits, puis analysés à l'aide du logiciel Nvivo (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 203-213) . Le logiciel, essentiel pour permettre une analyse croisée d'experts, a été exécuté pour

aider à identifier les points communs et les différences dans les problèmes de corruption et la manière dont ils ont été traités.

Les entretiens étaient semi-structurés avec des questions de base pour amorcer la discussion. Ils ont cherché à obtenir des expériences personnelles détaillées et à enrichir la compréhension conceptuelle des phénomènes de corruption et de la mise en œuvre des méthodes de PM :

- Dans quelle mesure considérez-vous qu'il y avait de la corruption dans les projets sur lesquels vous avez travaillé, et qu'aurait-il pu être fait pour empêcher cela ?
- Quels facteurs expliquent une telle situation : les individus et leurs objectifs personnels ; les relations interpersonnelles; l'environnement culturel (valeurs, normes sociales, etc.) ; ou un contexte marqué par des changements significatifs (politiques, économiques, idéologiques…) ?
- Quels facteurs peuvent atténuer les problèmes rencontrés : meilleur suivi et contrôle, règles et normes mises en place plus transparentes, intervention des autorités, et ensuite par quels moyens les autorités auraient-elles pu détecter ces problèmes ?

Les chercheurs ont prudemment pris en considération la sensibilité et la confidentialité des informations partagées (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60-84 ; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 501-507) . Compte tenu de la nature de la corruption en tant que phénomène socialement ancré, une attention a été accordée au contexte de travail, culturel, professionnel et idéologique entourant les acteurs interrogés. Les considérations éthiques ont été très importantes dans l'obtention du consentement des répondants, avec une bonne gestion des contacts, du maintien de la confidentialité et du traitement des contenus pour assurer la transparence et l'acceptabilité pour eux des données obtenues (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60-84 ; Creswell, 2013, pp. 152–153) . Cette recherche, bien que non financée, a été approuvée par le comité d'examen institutionnel de l'université. De plus, bien qu'inhabituel dans le rapport des différentes déclarations des répondants, il était nécessaire d'identifier les origines et l'occupation professionnelle, car la culture et les rôles des acteurs sont apparus comme des facteurs clés dans le modèle proposé. Cette pratique était néanmoins conforme au certificat d'éthique accordé aux chercheurs, car elle ne permettait aucunement d'identifier les répondants ni leur milieu.

Les données obtenues ont été traitées selon les méthodes de l'état de l'art préconisées dans la littérature, à l'aide du logiciel NVivo. Le codage des données obtenues a conduit à identifier et développer les principaux concepts identifiés comme signifiants pour les répondants (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 220-267) , en tenant également compte du contexte (ibid., pp. 268-282), tout en intégrant les catégories concernées (ibid., pp. 295-310). Le codage a également pris en compte les méthodes recommandées par Miles et Huberman (2003) , comme écrire des codes, des mémos, noter des modèles et des thèmes, compter la fréquence des codes, noter les relations entre les variables.

Comme nous nous sommes appuyés sur une approche théorique fondée, nous n'avions pas de facteurs précodés, mais nous nous sommes plutôt appuyés sur les répondants, ainsi que sur leur interprétation, de ce qu'ils qualifiaient de problèmes de corruption et d'initiatives anti-corruption. Pour faciliter notre processus de construction de la théorie, nous codons plusieurs des déclarations de nos répondants en utilisant les acronymes des quatre théories décrites précédemment : OIT pour la théorie des intérêts organisationnels ; PAT pour Théorie Principal-Agent ; CT pour théorie culturaliste et informatique pour théorie institutionnelle.

L'étude des déplacés internes et de la corruption nécessite, au moment de l'analyse des données, un ensemble de fondements théoriques permettant d'intégrer tous les concepts nécessaires au sein d'un modèle cohérent. Ils doivent refléter la complexité de l'aide au développement et de la corruption en tant que phénomènes en constante évolution et nécessitant des méthodes de PM innovantes pour contrôler les risques. Ces théories doivent tenir compte des différents risques, soit internes aux projets et à la gestion de projet, soit dus au contexte externe du projet, qui peuvent créer plus de possibilités (et de probabilités) que les projets d'aide puissent et soient soumis à des actes de corruption. Dans ces cas, il y a plus d'opportunités pour la "capture de projet". D'autre part, diverses mesures de sauvegarde peuvent conduire en probabilité à de meilleurs résultats quant à l'efficience et l'efficacité des projets (ou programmes) concernés. Pour aider à analyser les preuves recueillies et à formuler une théorie ou un modèle fondé, nous nous appuyons sur quatre théories intégrant les sciences sociales et administratives.

4. Résultats

Nous présentons dans ce chapitre, dans la figure 2, un modèle théorique original qui illustre quels acteurs, événements et contextes sont liés et liés dans les efforts dynamiques pour comprendre et combattre la corruption dans les efforts de développement international. Ces éléments sont liés soit au cycle de l'aide étrangère, aux opportunités de capture, aux pressions contextuelles, aux dommages personnels subis et aux mécanismes de contrôle exercés. Le modèle peut servir à interpréter divers problèmes interdépendants soulevés par nos répondants, tels que les problèmes de politique, les problèmes de gouvernance, les institutions impliquées, l'aide fournie, les actes de corruption rencontrés, le comportement des acteurs commerciaux, les problèmes de gestion, la population ciblée par l'aide internationale et l'environnement. Culture.

Pour aider notre analyse, nous présentons quatre-vingt-seize (96) extraits d'entretiens réalisés avec les trente experts internationaux rencontrés. Puis ces extraits sont reliés à quatre théories pertinentes, choisies épistémologiquement par suite de l'analyse de données empiriques : la Théorie des Intérêts Organisationnels (TIO), la Théorie Principal-Agent (PAT), la Théorie Culturaliste (CT) et la Théorie Institutionnelle (TI).

Nous avons également catégorisé les extraits, en les classant à l'aide de divers thèmes, tels que saisir les opportunités, la gouvernance, les institutions, la culture, les entreprises, les mécanismes de contrôle et une section « quoi, où et comment », concernant les écosystèmes sociopolitiques liés à la corruption, l'influence du néolibéralisme et les questions d'aide internationale et de gestion de projet.

L'intégration des résultats de la recherche, autour des éléments du modèle, conduit à articuler un ensemble de 12 sous-questions liées aux trois questions de recherche introduites dans le chapitre 1, à savoir le « quoi, où et comment » de la corruption chez les personnes déplacées. Les données probantes présentées au chapitre 4 ne couvrent pas la sous-question 12 puisqu'elle aborde la perspective de la population et dépasserait la portée de la présente étude, qui se concentre sur les pratiques de gestion. Cette sous-question mériterait également une autre thèse avec une analyse plus anthropologique et sociologique.

Ce modèle nous permet d'ouvrir une nouvelle fenêtre sur les manières et méthodes anthropologiques d'étudier la corruption dans différentes sociétés, ce qui correspond à une manière ontologique différente d'appréhender la corruption.

Torsello et Venard (2016) considèrent que la corruption doit être vue et étudiée de manière holistique Pour eux, la morale est une construction sociale, basée sur des processus sociaux d'interaction. Ils proposent des méthodes ethnographiques d'investigation. Ce qu'on appelle la « corruption » change selon les époques (ibid., p. 7). Les études de recherche doivent partir d'une position *éthique,* pour comprendre les réalités du point de vue du répondant (ibid., p. 8). L'anthropologie rejette le dualisme moral de la corruption tel qu'il est perçu par les spécialistes de la gestion, adoptant ainsi une vision moraliste et ethnocentrique du phénomène (ibid., p. 11). Dans diverses sociétés, elle engendre des liens de réciprocité. La morale est donc considérée selon des mœurs sociales historiquement situées (ibid., p. 13), considérées comme socialement acceptables par la plupart. Ainsi, ce qui est considéré comme moral peut diverger d'une société à l'autre, et à travers diverses époques.

La définition de ce qui est considéré comme des pratiques corrompues ou acceptables dans la société humaine, à notre époque, est liée à une succession de diverses pratiques de transformation économique, politique et institutionnelle des sociétés humaines (ibid., p. 16). Dans les réseaux commerciaux chinois, le *guanxi* (Smart & Hsu, 2008) est considéré comme une façon acceptable de faire des affaires (ibid., p. 19). Ou le *don (cadeau)* , selon Marcel Mauss (2011) , est une manière civilisée d'échanger des cadeaux, femmes, et est une base acceptée pour la réciprocité et les échanges de cadeaux dans certaines sociétés antérieures des mers du Sud (Malinowski, 2014) . Dès lors, les anthropologues nous avertissent du risque de considérer trop vite certaines pratiques comme inacceptables.

L'anthropologie est donc favorable à l'adoption d'une approche holistique, comptant sur des descriptions épaisses et l'importance d'une collecte détaillée d'informations. Les valeurs morales dépendent de la culture (ibid., p. 32). De plus, comme c'est le cas dans les sociétés d'Afrique subsaharienne, les individus sont confrontés à des morales conflictuelles, en particulier dans les périodes de transformations économiques et politiques rapides (ibid., p. 32).

Les nouvelles sous-questions proposées sont structurées comme suit pour chacune des trois questions de recherche (quoi, où et comment). Chacun est lié à des attributs spécifiques des composants de la Figure 2 (cases et flèches). Le « quoi » fait référence aux différents types de corruption et aux opportunités de saisir les IDP (boîte verte). Le « où » fait référence aux quatre facteurs contextuels (cases orange). Le « comment » fait référence aux quatre acteurs (boîtes bleues), comment leurs actions tout au long du cycle de vie du PDI sont entravées par la corruption et comment ils peuvent y échapper.

- **Quoi :** Les sous-questions font référence aux principales formes de corruption et saisissent les opportunités dans les PDI (la case verte identifie les liens avec les acteurs, le long des lignes noires liées au cycle de vie des PDI).
- **Où :** les sous-questions font référence aux liens entre les facteurs autour du modèle tout au long du cycle de vie du PDI (les lignes bleues indiquent comment le contexte exerce une pression sur les acteurs, les lignes noires représentent le cycle de vie du PDI).
- **Comment :** les sous-questions couvrent principalement les liens entre les acteurs et la corruption elle-même (les lignes rouges, jaunes et vertes identifient les opportunités de capture, les dommages et les efforts de contrôle).

Par rapport aux quatre théories sociales avancées dans cette thèse, neuf (9) extraits pourraient être liés à la théorie culturaliste (CT), comme pour la question Quoi (concernant les types de captation). Dix-neuf (19) extraits ont pu être liés à la théorie culturaliste (CT) quant à la question Où (sur les facteurs conditionnant la corruption) et deux (2) extraits pourrait être lié à la théorie culturaliste (CT) quant à la question Comment (les acteurs impliqués dans les instances corrompues).

Trente et un (31) extraits pourront être liés à la théorie institutionnelle (TI), pour la question « Quoi », trente-deux (32) extraits pourront être liés à la théorie institutionnelle (TI) comme pour la question « Où », et vingt-deux (22) extraits pourrait être lié à la théorie institutionnelle (TI) quant à la question « comment ».

Dix-sept (17) extraits ont pu être liés à la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT), pour la question « Quoi », sept (7) extraits ont pu être liés à la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT)

comme pour la question « Où », et dix-huit (18) extraits pourrait être lié à la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT) quant à la question « comment ».

Vingt et un (21) extraits pourraient être liés à la théorie Principal-Agent (PAT), pour la question « Quoi », six (6) extraits pourraient être liés à la théorie Principal-Agent (PAT) quant à la question « Où », et vingt et un (21) extraits pourrait être lié à la Théorie Principal-Agent (PAT) quant à la question « Comment ».

5. Débat

Parmi les apports théoriques, nous avons fait le lien entre la gestion de projet et quatre théories susceptibles de faciliter analytiquement une meilleure compréhension de ce processus social qui entend contribuer à changer les sociétés humaines et à mieux organiser le travail.

De nombreuses dimensions jouent un rôle dans les diverses manières dont l'aide internationale et la gestion de projet contribuent (ou pas assez) au développement des pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Nous avons donc développé un modèle pour synthétiser ces dimensions, pour aider le lecteur à mieux les appréhender d'un seul coup d'œil.

Sur le plan épistémologique, nous nous sommes appuyés sur quatre cadres théoriques pour nous aider à interpréter les données et formuler un modèle cohérent. Leur but et leurs interrelations visent à assurer la pertinence pour la pratique des experts en gestion de projet. Par conséquent, ces quatre théories sont davantage des outils d'interprétation que des théories explicatives : la théorie institutionnelle (IT), la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT), la théorie principal-agent (PAT) et la théorie culturaliste (CT). C'est notre modeste contribution pour répondre à la demande actuelle de nombreux universitaires (dans le développement de projets et l'aide internationale) d'ouvrir des liens de collaboration avec des chercheurs en sciences sociales.

La théorie institutionnelle (TI) est essentielle pour considérer les aspects multidimensionnels d'une société spécifique - ses institutions (telles que l'éducation, la santé, les systèmes judiciaires, entre autres), les valeurs partagées, les normes, les croyances et les parties prenantes, aux niveaux moyen et large de la société humaine. C'est donc un outil utile pour aborder le phénomène de la corruption.

La corruption est un facteur important qui dégrade les perspectives de développement de nombreuses sociétés contemporaines, mettant en danger des millions de personnes et les condamnant à vivre dans des conditions terribles de pauvreté et de désespoir. Pour qui suit l'actualité, on peut considérer que de nombreux pays croulent aujourd'hui sous le joug de la corruption. Sous des régimes corrompus, de nombreuses personnes sont emprisonnées, maltraitées ou pire.

Il serait même possible pour les chercheurs intéressés d'étudier la corruption en tant qu'institution, avec ses suspects habituels (hommes politiques, copains, hommes d'affaires), ses normes, ses valeurs et ses réseaux.

La théorie des intérêts organisationnels (TIO), quant à elle, considère les humains comme des acteurs rationnels qui ont des stratégies, entrent dans des relations de pouvoir et des coalitions et s'efforcent d'atteindre leurs objectifs, dans des circonstances spécifiques et contraignantes. Une telle approche recourt à une lecture socio-politique des situations organisationnelles rencontrées. Par exemple, nous avons constaté que le néo-patrimonialisme est une manière intéressante et pertinente de mieux comprendre la gouvernance dans les pays d'ASS. L'OIT est une théorie intéressante pour un chercheur qui voudrait comprendre les luttes entre les différentes factions qui s'efforcent de gagner plus de pouvoir aux dépens de leurs rivaux. Cette théorie pourrait renforcer l'acuité d'analyse de tels objets d'étude en matière de gouvernance et de corruption.

La théorie du principal-agent (PAT) peut aider à analyser les efforts des agences et des acteurs de développement dans leurs relations avec leurs gouvernements et leurs citoyens, ainsi que les acteurs des pays bénéficiaires de l'aide. Le PAT peut également jouer un rôle déterminant dans la recherche de diverses situations de capture de projet et de capture de l'État, dans lesquelles certains acteurs réussissent à rompre des contrats qui contraignent formellement leurs supposées manières de gérer l'argent fourni par les donateurs et les institutions internationales de développement. Une telle théorie est utile pour étudier les coûts d'agence liés à la surveillance et au contrôle des sommes dépensées dans l'aide internationale.

La théorie culturaliste (TC) peut être utile dans des domaines d'étude tels que les façons historiques dont les citoyens considèrent et font principalement confiance à leurs gouvernements. Certains auteurs consultés ont noté le manque de confiance des citoyens africains envers leur État national et leurs politiciens, qui n'est pour eux que la continuation des puissances coloniales qui ont exploité leur travail et leurs possessions à une époque antérieure. Le TC est également une bonne approche pour étudier le néo-patrimonialisme, en tant que successeur historique de la manière patrimoniale de gouverner, qui était une coutume respectée pour de nombreux Africains.

L'Afrique subsaharienne est aujourd'hui influencée de multiples façons par le reste du monde, à travers les médias, les émigrants vivant à l'étranger, les contacts avec les étrangers, les investissements étrangers directs, etc. La tomodensitométrie est un moyen privilégié pour étudier ces influences.

Nous considérons que la gestion des projets et programmes, au-delà de leur caractère pratique et de leur orientation technique, offre de nombreuses opportunités pour prévenir l'impact de la corruption sur les acteurs du projet. D'un autre côté, cependant, nous avons noté que la gestion de projet dans les pays d'ASS est souvent supplantée par la dimension sociopolitique, avec son système de gouvernance néo-patrimonialiste structuré et ses quasi-États hybrides, qui manquent pour remplir de nombreuses fonctions qui vont avec l'exercice du pouvoir selon le modèle wébérien rationnel-juridique.

Il nous semble que davantage d'études sur le système de gouvernance néo-patrimonialiste seront utiles, pour mieux saisir le fonctionnement de la corruption comme mode de gouvernance structuré, pour appréhender les ressources à des fins de rente. Un tel système nous apparaît fondamentalement préjudiciable à l'efficacité de la lutte contre la pauvreté et à l'atteinte des objectifs des Objectifs de Développement Durable de l'ONU (2015-2030). Il nous semble que la corruption reste un concept trop abstrait en soi, si l'on veut organiser la lutte contre elle.

Sinon, il nous semble que la corruption s'associera à d'autres menaces profondes pour notre planète, telles que le changement climatique, le manque d'emplois et de planification familiale dans les pays en développement, les pandémies, l'extinction des espèces, l'augmentation de la

désertification des terres dans de nombreuses régions. , raréfaction du poisson dans les océans, terrorisme islamiste, crime organisé et autres fléaux contemporains auxquels nous sommes confrontés.

Une de nos conclusions est d'être d'accord avec certains auteurs sur l'importance fondamentale de la bonne gouvernance dans ces pays, pour pouvoir avancer la perspective d'un agenda réaliste pour le développement. En effet, la bonne gouvernance est importante.

6. Conclusion

Cette recherche qualitative est de nature exploratoire et vise à sensibiliser les chercheurs et les praticiens aux réalités et aux conséquences du phénomène de la corruption sous ses diverses formes, dans le domaine des projets et programmes de développement international.

Dans le chapitre 3, nous avons expliqué quatre théories qui nous ont aidés à mieux comprendre les causes et l'impact de la corruption : la théorie principal-agent (PAT), la théorie des intérêts organisationnels (OIT), la théorie institutionnelle (TI) et la théorie culturaliste (TC). Dans le chapitre 4, nous avons présenté quatre-vingt-seize (96) extraits des entretiens réalisés avec nos répondants et lié certaines de nos théories aux extraits présentés.

Parmi les limites de cette recherche, il convient d'abord d'inclure le petit nombre de répondants, qui a néanmoins créé une variance et une représentativité suffisantes de l'ensemble de la chaîne de valeur de l'aide au développement. Les recherches futures pourraient également approfondir les entretiens dans des domaines institutionnels étroitement liés, tels que l'appui aux programmes sectoriels (par exemple, la santé et l'aide humanitaire, l'appui budgétaire direct, l'assistance technique, etc.). Il est également nécessaire d'explorer des théories plus complexes qui peuvent être appliquées directement pour aligner la gestion de la lutte contre la corruption et de l'aide au développement dans les projets et programmes, axés sur des acteurs clés spécifiques.

Il existe de nombreux types de corruption, petite, de type ordinaire, et grande, au niveau des hauts fonctionnaires et des décideurs. Ce phénomène prévaut dans de nombreux secteurs d'activité et dans de nombreuses régions du monde mais n'est presque pas pris en compte tant dans le domaine

de la gestion de projets et de programmes de recherche que dans celui de la recherche en développement international.

L'Afrique subsaharienne (ASS) est la région du monde la plus touchée par la corruption. La corruption est un concept multidimensionnel, souvent caché aux yeux des observateurs, qui prend divers noms et est difficile à combattre. Les citoyens ordinaires en entendent parler, ils le déplorent. Mais la plupart du temps, ils ne savent pas quoi faire et passent alors à d'autres préoccupations.

La prévalence des régimes de recherche de rente dans la plupart des pays d'Afrique subsaharienne érode la confiance et la foi des citoyens dans l'intégrité démocratique de leurs gouvernements et dans l'efficacité et l'efficacité de leurs institutions. Il diminue les investissements à allouer à l'éducation, à la santé, aux infrastructures. C'est un facteur négatif en termes économiques, moraux et démocratiques.

Dans la région ASS, le néo-patrimonialisme (NP) est le principal conduit permettant à la corruption de s'emparer de la gouvernance des pays. La corruption réussit à étrangler les perspectives de développement économique de la plupart des citoyens, ne profitant qu'à une minorité située dans l'élite du régime, enrichissant les copains, et étant sauvegardée par l'état-major militaire, qui en profite également.

Si le néo-patrimonialisme (NP) en Afrique sub-saharienne persiste et n'est pas combattu avec fermeté, les perspectives d'essor de la démocratie, de véritable développement économique pour tous et de réduction substantielle de la pauvreté sont minces.

Certains auteurs tels que Booth (2012) et Booth et Golooba-Mutebi (2012) considèrent que la NP est le « modèle modal » en place dans la plupart des pays d'ASS. Les racines de NP sont variées : historiques, culturelles, politiques et autres. Il est important de noter que la NP a été critiquée comme n'étant pas étayée empiriquement par des études macroéconomiques, et donc inefficace pour prédire les causes et les effets de la corruption (Mkandawire, 2015) . Cependant, le cadre conceptuel fourni par NP est principalement d'articuler les théories utilisées dans cette thèse comme des outils d'analyse, et non comme un instrument de mesure.

Du point de vue de la pratique, dans les conclusions d'un récent rapport de la Banque mondiale (2020, pp. 342-343) , les points suivants ont été avancés pour lutter contre la corruption :

- La nécessité d'un leadership politique fort pour mener les réformes et résister à l'opposition des groupes d'intérêts.
- Assurer la mise en place d'institutions solides pour fournir des freins et contrepoids et favoriser la responsabilisation.
- La transparence, pour favoriser une plus grande conformité et améliorer le comportement humain.
- Politiques gouvernementales ouvertes et accès à l'information comme leviers pour rendre les pratiques de corruption plus difficiles à dissimuler.
- Créer des incitations à changer les normes sociales et se concentrer davantage sur les micro-niveaux de la corruption et ses manifestations dans des secteurs spécifiques de la société.
- L'utilisation de la technologie pour minimiser les manipulations humaines corrompues afin d'assurer la responsabilité.
- Favoriser une meilleure collaboration entre les acteurs, nationaux et internationaux, dans la lutte contre la corruption.

La lutte contre la corruption n'est pas une entreprise facile, comme en témoignent les résistances des différents régimes des pays d'Afrique subsaharienne à changer leurs modes de gouvernance, comme l'illustrent les différents efforts de lutte contre la corruption de la Banque mondiale (2020) et la Convention de l'Organisation des Nations Unies contre la corruption. Programme anti-corruption (UNCAC) (Senu, 2020) . En outre, les faibles efforts des pays donateurs pour mieux reconnaître la prévalence de la corruption dans les pays bénéficiaires de l'aide, en raison de diverses considérations diplomatiques, commerciales et géopolitiques, n'aident pas.

Quant à la littérature sur la gestion de projet et l'aide internationale, nous considérons que davantage d'efforts devraient être déployés, en recherche, pour mieux théoriser le phénomène de la corruption, qui est complexe et multidimensionnel. Aussi, nous suggérons que davantage de liens de collaboration s'établissent entre les chercheurs en gestion de projet et en sciences sociales.

Il est également nécessaire d'explorer des théories plus complexes qui peuvent être appliquées directement pour aligner la gestion de la lutte contre la corruption et de l'aide au développement dans les projets et programmes, axés sur des acteurs clés spécifiques.

Il n'est pas facile en théorie d'étudier la corruption dans les projets d'aide. C'est difficile en raison de la grande diversité des acteurs présents dans les chaînes de valeur du projet. La présente recherche confirme la difficulté de restreindre la recherche de preuves pour soutenir toute théorie ou modèle valable pouvant expliquer la corruption et ses acteurs. C'est pourquoi l'application de diverses théories sociales à la gestion de projet contestée par des pratiques de corruption sera très appréciée pour l'agenda de recherche dans les années à venir.

Enfin, à propos de la corruption, plusieurs tabous persistent quant à savoir s'il convient ou non de poser la question, et si toute réponse de qui que ce soit serait entachée de préjugés, rendant toute conclusion peu fiable. L'approche et le modèle proposés servent principalement à surmonter ces tabous et préjugés dans l'étude de la corruption, car la "cartographie" des acteurs et de leurs interactions aide à se recentrer du "quoi, qui et pourquoi" sur les événements de corruption (ex-post), pour se demander plutôt où et comment cela se produit et aider à comprendre les méthodes pour atténuer ses effets sur les projets (ex ante).

SYNTHESIS IN ENGLISH

1. Introduction

The outcomes and quality of international development projects (IDPs) remain highly controversial, specially with the perception of corruption by various stakeholders, in the sub-Saharan African region notably. It is hard to find in previous research evidence to support any valid theory or model explaining corruption and the actors involved.

Since corruption is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, it is rarely mentioned in the international development literature. We propose to take a transdisciplinary viewpoint to review and synthesize the literature on the theoretical, methodological, and epistemic issues in the study of corruption as a construct. We also ask to what extent project management methods can be harmonized with broader anti-corruption initiatives in both aid donor and receiving countries.

For Sohail and Cavill (2008, p. 730), a general definition of corruption is the misuse of power for private gain at one's instigation or in response to inducements. Various forms of corruption include bribes (payments made in order to gain an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage), fraud (theft through misrepresentation), embezzlement (misappropriation of corporate or public funds), and kickbacks (sweeteners or rewards for favourable decisions). Other types of corruption are: favouritism, extorsion, diversion of funds (Nystrand, 2014, p. 819).

According to Winters (2014), common forms of corruption include bribe-taking either to accomplish or expedite official duties, collusion with goods- or labour-suppliers for kickback payments, the manipulation of wage payments that allow an official to pocket the difference between reported and paid wages, and the inflation of labour or goods expenditures that likewise allow an official to pocket the difference between reported and actual amounts (Olken, 2006 in Winters, 2014, p. 396). Sometimes, moral codes are transgressed, sometimes legal codes are broken; and sometimes moral codes are transgressed but not legal codes (Jancsics, 2014, p. 359).

Within the perspective of the Project Management discipline, using a qualitative and exploratory research design, we will apprise the complexity of this problem by answering the following research question:

RQ: How does corruption in developing countries, combined with poor governance, prevent international development projects (IDPs) from significantly achieving their objectives, notably in sub-Saharan Africa?

Our literature review shows that most authors have addressed this research questions from the viewpoint of "what, who, and why" corruption occurs in IDPs. We propose to refocus our research on such questions as "what, where, and how" for studying corruption. We are concerned with going beyond questions that seek to identify roles, positions, and actors responsible for corruptions. Instead, the present study seeks to identify "what, where, and how" corruption impedes IDP management. This leads us to formulate three research questions that constitute throughout this thesis a framework to guide theory development:

RQ1: What forms of corruption in IDP happen, and what are the main forms of capture and their impact at various levels in IDPs?

RQ2: Where do contextual factors exert certain pressures on actors in their interaction with the phenomena of corruption in IDPs?

RQ3: How do actors interact with, or get affected by, corruption and what are their levers in an IDP PM context?

To help develop an innovative model, we propose a grounded theory methodology based on thirty (30) interviews with international development experts, balancing representation from donor and receiving countries, as well as project managers from the bilateral and multilateral international aid agencies, and from NGOs (Bogner et al., 2009). Data is analyzed using a qualitative sorting process using the software NVivo. Our interpretation is based on four theoretical foundations to connect evidence within a coherent model: Organizational Interests Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, Culturalist Theory, and Institutional Theory.

To do so, we will present our problem statement and elaborate on the complexity of anti-corruption and project management methods in international development. We will later outline the four

theoretical foundations that helped us in our analysis, keeping in mind that these were never used during empirical data collection. Third, we present our research methodology, explaining how we have followed a purely exploratory and emerging process, based on grounded theory. Fourth, we summarize our data analysis and how the findings allowed us to interpret expert opinions about the proper use of PM methods in mitigating corruption in IDPs. Fifth, based on the theories outlined, we will interpret our results and formulate a new conceptual framework and theory to help integrate anti-corruption and project management methods. Our conclusion discusses the limitations of our study, the potential for a new research agenda, and how PM can reach beyond its practical nature and technical focus, to seize numerous opportunities to prevent corruption impact on project actors, even in a context where anti-corruption initiatives may be perceived as less effective.

2. Literature

According to Ika et al. (2020a), there has been little cross-fertilization between international development and project management. Both have come of age in the middle of the twentieth century, and they share a common concern for organizing work and delivering change (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 548). The project form is prevalent in international development (ID), contributing directly or indirectly to achieve sustainable and equitable poverty reduction and it also aims to improve the living standards of citizens in low- and low-middle-income countries comprised in the Global South (ibid., p. 548).

Considering their distinctive nature, IDPs qualify as a specific type of projects, though they are seldom featured in the mainstream project management literature (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469), whether in textbooks (e.g. Shenhar & Dvir, 2007), summaries (e.g. Davies, 2017), or standards. According to Ika (2015) we still do not know much, in both project management and international development literature, about how international development projects are carried out, why they fail, how they could succeed better, and what role project management processes play in their delivery, not to mention how projects can reach time, budget, specific objectives and stakeholders' expectations targets (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 470).

While numerous studies find that foreign aid fuels corruption (e.g. Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Busse & Gröning, 2009), others find that aid reduces corruption in recipient countries (e.g. Mohamed et al., 2015; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Tavares, 2003). Still, other academics report no significant effect of foreign aid on corruption (e.g. Ear, 2007; Menard & Weill, 2016).

Other academics delved into the incentive factors affecting whether aid spending is corrupted, pinpointing uncertainty (Kangoye, 2013), the size of inflows (Dalgaard & Olsson, 2008), ethnic and religious fragmentation (Svensson, 2000a) as relevant factors. Still, others argue that both donor and aid proliferation can dilute the governance agenda, creating space for discretionary spending behaviour with donor funds (Busse & Gröning, 2009; Knack & Rahman, 2007).

Other researchers have focused on the modality of aid distribution. Some scholars have debated whether general budget support or project aid is more effective for supporting development (Deaton, 2013; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). For others, multilateral aid is more effective in curbing corruption than bilateral aid (e.g. Charron, 2011).

It has also been argued that incentives for corrupt behaviour depend on recipient countries' elites' time horizons (Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Rock & Bonnett, 2004; Wright, 2008). Elites with long-time horizons, as for autocratic rulers who do not face significant challenges to their political authority, or democratic politicians in a highly predictable electoral arena – face incentives to restrain corrupt activities, and would rather invest public resources towards economic growth, so that some of them can loot more after. In the long run, elites with short-time horizons face incentives to steal as much as possible before leaving office.

Among the many factors to mitigate corruption in IDPs is the use of more agile and systematic Knowledge Management (KM) methods in PM. For example, Marquette and Doig (2004), studying the past performance of the European Union (EU) in development projects, stress the unrecognized importance, until now, of records and record keeping in developing countries for combating corruption and promoting participation. When they went through the examination of many evaluation reports of aid projects, as was their mandate, they were taken aback by the

absence of traces of justification for expenses made in various projects funded in the recent past by the European Union. They were aghast to realize the huge lack of coordination among the European donor countries as for an effective evaluation of past projects they funded. They add that this cannot be done if the quality, accessibility, and usability of records does not become a real concern. Accordingly, they recommend to the European Union to consider the importance of records and record keeping supporting the evaluation process and develop a better coordinated funding process. They also stress that a comparative approach is needed, to be able to maximize the identification and use of the expertise developed in the various countries comprised in the EU. They hope that their recommendations will help donor countries to build from now on a better institutional memory to take stock of past experiences. This impedes, among other things, the necessary strategic overview to devise about development aid in the recipient countries.

As was outlined by studies of corruption in other economic sectors and activities, studying this phenomenon in IDPs will undoubtedly require overcoming some epistemological issues. Among other authors, Jancsics (2014) advances that although the study of corruption has become a popular topic in social scientific disciplines, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication between these academic disciplines about it. Reviewing the major approaches found about corruption, he concludes that most studies of corruptions fall into three major categories: (1) the rational-actor models where corruption is viewed because of a cost / benefit analysis of individual actors; (2) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption, and (3) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks (horizontal or vertical) of corrupt actors.

Also, an interesting anthropological view of "corruption" is advanced by Torsello and Venard (2016), who consider that management studies of corruption have until now neglected to take into account the anthropological view of corruption. Anthropologists consider that corruption should be analyzed in a holistic way, as enmeshed in socio-cultural contexts. For anthropologists, corruption is viewed differently by various cultures, which relate to differing moralities. They also view corruption as a processual phenomenon, linked to the socio-cultural and economic transformations of society. They also criticize the prevalent moralistic view of corruption taken by most management researchers, based on a 'universal' condemnation of corruption, not considering that corruption is viewed in various and different manners, according to cultures and epochs.

Anthropologists insist that researchers must first start from the social actors' point of view, according to an emic approach, as people think and perceive the world in which they live.

Torsello and Venard (2016) advance that corruption cannot be defined in a universalistic, ahistorical manner. That can be seen in the sub-Saharan African region, and elsewhere as in India, where considerations of hidden morality of mutual ties, of reciprocity, gift exchanges, interpersonal trust matter. Corruption, according to these researchers, is a dynamic social reality, therefore requiring contextualization. They conclude that the notion of morality has no universal acceptation.

We propose that the research agenda on corruption in IDPs adopts a more open-ended, exploratory approach. Within a PM perspective, pinpointing the "where and how" of corruption in development projects will require addressing how actors build their knowledge management capabilities, and address the social and cultural challenges inherent to international development projects. Several gaps in the literature on corruption need to be addressed. Some aspects in relation to that phenomenon have been under-researched. A more transdisciplinary approach can help to enrich our understanding of the causes and means to mitigate corruption. More knowledge management efforts need to be mobilized. Epistemological reflections need to be addressed, by resorting to more theorization about corruption issues. On one hand, the anthropological approach has been neglected too long by management researchers.

3. Methodology

This qualitative research is of an exploratory nature and seeks to better understand where and how corruption occurs as a socially embedded administrative phenomenon, and to study how foreign aid agencies, along with their national partners, implement anti-corruption initiatives.

According to Babbie (2013, p. 90): "exploratory studies are done for three purposes: (1) to satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, (3) to develop the methods to be employed in subsequent studies". An exploratory approach is best fit to our objectives, seeking to identify the problems

occurring during the implementation of international development projects, and thus find the best ways to improve management effectiveness and efficiency at lower operational levels.

Given the context of our study, a grounded theory methodology was considered as a best fit to study the complex phenomenon of corruption (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Creswell, 2013, pp. 83–90). In this approach, the researcher does not begin the research with a pre-identified list of concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 15). The theory or model emerges as evidence finding and gathering data evolves, allowing to link evidence to concepts, and reach a saturation level allowing to explain actors, their actions, and networks and processes.

We aim to identify the factors linked to corruption that impact on development aid projects and programs' success, as perceived by the respondents. These factors may be technical, economical, political, social, cultural, and include among others:

- transparency of the project (or program) known by the various actors and stakeholders,
- involvement of the main stakeholders at the various stages of the project (or program),
- level of knowledge and education affecting project efficacy in decision-making,
- capacity by stakeholders to understand the scope and results of the project (or program),
- influence of the cultural and institutional context on the capacity of the stakeholders,
- awareness of accountability and ensuring good practices of good project governance,
- organizational maturity of stakeholder, especially as for project management methods.

While in no way an exhaustive list, and keeping in mind the principles of grounded theory, the scope of concepts and constructs was not bound by any preconceived theory or model. Categories and concepts were left to emerge throughout the project and were analyzed ex-post using the methods prescribed by the methodology.

The interviews, either in French or English, lasted about 90-120 minutes each, and were recorded and transcribed, later analyzed using the software Nvivo (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 203–213). The software, instrumental in enabling cross-expert analysis, was performed to help identify commonalities and differences in corruption issues and how they were handled.

The interviews were semi-structured with basic questions to initiate discussion. They sought to elicit detailed personal experiences, and enrich conceptual understanding of the phenomena of corruption and PM methods implementation:

- To what extent do you consider there was corruption in the projects you worked in, and what could possibly have been done to prevent this?
- What factors explain such a situation: individuals and their personal objectives; interpersonal relationships; the cultural environment (values, social norms, etc.); or a context marked by significant change (political, economic, ideological …)?
- Which factors can mitigate the problems encountered: better monitoring and control, more transparent rules and norms implemented, intervention by authorities, and then by what means could authorities have detected these problems?

Researchers cautiously took in consideration the sensitivity and confidentiality of information shared (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60–84; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 501–507). Given the nature of corruption as a socially embedded phenomenon, attention was given to the working, cultural, professional, and ideological context surrounding the actors interviewed. Ethical considerations were very important in obtaining respondent consent, with proper management of contacting, keeping confidentiality, and processing content to ensure transparency and acceptability for them of the data obtained (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60–84; Creswell, 2013, pp. 152–153). This research, while not funded, was approved by the institutional review board of the university. As well, while unusual in reporting the various respondent statements, it was necessary to identify the origins and professional occupation, as actor culture and roles emerged as key factors in the proposed model. This practice was nevertheless conforming to the ethics certificate granted to researchers, as it did not in any way allow for identifying respondents nor their milieu.

The data obtained was processed according to the state-of-the art methods recommended in the literature, using the NVivo software. Coding of the data obtained led to identify and develop the main concepts identified as meaningful for the respondents (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 220–267), also taking into account the context (ibid., pp. 268-282), while integrating the categories involved (ibid., pp. 295-310). Coding also considered the methods recommended by Miles and

Huberman (2003), such as writing codes, memos, noting patterns and themes, counting the frequency of codes, noting the relations among variables.

As we relied on a grounded theory approach, we did not have pre-coded factors but instead relied on respondents, as well as interpreted, what they qualified as corruption issues and anti-corruption initiatives. To facilitate our theory building process, we code several of our respondent statements using acronyms of the four theories previously outlined: OIT for Organizational Interests Theory; PAT for Principal-Agent Theory; CT for Culturalist Theory, and IT for Institutional Theory.

The study of IDPs and corruption requires, at the time of data analysis, a set of theoretical foundations that enable the integration of all the necessary concepts within a coherent model. They must reflect the complexity of development aid and corruption as phenomena still evolving and requiring innovative PM methods to control risk. These theories must consider the various risks, either internal to projects and project management, or due to the external context of the project, that can create more possibilities (and probabilities) that aid projects may and will be subjected to acts of corruption. In these cases, there are more opportunities for "project capture". On the other hand, various safeguarding measures can lead in probability to better results as for the efficiency and efficacity of projects (or programs) involved. To help analyze the evidence collected, and formulate a grounded theory or model, we rely on four theories integrating social and administrative sciences.

4. Results

We present in this chapter, in Figure 2, an original theoretical model that illustrates which actors, events and context are related and linked in the dynamic efforts to understand and combat corruption in international development endeavours. These elements are related to either: foreign Aid Cycle, Capture Opportunities, Context Pressures, Personal Damages encountered, and Control Mechanisms exercised. The Model can serve to interpret various interrelated issues brought forward by our respondents, such as Policy issues, Governance concerns, Institutions involved, Aid provided, Corruption acts encountered, Business actors' behaviour, Management issues, Population targeted by international aid, and the surrounding Culture.

To help our analysis, we present ninety-six (96) excerpts from interviews done with the thirty international experts encountered. Then these excerpts are linked to four relevant theories, epistemologically chosen following the analysis of empirical data: the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Culturalist Theory (CT) and the Institutional Theory (IT).

We also categorized the excerpts, classifying them using various topics, such as Capture Opportunities, Governance, Institutions, Culture, Business, Control Mechanisms and a 'what, where and how' section, concerning socio-political ecosystems related to corruption, the influence of neo-liberalism and international aid and project management issues.

The integration of research results, around the model elements, leads to articulate a set of 12 sub-questions linked to the three research questions introduced in Chapter 1, i.e., the ''What, Where, and How'' of Corruption in IDPs. The evidence presented in Chapter 4 does not cover sub-question 12 since it addresses the population perspective and would go beyond the scope of the present study, which focuses on management practices. This sub-question would also deserve another thesis with a more anthropological and sociological analysis.

This model allows us to open a new window on the anthropological ways and methods to study corruption in different societies, that corresponds to a different ontological manner to understand corruption.

Torsello and Venard (2016) consider that corruption must be seen and studied in a holistic manner For them, morality in a social construct, based on social processes of interaction. They propose ethnographic methods of investigation. What is called 'corruption' changes according to the times (ibid., p. 7). Research studies must start from an *etic* stance, to understand the realities from the respondent's point of view (ibid., p. 8). Anthropology rejects the moral dualism of corruption as seen by management scholars, therefore adopting a moralistic and ethnocentric view of the phenomenon (ibid., p. 11). In various societies, it engenders links of reciprocity. Morality is therefore considered according to historically situated social mores (ibid., p. 13), seen as socially

acceptable by most. So, what is considered as moral can diverge from society to another, and through various epochs.

Definitions of what is considered as corrupt or acceptable practices in human society, in our time, is linked to a succession of various practices of economic, political, and institutional transformation of human societies (ibid., p. 16). In Chinese business networks, *guanxi* (Smart & Hsu, 2008) is considered as an acceptable way to do business (ibid., p. 19). Or the *don (*gift*)*, according to Marcel Mauss (2011), is a civilized way to exchange gifts, women, and is an accepted foundation for reciprocity and gift exchanges in some previous South Seas societies (Malinowski, 2014). Therefore, anthropologists warn us of the risk of considering too fast some practices as unacceptable.

Anthropology thus is in favour of adopting a holistic approach, counting on thick descriptions and the importance of a detailed collection of information. Moral values are dependant on culture (ibid., p. 32). Moreover, as is the case of SSA societies, individuals face conflicting moralities, especially in periods of rapid economical and political transformations (ibid., p. 32).

The proposed new sub-questions are structured as follows for each of the three research questions (What, Where, and How). Each is linked to specific attributes of the Figure 2 components (boxes and arrows). The "what" refers to the various types of corruption and capture opportunities in IDP (green box). The "where" refers to the four contextual factors (orange boxes). The "how" refers to the four actors (blue boxes), how their actions throughout the IDP lifecycle are impeded by corruption, and how they can escape it.

- **What:** Sub-questions refer to the main forms of corruption and capture opportunities in IDP (green box identify links to actors, along black lines linked to the IDP lifecycle).
- **Where:** Sub-questions refer to the linkages between factors around the model along the IDP lifecycle (blue lines identify how the context pressures actors, black lines are the IDP lifecycle).
- **How:** Sub-questions cover primarily the linkages between actors and corruption itself (red, yellow, and green lines identify capture opportunities, damages, and control efforts).

In relation to the four social theories advanced in this thesis, nine (9) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT), as for the question What (concerning the types of capture). Nineteen (19) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT) as for the question Where (about the conditioning factors of corruption) and two (2) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT) as for the question How (the actors involved in corrupt instances).

Thirty-one (31) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT), for the question "What", thirty-two (32) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT) as for the question "Where", and twenty-two (22) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT) as for the question "How".

Seventeen (17) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT), for the question "What", seven (7) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT) as for the question "Where", and eighteen (18) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT) as for the question "How".

Twenty-one (21) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent theory (PAT), for the question "What", six (6) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent theory (PAT) as for the question "Where", and twenty-one (21) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) as for the question "How".

5. Discussion

Among the theoretical contributions, we made a link between project management and four theories that can facilitate analytically a better understanding of this social process that intends to contribute at changing human societies and better organizing work.

Many dimensions play a role in the various manners international aid and project management contribute (or not enough) to the development of aid recipient countries. So, we have developed a model to synthesize these dimensions, to help the reader to better grasp them in one look.

Epistemologically, we relied on four theoretical frameworks to help us interpret the data and formulate a coherent model. Their purpose and interrelations are for the sake of ensuring relevance for practice by PM experts. Hence, these four theories are more interpretative tools than explanatory theories: Institutional Theory (IT), Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), and Culturalist Theory (CT). This is our modest contribution to respond to the actual demand of many academics (in project development and international aid) to open collaborative links with social scientists.

Institutional Theory (IT) is instrumental to consider the multi-dimensional aspects of a specific society - its institutions (such as education, health, justice systems among others), shared values, norms, beliefs, and stakeholders, at the medium and large levels of human society. It is thus a useful tool to approach the phenomenon of corruption.

Corruption is an important factor that degrades the development perspectives of many contemporary societies, putting millions of people at risk and condemning them to live under terrible conditions of poverty and despair. For anyone following current events, one can consider that many countries are crumbling nowadays under the yolk of corruption. Under corrupt regimes, many people are imprisoned, mistreated or worse.

It would even be possible for interested researchers to study corruption as an institution, with its usual suspects (politicians, cronies, businesspeople), its norms, values and networks.

Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), on the other hand, considers humans as being rational actors who have strategies, enter into power relations and coalitions, and strive to attain their objectives, within specific and constraining sets of circumstances. Such an approach resorts to a socio-political reading of the organizational situations encountered. For example, we found that neo-patrimonialism is an interesting and relevant way to better understand governance in SSA countries. OIT is an interesting theory for a researcher who would like to understand the struggles between the various factions who strive to gain more power at the expense of their rivals. This theory could reinforce the acuity of analysis for such objects of study with regard to governance and corruption.

The Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) can help analyzing the endeavours of development agencies and actors in their relations with their governments and citizens, and also the actors in aid recipient countries. PAT can also be instrumental to research various situations of project capture and state capture, in which some actors succeed at breaching contracts that formally constrain their supposed ways to take care of money provided by donors and international development institutions. Such a theory is useful to study agency costs related to monitoring, and control of the moneys spent in international aid.

The Culturalist Theory (CT) can be useful in such matters of study as the historical ways citizens consider and mainly trust their governments. Some authors consulted have noted the lack of trust African citizens have for their national state and politicians, which is only for them a continuation of the colonial powers that exploited their work and possessions in earlier times. CT is also a good approach to study neo-patrimonialism, as a historical successor of the patrimonial way to govern, that was a respected custom for many Africans.

Sub-Saharan Africa today is influenced in many ways by the rest of the world, through the medias, emigrants living abroad, contacts with foreigners, direct foreign investments, etcetera. CT is a privileged way to study such influences.

We consider that the management of projects and programs, beyond their practical nature and technical orientation, offer many opportunities to prevent the impact of corruption on the actors of the project. On the other hand, though, we noted that project management in SSA countries is often superseded by the socio-political dimension, with its structured neo-patrimonialism system of governance and hybrid quasi-states, that are lacking to fulfill many duties that go with the exercise of power according to the rational-legal Weberian model.

It appears to us that more studies of the neo-patrimonialism system of governance will be useful, to better grasp how corruption works as a structured way of governance, to grasp resources for rent-taking purposes. Such a system appears to us to be fundamentally detrimental to the effectiveness of the fight against poverty and to attain the objectives of the UN Sustainable

Development Goals (2015-2030). It seems to us that corruption remains too abstract a concept in itself, if we want to organize the fight against it.

Otherwise, it seems to us that corruption will be partnering with other deep threats to our planet, such as climate change, lack of jobs and family planning in developing countries, pandemics, extinction of the species, augmentation of the desertification of lands in many regions, rarefaction of the fish in the oceans, Islamist terrorism, organized crime, and other contemporary plagues we now face.

One of our conclusions is to agree with some authors on the fundamental importance of good governance in these countries, to be able to advance the prospect of a realistic agenda for development. Indeed, good governance is important.

6. Conclusion

This qualitative research is of an exploratory nature and aims at sensitizing researchers and practicians to the realities and consequences of the phenomenon of corruption in its various forms, in the field of international development projects and programs.

In chapter 3, we have explained four theories that helped us to better understand the causes and impact of corruption: the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Institutional Theory (IT) and the Culturalist Theory (CT). In chapter 4, we have presented ninety-six (96) excerpts of the interviews made with our respondents and linked some of our theories to the excerpts presented.

Among the limitations of this research must be included first the small number of respondents, which nevertheless created sufficient variance and representativity of the whole value chain of development aid. Future research could also deepen interviews in highly related institutional areas, such as sectoral program support (e.g., health and humanitarian, direct budgetary support, technical assistance, etc.). There is also a need to explore more complex theories that can be applied directly to align anti-corruption and development aid management in projects and programs, focused on key specific actors.

There are many types of corruption, small, of the everyday type, and big, at the level of high-ranking officials and deciders. This phenomenon is prevalent in many sectors of activity and in many parts of the world but is almost not taken into consideration in both the project and program management field of research and international development research.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region of the world most affected by corruption. Corruption is a multi-dimensional concept, often hidden to the eyes of observers, that takes various names, and is hard to fight. Ordinary citizens hear about it, they deplore it. But most of the time, they don't know what to do about it, and then they pass to other preoccupations.

The prevalence of rent-seeking regimes in most sub-Saharan African countries erodes the trust and faith of citizens in the democratic integrity of their governments and the effectiveness and efficacy of their institutions. It lowers the investments to be allocated to education, health, infrastructure. It is a negative factor in economic, moral, and democratic terms.

In the SSA region, neo-patrimonialism (NP) is the main conduit allowing corruption to take hold of the governance of countries. Corruption succeeds in strangling the perspectives for economic development of most citizens, profiting only to a minority located in the regime elite, enriching cronies, and being safeguarded by the military brass, which also profits of it.

If neo-patrimonialism (NP) in sub-Saharan Africa persists and is not tackled robustly, the perspectives for the rise of democracy, real economic development for all, and the substantial reduction of poverty are meager.

Some authors such as Booth (2012) and Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) consider NP to be the 'Modal Pattern' in place in most SSA countries. The roots of NP are varied: historical, cultural, political and others. It is important to note that NP has been criticized as not empirically supported by macroeconomic studies, and therefore not effective at predicting cause and effect of corruption (Mkandawire, 2015). However, the conceptual framework provided by NP is primarily to articulate the theories used in this thesis as analytical tools, not as a measurement instrument.

From the practice viewpoint, in the conclusions of a recent World Bank report (2020, pp. 342–343), the following points were advanced to combat corruption:

- The necessity for a strong political leadership to lead reforms and resist the opposition from vested interests.
- To ensure the building of strong institutions for providing checks and balances and fostering accountability.
- Transparency, to promote greater compliance and improve human behaviour.
- Open government policies and access to information as levers to make corruption practices harder to hide.
- To make incentives to change social norms and focus more on the micro-levels of corruption, and its manifestations in specific sectors of society.
- The use of technology to minimize human corrupt manipulations to ensure accountability.
- To foster better collaboration among stakeholders, nationally and internationally, in the fight against corruption.

Combating corruption is not an easy endeavour, as can be seen by the resistances put by various regimes in SSA countries to change their ways of governing, as illustrated by the various World Bank (2020) anti-corruption efforts and the United Nations Organization Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) program (Senu, 2020). Also, the feeble efforts of donor countries to recognize the prevalence of corruption more fully in aid recipient countries, because of various diplomatic, commercial, geo-political considerations, does not help.

As for the literature about project management and international aid, we consider that more efforts should be put, in research, to better theorize the phenomenon of corruption, which is complex and multidimensional. Also, we suggest that more collaboration links should take place between researchers in project management and in social sciences.

There is also a need to explore more complex theories that can be applied directly to align anti-corruption and development aid management in projects and programs, focused on key specific actors.

It is not easy in theory to study corruption in aid projects. It is challenging due to the wide diversity of actors found across the project value chains. The present research confirms the difficulty of narrowing down the search for evidence to support any valid theory or model that can explain corruption and its actors. It is why the application of various social theories to project management challenged by corrupt practices will be highly appreciated for research agenda in the coming years.

Finally, about corruption, several taboos persist as to whether it is appropriate at all to raise the question, and whether any answer from anyone would be tainted by prejudice, rendering any conclusion unreliable. The proposed approach and model serve primarily to overcome these taboos and prejudice in studying corruption, as "mapping" actors and their interactions helps to refocus from "what, who and why" about corruption occurrences (ex-post), to ask instead 'what, where and how' it occurs and help understand methods to mitigate its effects on projects (ex ante).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACAs	Anti-Corruption Agencies
AID	Asset and Interest Declaration
APD	Aide publique au développement
APM	Association for Project Management
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAD	Canadian Dollar
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CFA Franc	Franc of the Financial Community in Africa
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPM	Critical Path Method
CT	Culturalist Theory
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DSG	Developmental State Governance
ECBA	Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis
E-GOV	E-Government
EITI	Extracting Industries Transparency Initiative
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
GAC	Governance and Anticorruption
GAD	Gender and Development
GBP	Pound Sterling
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
ICRs	Implementation Completion Reports
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies

ICU	International Corruption Unit
ID	International Development
IDOs	International Donor Organizations
ID NGOs	International Development Non-Governmental Organizations
IDPs	International Development Projects
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IFFs	Illicit Financial Flows
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPMA	International Project Management Association
IRM	Implementation Review Mechanism
IS	Information System
IT	Institutional Theory
KM	Knowledge Management
LFA	Logical Framework Approach
MBO	Management by Objectives
MMS	Money Moving Syndrome
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NORAD	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NP	Neo-Patrimonialism
NPM	New Public Management
NPMM	New Project Management Movement
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIT	Organizational Interests Theory
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
PAT	Principal-Agent Theory
PC	Political Conditionalities
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PFA	Project Facilitation Approach

PM	Project Management
PMBOK	Project Management Book of Knowledge
PMI	Project Management Institute
PM4DEV	Project Management for Development
PM4NGOs	Project Management for Non-Governmental Organizations
PSI	Party System Institutionalization
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RGB	Rwanda Governance Board
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SAIs	Supreme Audit Institutions
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SOEs	State-Owned Enterprises
SPA	Strategic Prospective Approach
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCAC	United Nations Convention against Corruption
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
WB	World Bank
WBG	World Bank Group
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1   Overview

The outcomes and quality of international development projects (IDPs) remain highly controversial, specially with the perception of corruption by various stakeholders, in the sub-Saharan African region notably. It is hard to find in previous research evidence to support any valid theory or model explaining corruption and the actors involved.

Since corruption is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, it is rarely mentioned in the international development literature. We propose to take a transdisciplinary viewpoint to review and synthesize the literature on the theoretical, methodological, and epistemic issues in the study of corruption as a construct. We also ask to what extent project management methods can be harmonized with broader anti-corruption initiatives in both aid donor and receiving countries.

We will integrate findings from both social and administrative sciences to focus our attention on the governance challenges involved in both business and public administration of such projects. Finally, we attempt to rely on theories of governance regimes as explanatory frameworks, especially taking a global view where corruption contributes to weaken democratic institutions.

However, the African continent is not studied as a whole, with caution toward respecting cultural and historical diversity. Developing countries cannot anymore be put in the same bag: indeed, some countries are "emerging", but some others, as for the countries of the ''Bottom Billion''

(Collier, 2007) fail to get out of various traps that keep most of their citizens poor. More than ever, governance matters, as for having governing elites wanting to really develop their countries, and not only counting on foreign aid for rent-taking purposes.

To assess the complexity of this problem, we will present our research question. We will also present our problem statement and elaborate on the complexity of anti-corruption endeavors and project management methods in international development.

We will present our research methodology, explaining how we have followed an exploratory and emerging process, based on grounded theory. We will also outline four theoretical foundations that helped us in our analysis of the data obtained through thirty interviews done with international experts. We also kept in mind that these were never used prior and during the empirical data collection.

We will summarize our data analysis obtained with the help of the NVivo software and see how the findings allowed us to interpret the expert opinions obtained about the proper use of PM methods in mitigating corruption in IDPs. Based on the theories outlined, we will interpret our results and formulate a new conceptual framework and theory to help integrate anti-corruption and project management methods. In the conclusion, we will discuss the limitations of our study, the potential for a new research agenda, and how PM can reach beyond its practical nature and technical focus, to seize relevant opportunities to prevent corruption impact on project actors, even in contexts where anti-corruption initiatives may be perceived as less effective.

1.2   Thesis Outline

In Chapter 1 - Introduction – In section 1.1, we present first an overview of the thesis, introducing the reader to some of the issues that will be at the heart of this thesis: the complexity of International Development Projects (IDPs), their relative lack of success as for the macroeconomic development of developing countries since the beginning of their application, notably in the region of sub-Saharan Africa, which receives about 37 % of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) (S. Brown, 2017, p. 153).

We then proceed, in section 1.2, with the thesis outline, to inform summarily the reader about the contents of each chapter. In section 1.3, we present international development projects (IDPs) regarding issues of governance, their relative failures to attain results for the economic development of developing countries, and we emphasize the importance of governance as an important contextual factor.

In section 1.4 of this chapter, we discuss the various definitions and types of corruption, such as petty and grand corruption. Many negative consequences of corruption are discussed: rising inequalities between social classes, low economic growth, lack of resources dedicated to education and health, and as for reducing poverty. The topic of project capture is presented, and how to prevent it by better targeting stakeholders.

We advance that corruption and bad governance are important factors explaining the lack of convincing results by international aid. Project capture and state capture are important factors that explain the present situation. Other developments such as the 2005 Paris Declaration and political

conditionalities can play a useful role to redress the situation in the future. Various authors give explanations about the relative failure of international aid and IDPs: weak governance, nepotism, excessive rent-taking by the regimes in place, pillage of the resources found in SSA countries, lack of administrative capabilities, and others.

In section 1.5, we present our research objectives, the research question, and recall that our research is of a qualitative and exploratory type.

In Chapter 2 - Literature Review – Section 2.1 is an overview of chapter 2. In section 2.2 We examine the latest research done on international development projects (IDPs): their historical and intellectual roots, the various types of IDPs, their main characteristics, notably their complexity (structural, technical, directional and being temporary), their relative rate of success for sixty years of practice in the developing countries, the main challenges and problems encountered, and new issues advanced by researchers. Some of the new issues revolve around the lack of cross-fertilization between project management and international development literatures, the proposal for a new project management approach, issues about gender parity, social capital support, knowledge management, and others.

In section 2.3 of this chapter, we discuss various anti-corruption measures undertaken until now, notably by the World Bank and the United Nations Organization, their relative lack of impact, due mainly to the evasive strategies devised by some aid recipient countries' regimes, the importance of the procurement issues in the fight against corruption, the elite capture going on, the analytical relevance of the concept PSI (party system institutionalization) for the 'regulation' of corruption

by the reigning elites in developing countries. Finally we enumerate the various factors causing corruption in developing countries, according to the researchers consulted in this literature review.

In section 2.4, we discuss the consequences of corruption on development, notably economic growth and the reduction of poverty, some of the international measures that have been taken to combat corruption, such as E-gov, the importance of better targeting aid recipients to better ensure accountability and to be able to reduce project capture, the importance of governance, and finally some characteristics of the 'development industry' that have divergent effects on the fight against the phenomenon of corruption.

In section 2.5, we discuss some issues such as knowledge management and some epistemological issues related to the study of corruption, followed by 2.6 – the conclusion.

In Chapter 3 - Methodology- To help develop an innovative model, we propose a grounded theory methodology based on thirty (30) semi-structured interviews with international aid development experts, balancing representation from donor and receiving countries, as well as project managers from the bilateral and multilateral international aid agencies, and from NGOs (Bogner et al., 2009).

The data obtained were processed through a qualitative sorting process by using the software NVivo. The data accumulated was analyzed, with clarification about the types of coding methods used.

Moreover, we explain how our data analysis was enhanced by resorting to four theoretical foundations. to connect evidence within a coherent model: Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Culturalist Theory (CT) and the Institutional Theory (IT), that can help to better understand corruption and its impact.

In Chapter 4 – Results - We present an original theoretical model that illustrates which actors, events and context are related and linked in the dynamic efforts to understand and combat corruption in international development endeavours. We have drawn arrows to link these elements: the foreign aid cycle, capture opportunities, the context pressures, the personal damages done, and the control mechanisms exercised. This model can serve to interpret various interrelated issues brought forward by our respondents, such as policy issues, governance concerns, institutions involved, the aid provided, corruption acts enacted, the business actors' behaviour, management issues, the population targeted by international aid, and the surrounding culture.

We also present ninety-six (96) excerpts from interviews done with the thirty (30) international aid experts encountered. These excerpts are only a part of the many comments made by our interviewees. We link these to the four relevant theories presented in the previous chapter. We also categorized these excerpts by using various topics, such as capture opportunities, governance issues, institutions (such as education, health, social classes, economy, the military and justice systems), culture, business, and control mechanisms. We closed the chapter with a ''what, where and how'' section that concerns the ecosystems related to corruption, neo-liberalism, international aid and project management issues.

In Chapter 5 - Discussion - We recapitulate our findings and draw some interpretations for the project management professionals active in IDPs. We ask to what extent can anti-corruption initiatives leverage PM methods as suggested by the proposed model.

In addition to project management literature, our findings are linked to emerging intellectual work on neo-patrimonialism and governance regimes, the concept of hybrid states based on the Weberian model of the modern state, the influence of some cultural models of patrimonialism still considered as relevant context for contemporary PM and anti-corruption methods. Also, we present three theoretical constructs, that can serve to better understand how to gauge the progress of anti-corruption measures: the good governance model, the long-horizon rent-taking model, and the developmental state governance model. Finally, the special case of Rwanda is examined.

We finally advance some contributions this study brings for practicians and researchers, the limitations, and some suggestions for future research.

Finally, in Chapter 6 - Conclusion - We present our main findings about the phenomenon of corruption as being an important factor that hinders the possibilities for the development of sub-Saharan Africa. We recall the four theories used for the interpretation of our empirical corpus, after having used the grounded theory methodology for processing the analysis of the interviews. We then recall the work accomplished for the research and the writing of this thesis. We also sum up the conceptual and empirical contributions of our endeavour. We finally advance some implications for project management practice, taking note of the limitations of our study, but also of the possibilities for stimulating future research.

1.3   International Development Projects

1.3.1   International Development and Governance

International development projects (IDPs) have become very complex with greater diversity of delivery actors. These include donor and receiving governments, national bilateral agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral agencies, and the vast industry of private contractors and suppliers of humanitarian aid, seeking to narrow the gaps between developing countries and developed countries, and to alleviate poverty. As IDPs evolve into more complex endeavours, they require the application of broader programs of projects, transforming the processes and venues sharing a common objective, to improve economic development, alleviate poverty, and empower local populations. The context of international development, such as for sub-Saharan Africa, which receives the bigger part of aid, more precisely 37,2 % of total Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2012-2013 (Brown, 2017, p. 153) is marked by unequal power relations between the actors involved. Moreover, there are instances of state capture by power elites in many receiving countries and weak management capabilities.

Foreign aid, as granted by governmental agencies based in developed countries and received in emerging countries, has been subjected to an increasing scrutiny by stakeholders and media. The lack of project success has called into question the quality and relative effectiveness of these programs, and their frequent incapacity to overcome deeply rooted challenges. The Project Management (PM) discipline, despite its increasing adoption throughout development programs, has yet to devise adequate methodologies to address this challenge.

Yet the incentives to improve PM methods are significant, as countries with better governance practices are more likely to receive industry aid relative to infrastructure aid from bilateral donors. On the other hand, multilateral donors tend to allocate more technical assistance aid relative to project aid for donors with higher scores on governance measures. This appears to be a trade-off between technical assistance and program-wide lending, and a trade-off between social sectors and infrastructure projects.

Critiques of development aid have pointed to its lack of success linked to corruption at various levels. While the study of corruption has focused on "what, who and why" to help understand its occurrence, there is a lack of analysis on "what, where and how" to ensure its prevention and improve PM methods to better support delivery actors. Corruption is often linked with poor governance in many countries.

An important contemporary issue is to develop more innovative methods to help mitigate corruption and its adverse effects on aid delivery. Essentially, a research priority is to develop more innovative PM methods that best fit the context of sub-Saharan Africa, with more consideration for the anthropological perspective, that allows to adequately customize management processes to the context of actors responsible for their implementation.

1.3.2 Failures in International Development

Despite the transfer of trillions of dollars to developing countries since 1960, a substantial part of the world population remains today in extreme poverty. Consequently, the 2005 Paris Declaration

announced a serious resetting of priorities for aid. Still, there is no consensus about why development aid provided by donor countries was not more utilitarian to improve the situation.

Easterly (2006) advances that the funds for development aid should rather be confided to *Searchers* (actors who understand the local conditions and seize opportunities for development), to work with representatives of civil society and entrepreneurs in a bottom-up fashion. He lost confidence and hope in Big Planners' endeavours who, through decades of false hopes and many "white elephants", did not reach notable results for developing the economy of poor countries, and reducing poverty.

Moyo (2009) even takes a more radical stance by stating that aid has more maleficent than beneficial results and should be cut in its present form. According to her, international aid must be examined in the context of the mainly dysfunctional public institutions that prevail in many developing countries, notably in sub-Saharan countries, where it engenders a culture of aid-dependency, leading its elite members to use a large part of it for their private enrichment and clientelist purposes. Aid is frequently used for other purposes than the ones intended, becoming fungible at the will of the elites. This impedes the economic take-off of many developing countries. Moreover, she adds that this influx of money distorts the market mechanisms of supply-and-demand, as also for prices and savings.

Moreover, what was called the Third World in the 1960's (Sauvy, 1952) and 1970's does not even exist anymore (Rist, 2013). The developing world is now divided between emergent economies (as for the BRICS - for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), mid-income economies,

and very poor countries. According to Collier (2007), there are fewer aid dependent countries than before, because many countries have succeeded at reducing poverty within their frontiers, but there is still the challenge of the 'Bottom Billion' countries to cope with. In these forty or so countries (mainly located in the sub-Saharan African region), their inhabitants live in fragile or failed states, and face intractable difficulties, which makes aid a very hard case to propose. For the inhabitants of these countries, there has hardly been any progress as for their general well-being since the beginning of this century, nor much hope to escape their bleak daily living conditions.

The imperative for transparency asks for a better account of the economic inputs in developing countries. Accordingly, more attention should be given to other sources of funding for the inhabitants of developing countries, to have a more complete picture of the situation. For instance, Adams and Cuecuecha (2013) analyze the impact upon Ghanaian households of internal and external remittances (Africa and other countries) made by expatriate citizens of these countries on investment and poverty. Their key findings reveal that households receiving remittances spend proportionately less on one key consumption: food, and more on three important investment goods: education, housing and health. The receipt of remittances, particularly from rich foreign countries, greatly reduce the likelihood of household poverty, but can also be only a temporary source of money for households, as can be seen in the contemporary period of COVID-19 pandemic (Economist (The), 2020b).

Taken together, the factors of IDPs failure reveal somehow the underlying project management challenges. We synthesized in Table 1 a number of these authors, who will serve for our literature synthesis as we address corruption as one of the key challenges of ID project management.

Table 1: Causes for International Development Failures

Authors	International Development and Governance Literature
Collier (2007)	Countries in the Bottom Billion have very few prospects for development, being impeded by various prevalent traps : i) the conflict trap (coups, recurrent civil or ethnic wars..); ii) the natural resources trap (e.g., countries which have rare resources - such as oil, gas, gold, diamonds, coltan, uranium), and are at the mercy of greedy and brutal regimes seizing the rent; iii) landlocked, having no commercial exit to the sea, and surrounded by instable or dangerous neighbor countries; and iv) bad governance (corruption, no democracy or recourse to a sound legal system).
Easterly (2013)	Early decisions made by donor countries and multilateral institutions (such as the IMF and the World Bank) to count upon Western experts to devise big macroeconomic plans and then confide the money to the recipient countries' governments (and strongmen in power) to implement these plans. Finally, they proved themselves untrustworthy.
Iyoha and Oyerinde (2010)	As for the Nigerian case: an absence of political will at the various levels of the State; lack of proper professional educa-tion of the politicians mandated to police the financial public system of expenditures: lack of appropriate documentation to audit and control the flows of public money; the too small number of registered auditors and accountants in the country. Many conflicts of interests take place. The prevalence of a collectivist and patriarchal culture which renders the policing and sanctioning of corrupt individuals an impossible endeavor for junior subalterns or auditors. Records poorly managed and difficult to access, even by public servants themselves. Poor accounting and auditing standards, resulting in the non-accountability of billions of dollars spent each year in that country.
Marquette and Doig (2004)	Lack of records and record-keeping in developing countries, which are necessary for combating corruption. As for the European Union

	(EU), until 2003, the examination of many evaluation reports of projects showed a blatant absence of traces of justification for expenses made in various projects funded. This impeded a strategic overview about development aid in the recipient countries. Huge lack of coordination among donor countries for the effective evaluation of past projects funded. Lack of a comparative approach between EU countries, to maximize identification and use of the expertise by the various donor countries. Lack of a good institutional memory to take stock of past experiences.
Authors	**International Development and Corruption Literature**
Booth (2012); Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012)	Nepotism, corruption, bad governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Lack of good leadership and public policies in taking national development as a central objective. "Rent extraction is a major source of personal enrichment for the political class as a whole as well as for private business… Secondly, the political leadership is either unwilling or unable to deny access to rent-taking opportunities by their major supporters, because it is largely by distributing such opportunities that it remains in power". Often, ineffective and rent-seeking public servants.
Burgis (2015)	Shadow dealings made between national elites and foreign entities, to recuperate for themselves the rent linked to rare resources. Double or hidden national accounting systems that escape public regard, as in Nigeria, Angola, Gabon, RD Congo, etc.
Moyo (2009)	Aid provided the means for the governing elites of developing countries to enrich themselves, using aid for rent-seeking purposes, inciting them not to take their historic responsibilities in building robust fiscal systems and encouraging domestic savings. According to that author, it is best to cut entirely foreign aid in its present form.
Authors	**International Development and Project Management Literature**

Ika (2012) and Ika and Hodgson (2014)	There is often a lack of administrative capabilities in recipient countries. Also, a mechanical application of tools and processes used by Western project managers for the planning, implemen-tation, and monitoring of international development projects (IDPs) in sub-Saharan Africa. Not enough adaptation of project management processes to the local conditions encountered (e.g., expectations of the local stakeholders and societal reality of Africa).
Rwelamila & Puru-shottam (2012)	Poor management of projects led by African project managers in the region of Austral Africa, due to: lack of strategic perspectives; lack of training in project management; lack of good business sense; micro-management tendencies of African supervisors; lack of centers of superior education in project management.
Winters (2014)	Frequent project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt, whereas well defined targeting of recipients of aid would often result in superior accountability.

1.3.3 Governance Matters

The 2005 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness grew out of a consensus on the importance of country ownership. But Booth (2012) considers that the premise of believing that most aid recipient countries already have development-oriented political leadership is untenable. He considers that aid can only be profitable for countries with good leadership and governance possibilities, but otherwise is on balance bad for the institutional fabric of poor developing countries. In those cases, more attention should be given to reforming the non-aid policies of donor countries (e.g., having more favourable commercial treaties, international pacts for the sound management of natural resources, regulating fiscal evasion, etc.). In the case of poorly led developing countries, aid as such is often harmful to country-owned development, because it shields incumbent leaders for their self-interested and irresponsible actions, and bad consequences

(Booth, 2012, p. 539). For Booth (2012, p. 540), the most important development issue is whether countries are governed by people for whom national development is a central objective.

Winters (2014) insists that a minimum requirement for good governance is that the funding reaches its intended destination. In fact, it is not what always happen. An important contribution of this author is to show that the well-defined targeting of recipients of aid results in superior accountability, and improved identifiability of stakeholders, notably when they can organize for collective action.

As for Rwanda, Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) address the specific approach of the RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front, the governing party in Rwanda) - led regime to political involvement in the private sector of the economy. These operations centralize the generation and management of economic rents that has distinguished the more developmental regimes of Asia and Africa. With some qualifications, the authors see Rwanda as a developmental patrimonial state, rendering possible the accumulation of wealth for the public good of the Rwandan society, and thus making Rwanda a particularly less corrupt society in this region of the world. A country is said to display developmental patrimonialism when the ruling elite acquires an interest in, and a capability for managing economic rents in a centralized way with a view of enhancing their own and others' income in the long run rather than maximizing them in the short run (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 381; C. Johnson, 1982; Wade, 1988). But Rwanda suffers from a number of serious handicaps in addition to its violent political history: the country is landlocked, underendowed with natural resources, and a very unfavourable person-land ratio (Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012, p. 384).

For Booth (2012, p. 540), donor countries must devote greater efforts at addressing global practices in banking and the arms trade that help to incentivize corrupt governance and violent conflicts in the South (Booth, 2012, p. 543).

1.4 Corruption in International Development

1.4.1 Nature and Challenges of Corruption

For Sohail and Cavill (2008, p. 730), a general definition of corruption is the misuse of power for private gain at one's instigation or in response to inducements. Various forms of corruption include bribes (payments made in order to gain an advantage or to avoid a disadvantage), fraud (theft through misrepresentation), embezzlement (misappropriation of corporate or public funds), and kickbacks (sweeteners or rewards for favourable decisions). Other types of corruption are: favouritism, extorsion, diversion of funds (Nystrand, 2014, p. 819).

According to Winters (2014), common forms of corruption include bribe-taking either to accomplish or expedite official duties, collusion with goods- or labour-suppliers for kickback payments, the manipulation of wage payments that allow an official to pocket the difference between reported and paid wages, and the inflation of labour or goods expenditures that likewise allow an official to pocket the difference between reported and actual amounts (Olken, 2006 in Winters, 2014, p. 396). Sometimes, moral codes are transgressed, sometimes legal codes are broken; and sometimes moral codes are transgressed but not legal codes (Jancsics, 2014, p. 359).

Among the negative consequences of corruption, we find the lowering of transparency of public policies, the wasting of resources, wasteful spending in the planning and implementation of projects and programs, low efficiency in resource allocation, reduced investment and low economic growth (Liu & Lin, 2012, pp. 165–166). They add that corrupt officials tend to artificially increase spending on science, education, and culture, and retain money for themselves. Corruption represents a form of income redistribution without transparency, increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, and is against social fairness and justice (ibid, pp. 165–166). Also, according to Winters (2014, p. 396), corruption means that the anticipated quantity (or quality) of goods and services does not reach end users.

The concepts of corruption and state capture are useful for the analysis of how states can be captured by special interest groups, either in the private or public sectors, leading to policies that benefit a privileged minority, with complex schemes for corruption throughout development projects (Hira, 2017, pp. 134–136; Krueger, 1974 - about the role of the state in development). "State capture includes the idea of powerful vested interests that can undermine the ability of the state to pursue national policies in the collective interest, thus undercutting the democratic process" (Hira, 2017). Some argue that the prevailing neoliberal views in the world economy play an important role in the context where corruption prevails in many developing countries (Beaudet, 2017).This trend also corresponds to the notion of the rent-taking modal pattern for the state that prevails in most sub-Saharan African states (Booth, 2012; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012).

Corruption and state capture can also happen in the North, as demonstrated by Locatelli et al. (2017), who show how the Italian State is penetrated by vested interests, notably in big

infrastructure projects, such as in the procurement processes and construction of the railroads to accommodate high speed trains in a large program linking various parts of Italy and transnational routes with its neighbours. The authors show how megaprojects, which are large, complex, and involving the public sector, are likely to be affected by corruption. They were also astonished by the fact that project management authors are very reluctant to tackle that important factor impeding efficiency and efficacy of large projects. Most of their references had to come from other fields of research such as public policies, risk management, construction industry.

Similarly, Molenaers et al. (2015) advance that new kinds of political conditionalities have emerged during the last decade. New questions appear around what now constitutes good governance, and the dynamics taking place between the parties (donor and recipient country) when negotiating about conditionalities. Some still claim that democratic governance and human rights ensure better normative grounds to provide aid more selectively. According to Koch (2015), political conditionalities (PC) need to be reconceptualized and researched to reflect better the global changes going on. PCs have moved from political rights toward social and environmental rights.

Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) say that "rent seeking in sub-Saharan Africa today is one in which rent-seeking is widespread and uncontrolled, and associated with both political and administrative corruption". They call the predominant pattern of functioning in most countries in the sub-Saharan African region as the ''Modal Pattern''. In those countries, policymaking is driven in part by the exigency of creating rents for allocation for their supporters and for replenishing the campaign funds of the party in power.

Burgis (2015), in a well-documented journalistic research on national oligarchies and foreign corporations taking illegal possession of much of Africa's wealth, records many instances of double national accounting methods (also called 'cooking the books') and shadow dealings involving various sub-Saharan African countries.

Evidence suggests that corruption is a costly factor in doing business in sub-Saharan Africa. Clarke (2011) found that average firms report bribe payments, to get things done for licenses, taxes, and other services. In the countries covered by their research, the percentage of bribes relative to sales go from a lower end of 0,9 % in Namibia, 1,0 % in Rwanda, to a higher end of 4,0 % in Guinea-Conakry, 4,4 % in Guinea-Bissau, and 4,4 % in Mauritania.

Aid works better when recipients of aid, with good social capital in their environment (Putnam, 2000), can organize for collective action. *A contrario*, there is more likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt (according to commonly used survey-based measures by Transparency International (2020) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2020). When aid recipients are well identified and defend their interests in development projects, it leads to create incentives for politicians and agents of government to avoid abusing public office by acts of corruption (Winters, 2014).

On the other hand, when projects are large, nationwide, or more diffusely targeted, it becomes more difficult to monitor and control the funds, and there are then more cases of misappropriating the collective goods. As for development projects, there are three scenarios for the illicit capture

of funds: bureaucratic corruption, biased selection of beneficiaries and the direct diversion of funding (Winters, 2014, p. 396). Their conclusion is that weak governance breeds several forms of donor selectivity. They also found evidence that bilateral donors will substitute programmatic aid instead of technical assistance and project aid in well-governed countries (Winters & Martinez, 2015, p. 516). They found that many donors, when aiding poorly governed countries, will use selective types of aid over which they have more control.

Also, some researchers have investigated the inefficacy of aid in the context of fragile states. Zürcher (2012) demonstrates the difficulty of implementing international aid projects and programs in fragile countries. Indeed, the objectives of the aid designers and sponsors to facilitate the installation of a more democratic society and good governance, often go counter to the interests of the ruling central elite that needs to consolidate its power base by establishing utilitarian relations with regional leaders who do not advance a democratic agenda. This creates an impossible situation for IDPs, as was the case in Afghanistan.

Moreover, security issues often render the implementation of projects a very difficult endeavour. Clientelism and nepotism often prevail, making corruption a factor to consider in everyday relations with nationals. "Most reconstruction and stabilisation operations in fragile states operate in highly volatile, unstable and insecure environments where armed factions are committing acts of violence or at least retain their capacity to do so, where governments are very weak and do not provide public goods and security to an impoverished and threatened population, and where large segments of the population are reluctant to align with the government and its foreign backers" (ibid., p. 471). Also, cultural barriers make it difficult for foreigners to understand what is going

on in the country. Finally, as in Afghanistan, according to the author, many local NGOs and contractors are corrupt, and aid finally fed the corruption games going on. The author concludes that aid cannot by itself reduce insecurity.

As for NGOs, Banks et al. (2015) ask serious questions about the ability of NGOs to meet transformative goals in their mission for development and social justice. The authors consider that most Western NGOs now have weak roots in the civil society of the developing countries where they are involved and have rather become part of the vast and technocratic aid apparatus politically and ideologically led by central governments in developed countries. According to the authors, NGOs still are appropriate for short term projects, but less so to get involved and collaborate with civil society groups, that can bring progress, justice, and lobby for a better redistribution of wealth in developing countries. External pressures from donors and local governments render their task difficult to get involved in grassroots activities (ibid., p. 712).

1.4.2   Integrating Anti-Corruption and Project Management

The outcomes and quality of development projects remain highly controversial, especially with perception of corruption by various stakeholders. It is therefore necessary to reconceive how we can integrate anti-corruption and project management practices.

While it should be easy in theory to study corruption in IDPs, given the abundance of background documentation throughout the project lifecycle, it is challenging due to the wide diversity of actors across these project value chains. Finally, several taboos also persist as to whether it is appropriate

at all to raise the question, and whether any answer from anyone would be tainted by prejudice, rendering any conclusion unreliable.

One approach to overcome the taboos and prejudice in studying corruption is to ask a different research question. As opposed to studying "what, who and why" about corruption occurrences (ex-post), given the challenge of unveiling its practices and motivations, we propose to ask instead "what, where and how" it occurs, and help understand methods to mitigate its effects on IDPs (ex ante). This chapter serves to outline and synthesize the factors that may help answer this question and propose a research agenda that would bring more practical results for IDP leaders.

Corruption is rarely mentioned in the international development literature. This is maybe because it is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, requesting further elaboration in discourses and explanations. Moreover, specific project management methods are necessary to integrate anti-corruption initiatives and help ensure quality aid delivery.

While organizational issues have been studied, an anthropological perspective can help enrich our understanding of corruption, with a focus on how project actors cope and could be better supported with more innovative methods. Some experts recognize the inefficacy of applying classical Project Management (PM) tools and processes in sub-Saharan Africa.

Regarding project management, Ika and Hodgson (2014) criticize the mechanical application of the PM tools used in international aid projects. They recommend using a more critical stance to broaden our understanding of the impact of PM, by considering PM in a wider political and

sociological perspective (also Hodgson & Cicmil, 2006). International development projects (IDPs), indeed, are part of a broad and specific context, facing serious problems in developing countries, that reflect political, economical, physical/geographical, socio-cultural, historical, demographical, and environmental challenges (Ika & Hodgson, 2014, p. 1186). Such contexts are characterized by many endemic problems: institutional and sustainability, such as corruption, capacity building setbacks, recurrent costs, lack of political support, lack of implementation and institutional capacity, and overemphasis of visible and rapid results from donors and political actors (ibid, p. 1186).

According to Ika (2012), four traps account for the relative ineffectiveness of these practices and tools: the one-size-fits-all trap, the accountability-for-fast-results trap, the lack of local project management skills and the cultural trap. Ika & Donnelly (2017) recommend adapting PM processes to the local conditions encountered, a more comprehensive and flexible approach to be able to attain longer term results, the creation and application of PM processes more adapted to local stakeholders' expectations and the societal reality of Africa.

We conclude with a research agenda for the several disciplines and fields concerned with solving this phenomenon.

1.5   Research Objectives

Using a qualitative and exploratory research, we will apprise the complexity of this problem, by answering the following research question:

RQ: How does corruption in developing countries, combined with poor governance, prevent international development projects (IDPs) from significantly achieving their objectives, notably in sub-Saharan Africa?

As introduced in section 1.3.1 in this chapter, we pointed out that the research literature until now has been addressing primarily research questions such as "what, who, and why". We propose to refocus our research on such questions as "what, where, and how" for studying corruption in IDPs. As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, the literature so far has been concerned with attempting to identify roles, positions, and actors responsible for corruptions. These studies try to analyze the motives of various actors and evaluate their impact. Instead, the present study seeks to identify "what, where, and how" corruption impedes IDP management. This leads us to formulate three research questions that constitute throughout this thesis a framework to guide theory development:

1. **RQ1:** *What forms of corruption in IDP happen, and what are the main forms of capture and their impact at various levels in IDPs?*
2. **RQ2:** *Where do contextual factors exert certain pressures on actors in their interaction with the phenomena of corruption in IDPs?*
3. **RQ3:** *How do actors interact with, or get affected by, corruption and what are their levers in an IDP PM context?*

To help develop an innovative model, we propose a grounded theory methodology based on thirty (30) interviews with international development experts, balancing representation from donor and receiving countries, as well as project managers from the bilateral and multilateral international aid agencies, and from NGOs (Bogner et al., 2009). Data is analyzed using a qualitative sorting

process using the software NVivo. Our interpretation is based on four theoretical foundations to connect evidence within a coherent model: Organizational Interests Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, Culturalist Theory, and Institutional Theory.

To do so, we will present our problem statement and elaborate on the complexity of anti-corruption and project management methods in international development. We will later outline the four theoretical foundations that helped us in our analysis, keeping in mind that these were never used during empirical data collection. Third, we present our research methodology, explaining how we have followed a purely exploratory and emerging process, based on grounded theory. Fourth, we summarize our data analysis and how the findings allowed us to interpret expert opinions about the proper use of PM methods in mitigating corruption in IDPs. Fifth, based on the theories outlined, we will interpret our results and formulate a new conceptual framework and theory to help integrate anti-corruption and project management methods. Our conclusion discusses the limitations of our study, the potential for a new research agenda, and how PM can reach beyond its practical nature and technical focus, to seize numerous opportunities to prevent corruption impact on project actors, even in a context where anti-corruption initiatives may be perceived as less effective.

Chapter 2

Literature Review

2.1 Overview

There are many definitions and types of corruption, such as grand and petty corruption, that are presented in this chapter. Authors generally agree that corruption undermines development and transparency in the functioning of a society. Many factors are conducive to corruption, such as the discretionary power of public servants, weak institutions, and incomplete market mechanisms. Moreover, various dimensions of governance play a role in the prevalence of corruption in a country. Various ways and means to combat corruption are presented, with specific examples taken both in developing and industrialized countries. It is important to devise anti-corruption strategies. Finally, the impact and consequences of corruption are considered, such as being a potential threat to democracy, and the inefficient allocation of resources.

As shown in Figure 1, the present Chapter is outlined using sub-section titles aligned with the binary combinations of our three major disciplines: Project Management, International Development, and Corruption Studies. This structure allows us to accurately target the most appropriate literature given our research questions. These keywords are used in our bibliographic search queries, and as such ensure that the foregoing discussion will remain relatively distinctive across sub-sections, and yet adequately integrated across as the binary combinations help us address each discipline at exactly twice.

Figure 1: Project Management, International Development, and Corruption

2.2 Managing International Development Projects

2.2.1 Introduction

In section 2 of this chapter (called 2.2.2 more precisely in the text), some historical and intellectual roots of International Development Projects (IDPs) are recalled, such as President Harry Truman in 1949 addressing the need for rich nations such as the United States to help economically the poorer nations, for social justice and security reasons. Also, we remind the reader of some development conferences that took place since 2000, that signalled important steps to take relatively to the international development field. We also present the principles agreed upon at the

2005 Paris Conference, indicating new ways to follow as for international development and reshuffling the respective roles played by donor and recipient countries.

In section 3, we present different professional roots that inspired the development of project management, and some key approaches and best practices that were influential historically for the project management actors.

In section 4, researchers and intellectuals concerned with project management take note of the necessary cross-fertilization that should take place, according to them, between the fields of project management and international development. Each field can nurture the other one, concerning their practices, and bring to each other useful lessons to learn.

In section 5, we present the objectives pursued by International Development Projects (IDPs), and the new challenges confronting them.

In section 6, we present the various types of IDPs, soft and hard.

In section 7, we show that IDPs are characterized by complexity, having to face multiple stakeholders, cultural, political, sociological realities in the field, taking place in various sectors of society, and lacking a clear and powerful customer as is the case for private and commercial projects.

In section 8, we show that many IDPs are complex, and that there are various types of complexity at stake. International development project managers must be able to master various professional abilities to succeed.

In section 9, Picciotto (2020) presents the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm that took place in the 1980's, and influenced International Development (ID) practices. The NPM approach was based on neoliberal economics, transaction cost analysis, principal-agent theory, and public choice doctrines.

In section 10, we show that various critics of ID do not appreciate in the same manner the success attained by International Development Projects (IDPs) until now.

In section 11, various political, legal, cultural, technical, organizational, social, economic, and environmental problems and challenges involving IDPs are discussed.

In section 12, Munro and Ika (2020) have identified different knowledge areas, concepts, tools and emphases that distinguish IDPs' professional reference standards from the standards in effect in other areas of practice.

In section 13, a New Project Management Movement (NPMM) is advanced by Picciotto (2020), that highlights the limitations of conventional project management practices as traditionally dominated by Management by Objectives principles (MBO). Various scholars suggest instead to replace 'top-down' and 'best-practices' by a 'muddling-through' approach, thus challenging the

linear concepts embedded in traditional project management approaches, which appear to them poorly adapted to operate in contemporary environments characterized by volatility and uncertainty.

In section 14, the logical framework approach (LFA), that is very much used by ID agencies, is considered by many aid professionals as a too rigid methodology, that does not have enough relationship with the success of a project.

In section 15, new project management issues tackled by various authors are presented: the first one is about social capital and knowledge management; others are about the following topics: gender and development, the underlying conditions explaining project success in international development, the Project Facilitation Approach, the Strategic Prospective Approach (SPA), and finally, National plans linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030).

Please find in Table 2 some of the main points advanced by specific researchers presented in section 2.2.

Table 2: International Development Projects (IDPs)

Authors	Key Trends and Research Issues
Ika et al. (2020a)	Considering their distinctive nature, IDPs qualify as a specific type of projects, though they are seldom featured in the mainstream project management literature…indeed, there has been little cross-fertilization between international development and project management. Both have come of age in the middle of the twentieth century and share a common concern for organizing work and delivering change.
Remington and Pollack (2010)	Many IDPs are to be considered as complex projects. There are four types of complexity: structural, technical, directional, and temporary. In these cases, risks come from all sides.
Picciotto (2020) and various authors	A new and growing scholarly literature currently challenges the linear concepts embedded in traditional project management approaches…traditionally dominated by Management by Objectives (MBO), that are poorly adapted to operate in environments characterized by volatility and uncertainty, since the new operating environment for projects everywhere is increasingly unstable, turbulent, and shaped by diverse and vocal interests.
Brière and Auclair (2020)	Efforts to integrate Gender and Development (GAD) must involve political engagement and self-criticism of power structures and actions within the organizations that carry out IDPs, and in the field. GAD adopts a critical perspective toward the patriarchal system, that limits women's presence in jobs entailing international deployment, and seeks to modify the position and subordination in which women have been historically placed.

2.2.2   Historical and Intellectual Roots of International Development Projects

International Development (ID) was born seventy years ago, at the end of the Second World War (Brooks, 2017; Rist, 2013; Sachs, 2005).

President Harry Truman, in his Inaugural Address January 20, 1949, said:

> "We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half of the people of the world is living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate, they are victims of disease. Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas. For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people … our imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible … The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit has no place in our plans." (4th foreign policy goal outlined in the Inaugural Address, better known as his "4th point" (cited by Esteva, 2010, p. 1).

Projects have been the main instruments used in the operational field of what was then called the Third World countries (Sauvy, 1952). The intentions of the international aid industry actors were to improve the well-being and capabilities of the world's poorest and more vulnerable people of the world (Sen, 1999).

Many conferences contributed to the advancement of the various intellectual and institutional ways to see and administer aid:

- Monterrey 2002: many countries adopted the Monterrey Consensus, the first UN framework to formally embrace the fight against corruption in international development. Today many IDOs have put similar policies into place that should in principle generate more selective similar anti-corruption into place (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 769).

- Rome 2003: donors sought to better harmonize their collaboration, among themselves and with aid recipient countries, standardize costly and inefficient procedures, improve aid effectiveness through building capacity in recipient countries, tying aid to a good governance agenda that establishes strict conditions for how money is spent. Moreover, they agree to resort more to support budget- global and sectorial, and help developing countries to cope with debt.

- Paris 2005: new principles are promulgated by the United Nations, to allow more decisional power to recipient countries in the composition and management of aid.

- Concerning the principles issued by the Paris Declaration of 2005, which the signatory countries including Canada have promised to put into practice (Wood et al., 2008) are:
  - appropriation (ibid., pp. 11-16): the aid recipient partner countries can exercise "real control over their development policies and strategies and to ensure coordination of action in support of development" (ibid., p. 11);

- alignment (ibid., pp. 17-23): aid donor countries undertake to "base all their support on national development strategies, the institutions and procedures of partner countries" (ibid., p. 17);

- harmonization (ibid., pp. 24-27): "the actions of donors will be better harmonized and more transparent, to allow greater efficiency" (ibid., p. 24);

- results-based management (ibid., pp. 28-30): "results-oriented management means managing and implementing aid by focusing on desired outcomes and using available data, with a view to improving the decision-making process" (ibid., p. 28);

- mutual accountability (ibid., pp. 31-35) "donors and partner countries are responsible for the results obtained in terms of development. A key priority for partner countries and donors alike is to strengthen mutual accountability and transparency regarding the use of development resources. It is also a way of rallying public support for national policies and development aid" (ibid., p. 31).

- Accra 2008: to improve aid efficacy; reiterate the new principles laid out by the 2005 Paris Declaration, recognition of the importance of good governance, the inclusion of civil society actors in development processes; take note of newcomers in international cooperation, such as philanthropies, private sector; promise to canalize 66 % of aid through program approach; and commit 50 % of aid through government-to-government channels.

- Busan 2011: recognition of the useful contribution of more actors – new donors, private sector, foundations in the field of development; gender equality, fighting corruption, and aid as a useful catalyst for change.

2.2.3   Types of International Development Projects

As synthesized by Ika et al. (2020a, p. 554 Table 2 for a more complete tableau), based on Chimbowu et al. (2019), Fischer (2019); Geraldi & Söderlund (2018) and Ika & Hodgson (2014):

- Disciplinary roots for classical PM can be found, from the 1950s to the 1990s, in engineering, construction and information technology, while for ID, from the 1950s to the 1980s, engineering and economics dominate, with some elements of sociology and political science. Later, as for ID (from the 1980s to now), the research has become inter-disciplinary to a certain degree, and welcome to social sciences, including gender studies, plus health, environmental and agricultural sciences.

- Project types have moved for classical PM from mono projects, typically infrastructure or military technology (e.g., rockets, nuclear submarines) to, as for IDP studies (for the period 1980s to now), to interorganizational projects of different types (such as blueprint; and also process or human capital, including capacity building and governance).

- Key concepts have evolved from rationality, objectivity and reductionism (linear rational planning) for PM and ID (1950s - 1990s, and 1950s - 1980s respectively) to experimentation, learning, participation, complexity, uncertainty, resilience, adaptation, flexibility, empowerment, power, as for ID (from the 1980s to now).

- Domain metaphor: (for PM- 1950s - 1990s) classic project is considered as a means to an end or a method, tool, way to achieve project and organizational objectives. For ID (1950s - 1980s) classic ID is a "top-down, technical, and managerial problem, of lagging behind

rich and developed countries" (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 554). As for ID studies, from the 1980s to now, we have a family of studies on long-term within- and between-country about social, political, economic, environmental, and technological, structural transformations.

- Key approaches, tools, and techniques: for classic PM (1950s to 1990s) best practices (e.g., PM standards and tools such as CPM, PERT, organizational structures, breakdown structures; for classic ID (from the 1950s to 1980s), best practices turn around national development planning, program and project management standards and tools such as the logical framework, cost-benefit analysis, linear programming, and input-output tables. As for ID studies (1980s to now), there is a strong residual of top-down "best practices" (e.g., randomized control trials, results-based management) increasingly challenged by participatory approaches, a focus on the context surrounding projects, and a central concern for people and power, critical discourse analysis, deconstruction, ethnography, environmental assessment, social, gender, and institutional analysis.

Historically, project management has been entrenched in a managerialist, technocratic and instrumental way of management (Dar & Cooke, 2008; Ika & Hodgson, 2014). The Management by Objectives (MBO) approach favours short-term objectives that are easy to quantify, irrespective of their strategic significance (Picciotto, 2020, p. 475). Lately, dominant project management (PM) practices are aligned with the MBO approach, reflecting the control orientation of New Project Management principles. Accordingly, the traditional PM approach concentrates on the mechanics of project planning, implementing, and controlling (ibid., p. 475).

Later, in the "Age of Relevance", research on project management increasingly scrutinized the links between projects, programs, portfolios, strategies, and organizational/ societal/ global challenges (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 549; Morris, 2013). Nowadays, scholarly concerns are evolving, taking more into account various concerns such as economic, social, political, and environmental transformations (Fischer, 2019; Geraldi & Söderlund, 2018; Ika et al., 2020a, p. 549)

2.2.4 Lack of Cross-Fertilization Between Project Management and International Development

According to Ika et al. (2020a), there has been little cross-fertilization between international development and project management. Both have come of age in the middle of the twentieth century, and they share a common concern for organizing work and delivering change (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 548). The project form is prevalent in international development (ID), contributing directly or indirectly to achieve sustainable and equitable poverty reduction and it also aims to improve the living standards of citizens in low- and low-middle-income countries comprised in the Global South (ibid., p. 548).

Considering their distinctive nature, IDPs qualify as a specific type of projects, though they are seldom featured in the mainstream project management literature (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469), whether in textbooks (e.g. Shenhar & Dvir, 2007), summaries (e.g. Davies, 2017), or standards. According to Ika (2015) we still do not know much, in both project management and international development literature, about how international development projects are carried out, why they fail, how they could succeed better, and what role project management processes play in their

delivery, not to mention how projects can reach time, budget, specific objectives and stakeholders' expectations targets (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 470).

According to Ika et al. (2020a), some of the foundations of project management grew out of the challenges associated with IDPs, as for funding decisions, performance assessments, and project governance (Morris, 1994). Moreover, ID has contributed a wealth of knowledge to PM, including the logical framework tool (Rodríguez-Rivero et al., 2019), feasibility studies, cost-benefit analyses, evaluations, gender analysis (Brière & Auclair, 2020), and result-based management (Biggs & Smith, 2003; Golini et al., 2015; Ika, 2012; Munro & Ika, 2020). Both PM and ID share a concern for change and rely on projects in general and interorganizational projects in particular (Manning, 2017), as means to deliver organizational (Schoper et al., 2018) or development change (Freeman & Schuller, 2020).

Also, as reported by Ika et al.(2020b), both PM (Morris, 2013; Shenhar & Dvir, 2007) and ID (Chimhowu et al., 2019; Horner & Hulme, 2019) increasingly situate project within programs, portfolios and a strategic stance. Consequently, PM has grown from being a strictly narrow management mean, where the focus is about doing things right (meeting time, costs, and quality), to a broader and more strategic and complex management of projects, where the focus is put on effectively delivering beneficial results for stakeholders and end-users (J. R. Meredith & Swikael, 2020; Williams et al., 2019).

2.2.5   International Development Projects' Objectives

International Development Projects (IDPs) seek to contribute, directly or indirectly, to achieving sustainable and equitable poverty reduction and/or improving the living standards in the Global South (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469). Fundamentally, IDPs seek to achieve intangible goals such as poverty reduction, improved governance, capacity building, and national transformation (Golini & Landoni, 2013; Ika et al., 2020a; Ika & Donnelly, 2017).

More than USD 250 billion is being spent in international development projects each year. It is estimated that 24 % of the world's GDP (USD 21 trillion) is generated through projects every year (Kaufmann et al., 2020).

Since the 1950s, ID had to deal with important, global, contentious, fast changing complex or "wicked" challenges, such as alleviating poverty, improving governance, building institutional capacity, promoting human rights, adapting to climate change, and helping to deliver a global response to Covid-19 (Munro, 2020; Smith et al., 2011, as reported by Ika et al., 2020b).

2.2.6   Types of International Development Projects

IDPs come in different types across a wide variety of sectors: health, education, governance, agriculture, infrastructure, utilities, transportation, water, electricity, energy, sewage, mines, nutrition, population, urban development, and governance (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004, 2005; Ika et al., 2020a; Manning, 2017).

They are usually categorized either as soft (such as promoting gender equality), process, or human-capital based projects (capacity-building, delivering policy reforms; governance, anti-corruption initiatives; or tackling global challenges (climate change, COVID-19) (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 549). IDPs can also have 'hard' objectives, when they have precise, well-defined infrastructure deliverables, such as the construction of routes, electric dams, water pipes (Ika et al., 2020b, p. 469).

IDPs often come in the size of large-scale international infrastructure projects with a huge size, enormous scope, numerous and diverse stakeholders, and with unprecedented transformational intent (Abers et al., 2017; Gil et al., 2019). Governance projects include human and civil rights protection, strengthening elections, political processes, and anti-corruption initiatives (Ramalingam et al., 2014).

They are also commonly differentiated as being systematic projects (e.g., infrastructure), ultimately seeking to reduce poverty, and emergency/ humanitarian projects (e.g., disaster relief or post-conflict rehabilitation projects) (Ika, 2012; Ika et al., 2020b), such as the Indian Ocean earth wake and tsunami relief in 2015, the Roll back malaria program and COVID-19 response, among others.

2.2.7   Characteristics of International Development Projects

The United Nations Organization defined ID project as a "planned enterprise that consists of a set of interrelated and coordinated activities to achieve specific objectives within the limits of a given budget and period" (Cohen & Franco, 2006, p. 85). According to the Project Management Institute

(PMI, 2017), ″a project is a temporary effort that is carried out to create a product, service or unique result".

IDPs differ from domestic projects, being multicultural, multi-country, multi-site, multi-organizational, and multi-stakeholder temporary endeavours, realized across the world. Being international, linked to interorganizational systems or networks (C. Jones & Lichtenstein, 2008; Manning, 2017; Oldekop et al., 2020), they are also characterized as involving high transaction costs. Coordination costs are related to many factors such as structural complexity and scale, interdependence, uncertainty, time pressures (R. J. Orr et al., 2011), and to space dimensions of project complexity.

Also, socio-cultural, political and sociological factors are present in IDPs, as they involve complex webs of formal and informal relationships between participants, distance constraints, and institutional differences in terms of beliefs and traditions, rule systems (R. J. Orr et al., 2011).

IDPs, either soft or hard, are often international projects, reaching beyond national borders, and involving multiple stakeholders, use resources or services from multiple world sites, geographies, cultures, organisations, and time zones (Grisham, 2010), government or business units and functions, whether physically or virtually (Ika et al., 2020a; Köster, 2009; Manning, 2017; Munro & Ika, 2020).

Ika (2012) summarized some of the main characteristics of IDPs: high complexity, a strong front-end activity, a large array of heterogeneous stakeholders often holding divergent perspectives,

need for compromise, strong appeal to politicians, profound cultural and geographical gaps between project designers and beneficiaries, an asymmetrical distribution of power between the richest countries and the poorer aid-receiving states, and the ever prevalent bureaucratic rules and procedures to attend to.

As reported by Rodriguez-Rivero et al. (2019, pp. 2–3), IDPs include practically all sectors (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004, 2005; Ika, 2012). They typically belong to the public sector (Ika et al., 2010; Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Ika & Hodgson, 2014; Wirick, 2009). They are regularly executed in difficult environments (Grisham, 2010; Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Ika & Hodgson, 2014; Landoni & Corti, 2011; Proulx & Brière, 2014; Youker, 2003). They involve many stakeholders and in different countries (Grisham, 2010; Hirschman, 1995; Ika, 2012; Khang & Moe, 2008; Youker, 1999). These stakeholders are distributed globally and locally, presenting differing if not contradictory expectations (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 552).

Moreover, the objectives are usually not achieved in a short period of time (Crawford & Bryce, 2003; Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Khang & Moe, 2008). They do not pursue economic benefits (Ahsan & Gunawan, 2010; Ika & Donnelly, 2017). Frequently, they are cases of multi-level principal-agent problems (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 552).

The customer is a community that does not establish the project and is rarely included in its definition (Ahsan & Gunawan, 2010; Ika, 2012; Proulx & Brière, 2014). Finally, project management tools are not as valid in some cultures (Blunt & Jones, 1992; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003).

IDPs tend to show high levels of socio-political complexity. Politics is everywhere in IDPs, from their selection by funders and political leaders, to their execution and evaluation. Moreover, Diallo and Thuillier (2005) found that for IDP managers, communication and trust matter a lot for their success.

To sum up the challenges they encounter, IDPs being mostly not-for-profit, technical, social, and political undertakings, they face many interrelated problems falling in three problem areas (Gow & Morss, 1988; Heeks & Stanforth, 2014 as collated by Ika et al., 2020a, p. 553):

- Structural or political, economic, physical/geographic, sociocultural, historic, demographic, and environmental problems.

- Institutional or collusion/corruption, capacity building, lack of political support, political interference, governance, and principal-agent problems.

- Managerial or initiation, planning, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation problems (Ika, 2012).

IDPs require many bureaucratic safeguarding operations and strong procedure orientation (e.g., as for procurement guidelines). Bilateral and multilateral donors put great emphasis on project procedures, including strict monitoring and reporting requirements, notably concerning the procurement guidelines.

The funding agency often leads the project identification in line with its own objectives (Youker, 2003). But it does not constitute a client/owner like in other projects as it does not receive the deliverables (Khang & Moe, 2008). In consequence, IDPs exhibit a lack of a clear and powerful customer (Golini & Landoni, 2013).

2.2.8 Many International Development Projects Are Complex

According to Remington and Pollack (2010, pp. 27–72), there are four types of complexity: structural, technical, directional, and temporary.

2.2.8.1 Structural Complexity

Structural complexity occurs when several elements (hierarchical levels, organizational subsystems, multiple organizations) become involved and are interdependent in the design, planning or execution of projects (ibid., pp. 27-38). Such a situation is particularly found in the construction, engineering, information technology sectors and defense projects, etc. (ibid., p. 27). There is much interdependence between the parties involved, in terms of carrying out the tasks, the decisions to be made, the resources required, etc.

This complexity usually creates tension, conflict, deadlines, significant cost overruns, and uncertainty. Emerging effects may occur, which were not initially foreseeable. Other problems could arise, such as: blockages in the flow of information, inflexibility in the application of rules, which make the organization ill-suited to react in time to face the problems (ibid., p. 30).

Faced with structural complexity, the organization is subject to a strong propensity for chaos, or even collapse of operations. Risks come from all sides: communications, schedule of operations, contract management, cost estimation, etc. As pointed by Williams (2002, pp. 157–158), there is a risk for human cognition of managers to be overwhelmed by this reality to which they are subjected. Among the preventive or remedial measures put forward by the authors, there is the need to rely on the support of senior management, and the importance of properly informing the actors involved (Davies et al., 2009; Jonsson et al., 2001).

2.2.8.2   Technical Complexity

Technical complexity, as presented by Remington and Pollack (2010, pp. 39–50), relates primarily to information technology areas and new product development. For these authors, this type of complexity applies to projects in which there are aspects either related to the conception (design) or of a technical nature that are unknown or not yet tested. Usually, teams of specialized experts, used to working independently, are involved in these technically complex projects. In this type of project, technical contributions are essential, and can slow down or prevent a project from succeeding. For the project manager, soft management skills are required and in addition he-she will need to demonstrate integrative skills about the relationships and contributions of the various teams.

Another factor relating to the technical complexity of aid is linked to the current strong bureaucratization of aid mechanisms. An editorial in The Globe and Mail (2011) laments that in a world where Canada must be able to respond effectively and expeditiously to global development needs, CIDA (the name of the former Canadian aid agency) was often constrained to respond to

heavy technocratic control rules. The editorial argues that a typical aid project takes 43 months to obtain the necessary approvals, in addition to having to produce an average of 28 documents to move from concept to action.

2.2.8.3 Directional Complexity

Directional complexity arises when objectives are not well defined or well understood by the actors involved in the project, or when the main stakeholders pursue different objectives (Remington & Pollack, 2010, pp. 51–60). Moreover, because of the political reality at stake, there may be no possibility for one of the organizational or sub-organizational actors to take decisions unilaterally and impose them on others in an authoritarian manner (ibid., p. 53).

2.2.8.4 Temporary complexity

For Remington and Pollack (2010, pp. 61–72), the project, in these cases, navigates through a changing scenery. Flexibility is required from project managers, who must keep open channels of communication and have negotiation skills, while keeping the actors involved well informed (ibid., pp. 63-64). The longer the project lasts, the more this type of complexity is likely to arise. Actors must then keep options open as the project progresses.

The project manager must be kept well informed of events and political pressures that may arise. However, no one better than senior managers (in their role of sponsors, champions, members of the steering committee, etc.) are better able to do this. There is a risk that a lack of information or transparency leads to demotivation and cynicism among project members.

In complex projects, particular managerial skills are required. Among such needed skills, we find, according to Hass (2009, p. 58), those which seem to apply to complex international aid projects, such as mastery of the factors of a political and administrative nature; the ability to formulate a vision, in particular consistent with the principles formulated in the 2005 Paris Declaration, the management of organizational change, an appropriate sense of ethics and strategic planning skills. Moreover, managers must resort to risk analysis, the workings of international cooperation, and writing documents clearly. We can also add that sufficient intercultural communication skills are useful (Davel et al., 2008; Kerzner & Belack, 2010).

Other dimensions specific to complex IDPs signify additional challenges to be tackled by project managers, such as the frequency of cost overruns and deadlines for complex projects (Kerzner and Belack, 2010, pp. 78-79); the presence of many stakeholders; the necessity to have an adequate governance structure (ibid., pp. 80-81); the need to properly identify the stakeholders in order to have an effective decision-making process (ibid., pp. 82-83).

Kerzner and Belack (2010) also argue about the need to be flexible and use various methods in complex project management (ibid., pp. 86-87). They underline the advent of several changes in the environment, given the many stakeholders and the long duration of the typical complex project. The stakeholders can also serve as valuable informants on the changes related to the context of the action (ibid., pp. 88-89).

It is possible that the stakeholders have different objectives, which complicates the decision-making process, or even may wish, in some cases, that the project be unsuccessful (ibid., pp. 100-

101). Cultural differences may also play a role in the relations between experts (including the project manager) and the local population (ibid., pp. 102-105); the decision-making process can be long and complicated (ibid., pp. 106-107).

The project must be reassessed for its relevance at certain stages (milestones' go-no go decisions), even if it means having to terminate the project prematurely in cases of marked under-performance (ibid., pp. 108-109; 114-115). Political factors can also come into play and complicate the decision-making process (ibid., pp. 124-125).

For Kerzner and Belack (2010), it is necessary to take into account the interdependence of the delivery of services, in relation to the needs of stakeholders (ibid., pp. 128-129). They add that it is also important: to manage change reports closely, to be accountable (ibid., pp. 130-131). The project manager must also keep detailed records of changes occurring in projects (Williams, 2002, p. 227).

According to Kerzner and Belack (2010), major changes are likely to be found in complex projects (ibid., pp. 142-143). It is important to clearly identify the stakeholders and their needs. Progress reports are required, on the status of the project and on forecasts (ibid., pp. 154-155). Since changes of the scope of the project are likely to occur, it is preferable to have a more flexible approach in the change control process (ibid., pp. 158-159).

As for human resources management, as in any human enterprise, projects may be based on unrealistic premises (ibid., pp. 206-209). Consequently, someone can ask to what extent we can

apply several of the principles of the Paris Declaration when the probity or the efficiency of the authorities of the recipient country are lacking.

The differences in remuneration between members of the project team, if they are attached to different organizations, can create dissatisfaction, jealousy, or create a bad work climate. The various cultures present (in NGOs, government agencies, multilateral organizations, etc.) can give rise to manifestations of various attitudes or reactions, in relation to variables such as control of uncertainty, risk-taking, linear, or holistic thinking, etc.

Due to the length of the programs, some high-quality human resources can be transferred elsewhere or go away, creating problems of various kinds (loss of established contacts, of the historical memory of the project, etc.) (ibid., pp. 222-223). In addition, project managers must learn to live with cultures different from their own, which is a problem that occurs with project managers trained in technical matters and not much in relational and intercultural skills (ibid., pp. 220-221).

In terms of the human resources available to the project, sometimes in developing countries, the quality of staff is very variable and difficult to verify at the start of the assignment (ibid., pp. 226-227).

Finally, corruption is a factor to take into consideration: several officials may take advantage of obtaining a position to divert funds for their own benefit (sale of licenses, rights, permits, etc.). Contrary to what Max Weber advanced on the rules of bureaucracy, which according to him make

it possible to promote justice and the equity of treatment of citizens, in some recipient countries, some civil servants may turn out to benefit of the situation, outside the rules, and enjoy undue administrative privileges.

2.2.9 The New Public Management Approach

According to Picciotto (2020, p. 474), the New Public Management (NPM) approach emerged in the late 1970's and triumphed in the early 1980's, introducing the widespread adoption of business administration principles (Ika & Lytvynov, 2011; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). The New Project Management Movement (NPMM) inspired the design and use of such policies as budget austerity, privatization, deregulation, contracting out, decentralization, the promotion of corporate management methods in the public sector (Picciotto, 2020, p. 474). It is easy to see the links here with the program of structural adjustments imposed by the IMF, the World Bank, and the US Treasury Board to the indebted developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s.

According to Picciotto (2020, p. 474), the NPMM rests on the theoretical pillars of neoliberal economics, transaction cost analysis, principal-agent theory and public choice doctrines. Consequently, project management practitioners tend to devote more attention to justifying the means rather than the ends of projects (Morris, 2013), encouraged to adopt this stance by project management handbooks that concentrate on implementation towards predetermined goals, with little relevance to their social relevance (Picciotto, 2020, p. 474).

2.2.10 Appreciation of the Rate of Success Attained by International Development Projects

Professionals and researchers have argued about the effectiveness of international aid (Bourguignon & Platteau, 2017). Supporters of aid consider that aid brings positive development in the long term (Arndt, 2015; Sachs, 2005). On the other hand, detractors contend that aid is not effective enough (Bigsten & Tengstam, 2015; Easterly, 2006). Even worse, some contend that international aid is in itself a problem, being based on western economic models that generate dependence relationships (Brooks, 2017; Moyo, 2009).

Some large infrastructure projects have been successful, such as the Three Gorges Dam project in China (1994-2011), that was managed by a government-owned company with an initial budget of USD 22,5 billion (Shenhar & Holzmann, 2017). Some large international projects like the USD 4 billion Addis-Ababa-Djibouti Railway, inaugurated in January 2018, will significantly help land-locked Ethiopia to disentangle its exports to the sea. That will help to improve that country's electrical supply (Ng, 2018).

But other huge mega-projects were historical failures, such as the USD 4 billion Chad-Cameroon pipeline project, which was intended by the World Bank to serve as an example to reduce poverty and strengthen Chad's institutional capacity. Unfortunately, the Chadian government reneged on its obligations, spending most of the oil revenues on arms and military equipment to fight rebels, instead of seeing to the urgent health and education problems of the country (Calderisi, 2006; Ika & Saint-Macary, 2012).

2.2.11 Challenges and Problems Relative to International Development Projects

There are many political, legal, cultural, technical, organizational, social, economic, and environmental challenges involved in IDPs.

Such strategic projects are often plagued by various mismanagement problems such as imperfect project initiation, poor understanding of the project context, poor stakeholder management, dysfunctional politics, delays of execution, cost overruns, poor risk analysis, inadequate monitoring and evaluation failures (Ika & Donnelly, 2017, p. 45).

Mismanagement concerns are often related to initiation, understanding the context, stakeholder management, execution delays and cost overruns, risk analysis, monitoring and evaluation, the structural complexity of IDPs, uncertainty, and the pace and dynamics of emergent complexity challenges (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 552).

IDPs, however, are projects in the classic sense of the term, since they are limited in time, temporary, unique, multidisciplinary undertakings, and aim to deliver goods and services. They have a life cycle, typically evolving from the preparation phase to the implementation phase, then to the final closure/evaluation phase. IDPs require the competent utilization of project management approaches, tools, and techniques to deal with the delivery constraints such as time, cost, quality (Golini et al., 2015; Ika et al., 2010; Landoni & Corti, 2011; Munro & Ika, 2020).

Finally, the combination of these characteristics often makes these types of projects cases of extreme socio-political complexity (Ika & Hodgson, 2014).

Several authors estimate that managerial explanations for project failures seem to be the same for both IDPs and other projects (Gow & Morss, 1988; Ika & Donnelly, 2017). Ika (2015) says that it would be helpful to open the project management "black box", and learn how IDPs are actually carried out, instead of devoting little interest to what is going on inside.

Andrews (2018) examined World Bank-funded public policy reform projects, and revealed that while 25 % are project management failures (not in time, scope, budget), 50 % are, in fact, international development failures (having had little or no impact).

Many observers estimate that many IDPs come in over budget and/or over time (Flyvbjerg, 2016). Also, for over seventy years, trillions of dollars have been spent on IDPs, with often meager results to show for it (Easterly, 2006). Numerous projects have failed to deliver sufficient impact for the targeted beneficiaries (Andrews, 2018; Banerjee & Duflo, 2012; Ika, 2012). There are also successes (Feeny & Vuong, 2017; Honig, 2018; Ika, 2018).

The ignorance of unfamiliar institutional contexts where the projects take place is often an issue. IDPs regularly take place in challenging, complex, uncertain volatile and crisis-ridden contexts (Picciotto, 2020); making partnerships and stakeholder engagements (Lannon & Walsh, 2020); social capital and knowledge management (Miković et al., 2020); gender mainstreaming (Brière & Auclair, 2020); and adaptation, evaluation and learning crucial (Picciotto, 2020), as reported by Ika et al.(2020a, p. 555).

Also, ID has traditionally focused on people-centered and participatory approaches, engaging with external stakeholders such as project beneficiaries (Abers et al., 2017; Rodríguez-Rivero et al., 2020). Moreover, strategic alignment and implementation have always mattered in ID (Easterly, 2006; Goldsmith, 1996; Hirschman, 1995; Oldekop et al., 2020). IDPs also contribute to strategy formation and how multi-level and multi-country strategies are formed through projects (Ika et al., 2020a, p. 555). Consequently, Picciotto (2020) calls for mainstream PM scholars to embrace adaptable processes, systems thinking and experimental approaches, where they see fit.

Moreover, governments in low-income countries face more acute resource shortages than governments of upper-income countries, resulting in a lack of administrative expertise (Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Youker, 2003). Also, IDPs are more likely to fall prey to corruption in developing countries, where extreme resource scarcity often induces fierce competition for resources (Grindle, 1980; Ika et al., 2020a, p. 553; Ika & Hodgson, 2014).

IDPs mostly take place in particularly challenging places: in developing countries which are often resource-poor, higher-risk, lower administrative capacity, often conflict-riddled environments, and characterized by weak institutions or bad governance (Crost et al., 2014; Picciotto, 2020).

Financially, they frequently involve complicated financial funding and implementation arrangements (Ika & Hodgson, 2014).

Nowadays, many factors are changing the scene of the international aid endeavours: the arrival of new donors or lenders (such as the Persian Gulf countries, Turkey, India, China's Export-Import

Bank), private foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Tata Foundation, etc. Moreover, the contemporary era marked by climate change, migration, and the COVID-19 pandemic, which prevails now at the time of writing, will surely provoke substantial perturbations and setbacks in the economic and political situation of many developing nations, notably in the region of sub-Saharan Africa.

2.2.12 Differentiate Standards

Munro & Ika (2020, p. 934) have identified different knowledge areas, concepts, tools and emphases that distinguish IDPs' standards from two non-profit organizations - PM4DEV and PM4NGOs, one parastatal - Canada's International Development Research Centre (IDRC) and two governmental agencies – the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, all working in international development from project management standards.

According to these researchers, a tension prevails in managing IDPs: a generic, one-size-fits-all approach, and a contingent, context-specific approach coexist in practice in IDPs.

Whereas a generic approach is grounded in fields such as engineering, construction and economics, the context-specific approach, more found in IDPs, is also grounded in disciplines such as sociology and anthropology (ibid., p. 934).

IDPs have their own special characteristics and logics. They often pursue 'intangible outputs', such as poverty reduction, improved governance or capacity building, which makes them 'soft', not 'hard' projects.

They often feature a high number of stakeholders (Golini & Landoni, 2013), such as, in World Bank projects: the project manager, the project supervisor in Washington, the recipient country national supervisor, a steering committee, subcontractors, suppliers of goods and services beneficiaries, and the population at large (Ika & Donnelly, 2017). Munro and Ika (2020, p. 936) add that IDPs tend to take place in difficult, complex and risky environments characterized by elevated levels of 'resource scarcity'. Such resource-rich projects can attract unwanted attention. They often involve several different ways of funding, implementing, and overseeing organizations.

Cultural differences, in IDPs, also play a larger role than in non-international development projects implemented by a single organization operating in a single country (Golini & Landoni, 2013).

Munro and Ika (2020, p. 942) found that international standards, except for PM4DEV, are more sensitive to the need for the project to adapt to its environment, compared to non-international development standards, such as the PMBOK Guide 2000, PMBOK Guide 6, and APM 6. Moreover, in general, the IDP standards take more into consideration approaches related to beneficiaries' needs, stakeholder consultations, community-based methods, and social, political, and cultural factors. Also, the unintended consequences of projects are more taken into consideration in IDP standards.

Finally, other sensibilities are found in IDP standards relatively to classical PM standards: a greater emphasis on gender analysis (Lewis et al., 2021), the effects of projects on stakeholders' human rights (Caldwell, 2002), a greater openness to participatory forms of project management beyond the project team (Ika & Hodgson, 2014), and a more explicit emphasis on evaluation and learning (Picciotto, 2018).

2.2.13 Toward a New Project Management Movement

Some researchers have highlighted the limitations of conventional project management practices as traditionally dominated by management by objectives principles (MBO) (Picciotto, 2020).

As reported by Ika et al. (2020a), it is relevant to suggest replacing 'top-down' and 'best-practices', by a 'muddling-through' approach. as for managing projects such as 'Problem driven initiative adaptation' (Andrews et al., 2012; Ika & Donnelly, 2017; Picciotto, 2020; Rondinelli, 1993).

International development experience stresses the promise of adaptable approaches to project design and management to face the contemporary complex and turbulent operating environments encountered by agencies and operatives. Projects conceived as experiments can contribute to sound decision making at a higher plane of strategy formation and policy making (Picciotto, 2020, p. 474).

Such an innovative PM movement has been theoretically constructed by project management academics (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Morris, 2013; Sydow & Braun, 2018, as reported by Picciotto, 2020, p. 475). Other academics have put forward the opportunity to question the lack of

analytical bridges between project management and international development (Ika, 2018; Ika & Hodgson, 2014).

A new and growing scholarly literature currently challenges the linear concepts embedded in traditional project management approaches, poorly adapted to operate in environments characterized by volatility and uncertainty, since the new operating environment for projects everywhere is increasingly unstable, turbulent, and shaped by diverse and vocal interests. In such circumstances, precise planning is ineffective due to the unpredictable ways in which unstable systems change (Kopczyński & Brzozowski, 2015, as reported by Picciotto (2020, pp. 476, 482)).

Management practices that ignore the antecedents, social and institutional context of the projects, and treating projects only as islands (Engwall, 2003) and only "best managed by the book", are doomed to fail. Accordingly, the New Project Management Movement (NPMM) calls for stronger connection between project management analysis to social sciences.

Contemporary PM research seeks to rethink PM theory by broadening its scope (Svejvig & Andersen, 2015). These efforts, critical of the supposed causal relationships found in the positivist tradition, seek instead to mobilize the insights of complexity and network theories, searching to give voice to the disadvantaged groups (Geraldi & Söderlund, 2018). Taking into account the accumulated lessons of the international development endeavours, such researches pursue a more values-based, ethical and sensitive approach, better reflecting the diverse stakeholders' views (Moylan & Walker, 2012).

The NPMM also advances that project's objectives must be consistent with beneficiaries' requirements and the authorizing environment (principle of relevance); the project's intervention must take account of their relative importance (principle of efficacy); the resources used by the project are expected to be converted into results economically possible (principle of efficiency); the project benefits have to be sustained (principle of sustainability), and project results must include unintended and side effects positive and significant for society over the long term (impact) (Picciotto, 2020, p. 483).

2.2.14 Reliance on the Logical Framework Approach

The Logical Framework Approach (LFA), also called ″logframe″, was initially developed by the Practical Concepts Incorporated consulting firm under the order of the United States Agency for the International Development (USAID) in 1969. It was created to address the problems that were observed in the evaluation of USAID's IDPs. LFA could be summarized by a need for more defined planning (PCI, 1979). The LFA is a method of planning by objectives or top-down.

The logical framework is a tool often used in IDPs, that has great value in ensuring that success indicators are identified and tracked but leaves wide open questions about the relevance of project goals and the justification of the means used to pursue them (Picciotto, 2020, p. 483). The use of the log frame tool must also be linked to theories of change that address the transformation of outcomes into impact, which largely depend on contextual factors. In that sense, systems theory, complexity thinking and network analysis must be put to work by the log frame (Picciotto, 2020, p. 483).

Golini et al. (2015) found, in their survey of project managers in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on IDPs, that there are important differences among them in their adoption of project management practices such as the logical framework tool, and that other tools, such as the critical path method, are less used. These differences are often due to variable organizational maturity levels found in NGOs.

The Logical Framework Approach (LFA) needs to be improved in the evolution of this mature methodology, such as for the integration of risk management (Rodríguez-Rivero et al., 2019, p. 1). Their research, done in consultation with various Spanish development agencies, led them to conclude that the logframe is considered by many aid professionals as a too rigid methodology, not having enough relationship with the success of a project. This argument is also supported in previous studies (de Bakker et al., 2010; de Carvalho & Rabechini, 2015; World Bank, 2018).

Still, the log frame report is considered essential for obtaining funds. It means that the more projects an organization undertakes, the more important that tool is for obtaining financing (Rodríguez-Rivero, 2019, pp. 11–12). Also, many respondents suggested the need to introduce new approaches such as gender, or human rights, and to better adapt the LFA to processes 'approaches advanced by the theory of change' (ibid., p. 13).

2.2.15 New Issues Tackled

2.2.15.1 Social Capital and Knowledge Management

In the learning category, Biggs and Smith (2003) have singled out the paradox of learning at the heart of project cycle management and emphasized the role of organizational culture in understanding how organizations learn (or do not learn) from their projects.

Miković et al. (2020) found that lack, and mismanagement of social links and knowledge resources have been identified among the biggest challenges of International Development Non-Governmental Organizations (ID NGOs) in reaching vulnerable beneficiary populations. Accordingly, they have explored ID NGOs' social capital and knowledge management systems to propose an integrated model to optimize ID NGO project management through social resources embedded into organizational structures. They propose to enable multistakeholder engagement in all phases of project lifecycle, to build a culture of accountability and respect.

Based on a survey of 215 ID NGOs active in the European Community and the West Balkan region, they found that human and social capital are important determinants of people's capacity to respond to the challenges in their working environment (Laszlo & Laszlo, 2002).

The key premise of the social capital concept is that networks are a valuable resource, bringing mutual recognition and long-term obligation as a result of feelings of gratitude, respect, friendship or institutionally guaranteed rights, to members of a family, class or school (Bourdieu, 1986; Jacobs, 1992). Accordingly, they focused on four dimensions of social capital: structural (Burt,

1992, 2004), relational (Fukuyama, 1995; Granovetter, 1992; Marsden & Campbell, 1984) cognitive (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; J. E. Orr, 1990), and nodal (Phelps et al., 2012).

They recommend that development actors work collaboratively across their organization as well as with key partners inside and outside their sector, sharing experiences and challenges. On the other hand, they determined the variables of knowledge management on four key stages: creation/ innovation, acquisition/collection, dissemination/share and usage/application (Bukowitz & Williams, 2000; McElroy, 2003; Meyer & Zack, 1996; Wiig, 1993).

When acquiring project knowledge, their analytical model suggests that, regarding internal sources, it is the quality of ties between employees and project teams (open, long-lasting, and recurring cooperation) and reciprocal exchange of information and knowledge that dictate the extent of which missing project knowledge will be acquired. The more intensive the ties and reciprocal exchanges, the better the access to project information for project managers (Miković et al., 2020, p. 528).

2.2.15.2 Gender and Development

Despite the proliferation of studies and guides to integrate gender in IDPs, a large gap persists between the theory, as explained in the literature, and practices that unfold in the field (Brière & Auclair, 2020). Many difficulties and resistances happen in all steps in the project life cycle. Using both paradox and critical theories, these researchers consider that project management methods traditionally aim to attain results specifically identified in the Logical Framework Approach. Project management concepts are based on certain assumptions about human behaviour such as

economic rationality (Muriithi & Crawford, 2003), which is functional and instrumental. Project management advances a coherent set of prescribed processes and techniques, as the well-established discipline that have their origins in engineering, construction, aerospace and defense sectors (McEvoy et al., 2016; Pellegrinelli, 2011).

Efforts to integrate Gender and Development (GAD) have to involve political engagement and self-criticism of power structures and actions within the organizations that carry out development projects (Eyben & Turquet, 2013; Gilles, 2015; Moser & Moser, 2005). The GAD approach reveals exclusion and discrimination and seeks to modify the position and subordination in which women have been historically placed under the patriarchal system (Brière & Auclair, 2020, p. 506). This is in line with the concepts of 'glass ceiling' (Laufer, 2003), and 'sticky floor' (Linehan & Walsh, 2000; Still, 1997) referring to systemic barriers limiting women' presence in jobs entailing international deployment. The professional context, which involves frequent international travel and support from organizations for work-life balance, still remain problematic nowadays (Razavi, 2016; Sampson & Moore, 2008).

Moreover, other systems of subordination, such as those based on age, ethnicity or social class (Akerkar, 2001) are still present in the field. Accordingly, teams in north-south projects tend to reproduce traditional colonial patterns characterized by individual and organizational relations still influenced by gender, class and heteronormality (Baines, 2010). Brière and Auclair (2020, p. 508) demonstrate the complexity of deconstructing gendered social constructs that underpin inequalities and discriminations historically experienced by women, and to modify power relations to achieve equality.

2.2.15.3 Better Understanding the Underlying Conditions that Explain Project Success.

Ika and Donnelly (2017), for their part, aim to better understand the underlying conditions that explain project success. Resorting to a multiple case approach, the researchers exchanged with the actors who were involved in four capacity building projects in Ghana (hygiene education in primary schools), Indonesia (improvement of library services), Sri Lanka (improvement of solid waste management services) and Vietnam (support to administrative reforms in land management and taxation).

They conclude that structural conditions (the contextual environment, accountability, and public participation), institutional conditions (beneficiary institution capacity and implementing organization capacity), and project management conditions (such as leadership, monitoring, design and stakeholder commitment and coordination) are the main factors of success at stake, to attain positive results. They propose that maintaining proper alignment with community and stakeholders' needs and adaptation are necessary for capacity building projects to succeed (ibid., p. 60). Also, they take into consideration emergent success conditions that occurred in the wake of the project.

Another finding is that consultations should include beneficiary staff, political champions, and various community stakeholders, since each group contributes differently to the required conditions for success.

2.2.15.4 The Project Facilitation Approach.

Lannon and Walsh (2020) present a Project Facilitation Approach (PFA), as an active response to tensions in international development programs. Based on three ID NGOs programs going on in three sub-Saharan African countries (Kenya, Zimbabwe and Uganda), they plead for the advantages brought forward by the program approach in international development: as sites for adaptability and learning (Pellegrinelli, 1997), for incorporating local experience and aiming to achieve strategic goals. According to these researchers, ID programs permit the conjoining of existing projects with organizational strategy (Lycett et al., 2004; Murray-Webster & Thiry, 2000), thus offering a transformational way to integrate projects and deliver long term benefits. Such a project facilitation approach allows the sharing of resources across projects, the need for inter-project coordination, allowing a constructive divergence and multiplicity of interrelations between constituent projects, and the involvement of multiple stakeholders (Pellegrinelli et al., 2007; Stretton, 2016; Wagner & Lock, 2016).

The project facilitation approach corresponds to an increasing need for adaptability and learning (Nejmeh & Vicary, 2009), and responds to the limitations of traditional project management techniques and structures, enabling organizations to deal with emergence, ambiguity and changing goals (Pellegrinelli et al., 2011, 2015; Thiry, 2016; Wagner & Lock, 2016).

2.2.15.5 The Strategic Prospective Approach

For their part, Rodríguez-Rivero et al. (2020) explain the usefulness of the Strategic Prospective Approach (SPA) that was applied in a development project in a Colombian higher technical school (to develop the employability for low-income young people). Probable future problems were

identified in advance with the stakeholders (teachers and incoming students), a process which had a positive impact on the project. This method allowed considering the problems anticipated, instilling flexibility and strategic alignment for the enablers of this experimental project. It improved risk management (Hartono et al., 2014; Kwak & Dewan, 2001) and the project's effectiveness to face uncertainties.

The Strategic Prospective Approach (SPA) experiment empowered the project managers to better deal with the unpredictable and rapidly changing conditions (Mack et al., 2016). Many meetings and focus groups with various stakeholders were arranged all along the project, to better evaluate the opportunities, possible change factors and pitfalls that occurred (Godet, 2004; Godet & Durance, 2011; Mojica, 2005).

The Strategic Prospective Approach (SPA) could be used by international development organizations to open an early dialogue with partners about the dangers of corruption that may lurk in aid project and programs to be launched. This also constitutes a way to send meaningful messages about their resolve to tackle corruption

2.2.15.6 National Plans Linked to the Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030)

Chimhowu et al. (2019) have examined the new trend by numerous countries to make development plans in relation with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030). One hundred seven (107) countries have presented national development plans. The authors found that plans vary significantly in terms of the evidence used, the degree of internal consistency between

the parts of the same plan, the process of developing the plan (either inclusive or elite-driven, and the extent to which they are clear on how they will be financed.

The research shows that there is a global renewed interest in comprehensive national planning. This new national planning trend has been stimulated by several factors: the recognition that markets by themselves cannot coordinate development activity and promote structural transformation. Nevertheless, this new trend differs greatly from the 1950s to 1970s era of national planning, by considering the plan method as a tool of development and not as a guarantee for development. This new paradigm recognizes more the factors of uncertainty and contingency, and the importance of communication and collaboration on the way planning should be carried in most countries.

Before, the classical planning paradigm was based on theories of linear rationality, seeing planning as an 'organized, conscious, and continual attempt to select the best available alternative to achieve specific goals' (Waterston, 1965, 2006). The plan was a blueprint document informed by impartial experts (technocrats). A second paradigm, more adopted nowadays, is based on more recent theories of communication and negotiation, using collaborative or instrumental rationality (J. E. Innes & Booher, 2010).

Another factor that played a role was, starting in 1996, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative that offered debt relief in exchange for commitments by beneficiary countries to invest in health, education, nutrition, and poverty reduction. The creditors insisted that HIPC

beneficiaries have a demonstrable strategy for reducing poverty, as well as the means to measure and track anti-poverty investments (Mallaby, 2004).

Around the same time, the rise of complexity science (Colander & Kupers, 2014; Ramalingam, 2013) argued for new forms of planning, based on contingency, behaviour change, adaptation and constant learning (Earl et al., 2001; Swanson & Bhadwal, 2009). As reported by Chimhowu et al. (2019, p. 79), especially in environmental science and policy, planning for complexity became increasingly mainstream. Planning did not insist anymore for specific outcomes, but for the increased resilience of individuals, organizations and systems in the face of emergent phenomena (Hummelbrunner & Jones, 2013). The same trend stands for contemporary national planning in its more sophisticated forms.

Considering these national planning endeavours, currently coming back into favour, could constitute an interesting way for aid donor countries to verify if these countries are serious when announcing their efforts to tackle corruption, and if so, verifying what are the actual results attained.

2.3   Understanding Corruption in International Development

2.3.1   Introduction

In section 2 of chapter 2.3 (named 2.3.2 in the text), there is a realization in international development circles that various revelations about scandals related to international aid and the doubts that many actors have about the efficacy of anti-corruption measures must lead donor countries and their citizens to re-evaluate the situation and to have more targeted interventions and

efficient anti-corruption measures enacted, to better succeed at reducing poverty and enhance social and economic growth in aid recipient countries.

In section 3 (2.3.3) of the present chapter, we see that there is a lack of consensus among scholars about the efficacy of foreign aid.

In section 4, many different factors are advanced by scholars about the various reasons that can explain the limited impact, until now, that anti-corruption efforts have had. Among the reasons advanced, we find the necessity to improve public procurement measures taken, in recipient countries, to promote better governance, and internal factors such as the political time horizon of national elites in developing countries.

In section 5, we see that donors' anti-corruption mechanisms regarding procurement measures generally have two main regulatory strategies available: increasing oversight over the spending of their funds, and pressuring recipient governments into widening access to tenders.

In section 6, we present some evasive strategies that recipient countries take to counter donors' reforms to open access and increase oversight concerning public procurement.

Section 7 is about the specific concerns and measures taken about public procurement, which accounts for 30 to 50 % of states' public spending and is highly prone to corruption. So, regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing oversight over the spending of aid may strengthen the accountability of recipient countries.

Section 8 reports the findings of a group of researchers who have found an alarming leakage rate of foreign aid, that is deposited in financial havens at a mean rate of 7,5 % of World Bank aid received, thus demonstrating that a high amount of aid is captured by recipient countries' elites. Section 8 also presents various World Bank anti-corruption institutional measures taken.

In section 9, we examine the efforts made by the World Bank since 2003 regarding the means taken to reduce corruption about procurement issues. Moreover, researchers have found that the notion of PSI (Party System Institutionalization) plays an important role in how the occurrence of corruption is linked to the political systems in place in aid recipient countries.

In section 10, we report about various studies that examined the factors conducive to corruption in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, such as economic development, per capita income, rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, type of governance, foreign direct investments, etc.

Section 11 highlights the fact that the membership of the International Donor Organizations (IDOs) plays an important role about how foreign aid organizations consider or not to take into account the corruption measure of recipient countries in the establishment of their aid strategy.

Please find in Table 3 some of the main points advanced by specific researchers presented in part 2 of chapter 2.

Table 3: To Better Understand Corruption in International Development

Authors	To Better Understand Corruption in International Development
Dávid-Barret et al. (2020) and Dávid-Barret & Fazekas (2020)	The World Bank reform, to open up access and increase oversight, decreases corruption risks associated with lack of competition during the bidding stage linked to procurement processes. But this reform displaces corruption risks to untreated phases of the procurement process.
Andersen et al. (2020)	On elite capture: in many aid recipient countries, a substantial part of ODA received is stashed away in financial havens. This finding is consistent with economic theories of rent-seeking related to foreign aid. Aid, when corresponding to 1% of a recipient country's GDP, leads to deposits made in financial havens, at an average leakage rate of approximately 7,5 %.
World Bank (2020)	The fight to combat corruption will be long and complex. The necessary Anti-Corruption Institutional Measures concern: 1) five functions any government performs; 2) five selected policy tools governments use or should use; and 3) three oversight institutions governments use.
Dávid-Barret et al. (2020)	The concept of Party System Institutionalization (PSI) is important to understand how the political context in recipient countries affects the corruption risks in aid. A higher PSI seems to be associated with lower corruption risks in aid-funded public procurement. Indeed, the most efficient way for a strongly institutionalized party to maintain a large support base, is to "buy" electoral loyalty with public goods such as economic growth, rather than clientelist goods. On the other hand, a low PSI creates a short horizon of power for elites, inciting them to resort to clientelist corruption schemes.
Musila (2019), Gani (2017), Gök (2020)	Many variables are correlated to corruption incidence: economic determinants such as revenue per capita, industrialization, trade openness; political factors such as democracy, good governance, political freedom and competition, freedom of press, women in

	government; bureaucratic and regulating factors such as quality of bureaucracy, the judicial system / rule of law; socio-demographic factors such as education, linguistic and ethnic homogeneity.
Ferry et al. (2020)	International Donor Organizations (IDOs) composed of donor states with lower levels of corruption are less willing to allocate aid to corrupt recipients than IDOs composed of corrupt donors, which are not likely to refuse aid to a recipient based on corruption allegations. Their study contends that, in the contemporary context of corruption, talk of good governance appears to be largely cheap talk for some donors. On one hand, indeed, less corrupt donors enforce these norms, but, on the other hand, many IDOs simply ignore the rules at will.

2.3.2 The Uncertain Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures

Following scandals about corruption in foreign aid, and in a political climate that increasingly questions the legitimacy of development assistance, donors are under pressure to better control how their funds are spent (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020, p. 481). Moreover, given a widespread sense among donors that mainstream anti-corruption reforms over the past 25 years have failed to yield sufficient results, there ensued a move toward more targeted interventions by aid donors (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020).

Scandals showing how foreign aid has been embezzled weaken the support of donor countries' national electorates. Donors have responded by seeking to better control their spending, while balancing this against exhortations to build better recipient government capacity (ibid., p. 482). For many researchers, a central question is: does the effectiveness of donors' anti-corruption mechanisms depend on recipient-country characteristics?

2.3.3 The Divergent Studies' Conclusions on the Efficacy of Foreign Aid

While numerous studies find that foreign aid fuels corruption (e.g. Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016; Bräutigam & Knack, 2004; Busse & Gröning, 2009), others find that aid reduces corruption in recipient countries (e.g. Mohamed et al., 2015; Okada & Samreth, 2012; Tavares, 2003). Still, other academics report no significant effect of foreign aid on corruption (e.g. Ear, 2007; Menard & Weill, 2016).

Other academics delved into the incentive factors affecting whether aid spending is corrupted, pinpointing uncertainty (Kangoye, 2013), the size of inflows (Dalgaard & Olsson, 2008), ethnic and religious fragmentation (Svensson, 2000a) as relevant factors. Still, others argue that both donor and aid proliferation can dilute the governance agenda, creating space for discretionary spending behaviour with donor funds (Busse & Gröning, 2009; Knack & Rahman, 2007).

Other researchers have focused on the modality of aid distribution. Some scholars have debated whether general budget support or project aid is more effective for supporting development (Deaton, 2013; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008). For others, multilateral aid is more effective in curbing corruption than bilateral aid (e.g. Charron, 2011).

It has also been argued that incentives for corrupt behaviour depend on recipient countries' elites' time horizons (Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Rock & Bonnett, 2004; Wright, 2008). Elites with long-time horizons, as for autocratic rulers who do not face significant challenges to their political authority, or democratic politicians in a highly predictable electoral arena – face incentives to restrain corrupt activities, and would rather invest public resources towards economic growth, so

that some of them can loot more after. In the long run, elites with short-time horizons face incentives to steal as much as possible before leaving office.

2.3.4 The Limited Impact of Anti-corruption Efforts Until Now

Despite making considerable investments in fighting corruption over several decades, international development agencies are often criticized for having failed to achieve a significant impact on levels of graft (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020, p. 1). These anti-corruption reforms often overlooked the challenges to implementation in given development contexts. Among the challenges encountered, there is a lack of state capacity and weak resources (Pritchett et al., 2010). Also, there is the need to 'think and work politically' by paying attention to how affected interests might react (Rocha Menocal, 2014).

Many standardized and 'best-practice' public procurement laws have been introduced around the world, but often made little difference to procurement practices (Atiga & Azanlerigu, 2017; D. S. Jones, 2007; Williams-Elegbe, 2014, 2015).

External factors, such as donor controls, interact with domestic factors (de Renzio, 2006). The impact of anti-corruption tools depends to a large extent on the environment in which they are implemented, for example the quality of the local accountability ecosystem (Bräutigam, 1992; Grimes, 2013), the presence of rule of law in the recipient country (Mungiu-Pippidi & Dadasov, 2017), the degree of media freedom (Brunetti & Weder, 2003) and the competitiveness of elections for public office (Winters & Weitz-Shapiro, 2013). Some also argue that incentives for corrupt

action depend on elites' time horizons (Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Rock & Bonnett, 2004; Wright, 2008).

Where political connections are important to procurement success, this tends to benefit domestic firms which are more likely to build long-term relationships with local public authorities than foreign firms, especially those without a domestic subsidiary (Coviello & Gagliarducci, 2017).

When it comes to corruption in the spending of aid, one set of institutions that shape elites' risk calculations in recipient countries are donors' anti-corruption mechanisms, Since the poorest countries are also often the most corrupt ones, it becomes crucial for donors to control recipients' spending from aid funds via well-established institutions (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).

There is also at stake a collective action problem, meaning that individuals in contexts where corruption is systemic have little incentive to change their behaviour (A. Persson et al., 2013).

2.3.5 The Donors' Own Anti-Corruption Mechanisms

In seeking to curb corruption, donors have two main regulatory strategies available: increasing oversight over the spending of their funds, in line with economic approaches (Klitgaard, 2009; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016), or promoting greater local competition by pressuring recipient governments into widening access to tenders.

Institutional anti-corruption mechanisms by donors also shape recipient countries' elites' calculations (Alesina & Weder, 2002; Easterly & Pfutze, 2008).

Since the 2003 Rome Declaration, donors have sought to improve aid effectiveness through building capacity in recipient countries (OECD, 2003), and tying aid to a good governance agenda that establishes strict conditions for how money is spent (Charron, 2011; Ellmers, 2011; Tavares, 2003). This policy-related conditionality targeted aid relatively to budget support (H. White & Dijkstra, 2003), but it seems to work better in some contexts than others (Caputo et al., 2011; Cordella & Dell'Ariccia, 2007; Dijkstra & de Kemp, 2015).

In weak governance and high-corruption contexts, donors prefer to use earmarked or project aid, subject to tighter controls (Radelet, 2005). But this can blur donor and recipient ownership, and cloud accountability relationships (Fritz & Kolstad, 2008). Otherwise, increasingly, donors prefer disbursing funds against outcomes, this being called 'results-based aid', thus reducing their exposure to institutional weaknesses (Perakis & Savedoff, 2015).

Many common reforms to procurement are in line with both logics: the introduction of e-procurement both reduces transaction costs and constrains the discretionary power of officials overseeing the process. The introduction of e-procurement has been found to reduce prices (Auriol, 2006; Singer et al., 2009) and, for instance in both India and Indonesia, to increase the probability that the winning bidder comes from outside the region where the contract takes place – an indicator of widening access (Lewis-Faupel et al., 2016).

2.3.6   Opportunistic Evasive Strategies that Recipient Countries Take

There is mounting evidence that a targeted intervention to curb corruption in procurement processes might achieve its specific goal and yet also trigger strategic responses on the part of corrupt individuals, who will simply adapt their behaviour and find new loopholes to exploit. Corrupt officials, confronted with tougher regulations, often find alternate strategies to pursue rents (Olken & Pande, 2012). In a recent study of healthcare reform in Uganda, in spite of a drastic increase in oversight and penalties for bribe-taking, resulting in the short term to reduce bribe requests, the beneficial result was short-lived because staff began instead to solicit 'gifts' or other 'signs of appreciation' to supplement their income (Peiffer et al., 2018).

In another experiment in Romania, increased oversight of high-school exams and tougher penalties reduced collective cheating, but then more affluent students switched to paying bribes to improve their results, while less affluent students saw their grades drop (Borcan et al., 2017; Fisman & Golden, 2017).

As reported by Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020, p. 2), significant 'displacement effects' are widely observed in criminology too, with law enforcement actions against organized crime often resulting in unintended consequences or prompting strategic responses (Guerette & Bowers, 2009; Levi & Maguire, 2004; R. G. Smith et al., 2003; Welsh & Farrington, 2003). Criminals under pressure move to different geographical locations to take advantage of weaker law enforcement or greater market opportunities (Varese, 2012), or to get around regulations (Vidal & Décary-Hétu, 2018). They also utilize new technologies to avoid detection as with the growing use of drones to smuggle drugs in prisons (O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017).

This is in line with a broader literature that indicates that anti-corruption reforms fail because they do not address the underlying political and social conditions fostering corruption, or the difficulty of motivating individuals to overcome entrenched collective action problem (Marquette & Peiffer, 2015; A. Persson et al., 2013; Rocha Menocal, 2014).

Technical interventions might not represent the best way to tackle systemic corruption; instead, strategies should target the root causes of corruption and contribute to building a culture of integrity (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020, p. 8).

Strong displacement effects may cancel out the direct positive impacts. Such evasive strategies follow two main logics: 1) substituting corruption techniques in more tightly controlled areas; 2) exploiting remaining weaknesses in the control framework more intensively. Corrupt buyers may switch to non-treated non-competitive procedure types, whose prevalence increases from 7 % to 10 % while risky signature periods also become more common, increasing from 25,0 % to 29,4 % (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020, p. 8).

Corruption in public procurement is predominantly about erecting barriers between 'insiders' or connected firms on the one hand, and 'outsiders' or non-connected firms on the other.

Corrupt actors administering public procurement processes respond strategically. This can be done by splitting lots so that they fall below thresholds at which certain controls or transparency are required (Papanek, 2009; Piga, 2011); or by invoking exceptions to the rules on grounds of national security or extreme urgency (OECD, 2007; Schultz & Søreide, 2008; Søreide, 2002).

Corrupt actors may take advantage of the fact that the process is complex, yet structured, so when they are confronted with significant changes in procurement rules that increase oversight or constrain their discretionary power, corrupt officeholders have considerable scope to respond strategically by shifting their manipulations to another phase of the process, as reported by Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020, p. 3).

There are only two main ways for corrupt actors to react to increased corruption controls: to move on to other, less controlled phases of the procurement process or to exploit existing loopholes more intensively.

Two evasive responses are pre-eminent. Corrupt actors may switch to procedure types less competitive by nature such as sole-sourcing or negotiated procedures (ibid., p. 4). The new requirements of online advertising and use of e-procurement then have little impact. Many evasive strategies abound, such as when the bids are evaluated, cronies may be favoured instead through improper influence over the evaluation committee.

2.3.7   Specific Concerns and Measures on Public Procurement

Public Procurement typically accounts for a large portion of government spending in the developing world (World Bank, 2015a), making it a key target for elites seeking to steal (Søreide, 2002; Ware et al., 2007). Technically, it is controlled by bureaucrats rather than politicians, but politicians are often able to exert considerable influence through control over appointments to the bureaucracy and regulatory agencies (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020).

It is thus necessary to observe a whole system to detect displacement effects and unintended consequences. The context of corruption in public procurement is an area critical to good governance, since government procurement typically accounts for 30-50 % of state public spending, and is highly prone to corruption (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016; Ware et al., 2007).

Where aid is disbursed through national procurement systems, it is then vulnerable to institutionalized grand corruption, whereby rules and principles of good public procurement are subverted to benefit a closed network or cronies or allies, while denying access to others (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006; North et al., 2009; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In public procurement, it is assumed that contracts will be allocated to the bidder with the most favourable offer, according to predetermined criteria. Corruption occurs in public procurement when a contract is steered to a favoured bidder rather than being allocated according to principles of open and fair competition (World Bank, 2009).

Corruption in public procurement typically occurs when insiders manipulate different parts of the process – for example, by writing the specification of the tender very narrowly in such a way that only one company can meet the conditions (Báger, 2011; Goldman et al., 2013; Grødeland, 2005; Heggstad & Frøystad, 2011). Also, advertising the tender for a very short period so that only companies with advance knowledge have time to write a bid (Kenny & Musatova, 2010; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997).

Regulatory reforms aimed at enhancing oversight over the spending of aid should in principle reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen the accountability of recipient governments. According to some studies, the threat of external audit effectively reduces corruption (Avis et al., 2018; Knack et al., 2017; Olken, 2007; Zamboni & Litschig, 2018). Also, intensive audits will reduce prices for homogeneous goods (Di Tella & Schargrodsky, 2003).

2.3.8 World Bank Studies on Elite Capture and Anti-Corruption Institutional Measures

2.3.8.1 Elite Capture

Andersen et al. (2020), of the World Bank Group / Development Research Group, have calculated that World Bank aid disbursements to the most aid-dependant developing countries coincide with significant increases in deposits made by these aid recipient countries' elites, to be held in offshore financial centers known as 'financial havens', reputed for their bank secrecy and private wealth management (Andersen et al., 2020, p. 19).

They estimate a leakage rate by these elites to be around 7,5 % for the average highly dependent countries. Their sample consisted of 22 aid recipient countries, for the period of 1990-2010, that received annual disbursements from the World Bank, equivalent to at least 2 % of their GDP, and for whom development aid from all sources exceed 10 % of their GDP on average (ibid., p. 7). The researchers took care to exclude for these countries' specific periods characterized by wars, coups, natural disasters, and financial crises (ibid., p. 13).

They conclude that aid capture by ruling politicians, bureaucrats, and their cronies, when receiving World Bank aid, is proven, substantial, and consistent with economic theories of rent-seeking related to foreign aid (Svensson, 2000a).

These most secretive financial havens can be found in Switzerland, Luxembourg, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Hong Kong and Singapore, whose legal framework emphasizes secrecy and asset protection. It is remarkable that this money does not go to financial centers such as London, New York, and Frankfurt, where knowledge about deposits can be made public on demand.

These findings contribute to debates about the effectiveness of foreign aid (Andersen et al., 2020, p. 1), how aid is spent (Werker et al., 2009), how it is absorbed in the domestic economy (Temple & Van de Sijpe, 2017), how it stimulates growth (Dalgaard et al., 2004), improves human development (Boone, 1996) and reduces poverty (Collier & Dollar, 2002).

These transfers are private, and "It is almost certain that the beneficiaries of the money flowing to havens at the time of World Bank disbursements belong to economic elites" (Andersen et al., 2020, p. 2).

To be more precise, Andersen et al. (2020, pp. 3-4) estimate that aid corresponding to 1 % of a recipient country's GDP increases deposits in havens by around 3,4 %, making the average leakage rate at approximately 7,5 %. On the other hand, for the sample of the seven countries that receive aid equivalent to 3 % of their GDP, they found a higher leakage rate of around 15 % for these countries.

These least developed countries are also often the worst governed (Alesina & Weder, 2002), which leads to think that very high levels of aid might foster corruption and institutional erosion (Djankov

et al., 2008; Knack, 2000). The researchers also found that 15 % of petroleum rents in countries with poor governance are diverted to bank accounts in havens (Andersen et al., 2020, p. 14).

Specific examples about average haven deposits range from USD 4 million in tiny Sao Tome and Principe, to almost USD 200 million in Madagascar (Andersen et al., 2020, p. 6).

2.3.8.2   Anti-Corruption Institutional Measures to Implement

In its September 2020 World Bank Report titled "Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency: The Fight Against Corruption", the World Bank (2020) presents:

- In part I, five functions that any government performs. It: 1) procures goods and services (World Bank, 2020, p. 18-27); 2) provides public goods (e.g., infrastructure) (ibid., p. 52-61); 3) runs public sector companies – State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) (ibid., p. 94-102); 4) collects revenue, prevents smuggling; manages customs (ibid., p. 122-134); 5) provides services (e.g., ports, land management, healthcare) (ibid., p. 152-157).

- In part II, five selected policy tools a government uses or should use are: 1) open government (ibid., p. 178-185), 2) Gov Tech (ibid., p. 202-213); 3) asset and interest disclosure (ibid., p. 224-231); 4) beneficial ownership transparency (ibid., p. 248-265); 5) exchange of tax information and identification of tax crimes (ibid., p. 266-267).

- In part III (ibid., p. 289-331)., three oversight institutions governments use: 1) anti-corruption agencies; 2) supreme audit institutions; 3) justice system.

In part I, about the functions that a government performs, the World Bank (WB) reports that public procurement accounts for between 10 to 25 % of public spending globally. According to WB experts, corruption in procurement is rampant, with estimates capital investment projects being consumed by corruption ranging from 10 to 30 % (World Bank, 2020, p. 19). It impacts the poorest sections of society and distorts competition and economic growth.

According to the WB group, reducing corruption in public procurement requires a country-specific approach and to harness forces in the private sector and civil society. In the WB report (2020), three national cases are studied: Somalia, Bangladesh, and Chile, the later considered to be a model of well-performing state with a relatively high degree of capacity and integrity (ibid., pp. summary xvii-xviii, 28-51).

As for public infrastructure, USD 3 to 4 trillion will be needed to meet annually the needs of the 1,2 billion of people who lack electricity, the 663 million who lack adequate drinking water sources, and the billion people who live more than two kilometers from any all-weather route (ibid., p. summary xviii, 53).

As for infrastructure, the subsequent procurement phases, following project selection, tend to be where the most entry points for corruption take place, the construction phase being vulnerable to various post-renegotiations of performance requirements, where the losses for the public purse are significant (ibid., p. 54). In the WB report, the cases of Thailand, Ukraine, Honduras (ibid., pp. 62-75), and Colombia are discussed (ibid., pp. 84-93).

About state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the WB report (2020) proposes various measures, such as reducing their monopoly power, professionalizing the SOE board of directors and senior management, and breaking some large SOEs into smaller businesses to bring opportunities for greater private sector involvement in the operations (ibid., pp. 99-100). The WB report discusses the cases of Brazil (where the high-profile *Lava Jato* – meaning car washing, initiative took place, among others revealing the Petrobras scandal), Angola (with the backdrop of massive scandals that took place in the state oil company), and Colombia (ibid., pp. 103-121).

As for customs administration, the collection of taxes (tariffs, excises and import value added tax) account for a sizable portion of government revenues - commonly 30 to 50 %, and even more in less developed and fragile countries. Customs administration can be highly vulnerable to corruption since officials often enjoy discretionary powers. Such a situation can be a disincentive to foreign investors (ibid., pp. summary xx,). The WB takes notice of the interesting efforts done in this sector of state revenue by Rwanda and Georgia (ibid., pp. 128-129). The WB report also presents the cases of Madagascar and Afghanistan (where a country-wide computerization of customs clearance operations succeeded in reducing face-to-face contacts and increase state revenue) (ibid., pp. 135-151).

Concerning service delivery in sectors such as land, health and ports, the WB report (2020) considers that unpacking sector-specific issues is crucial to diagnose the root causes of corruption in these public services, and design appropriate interventions, the three sectors being very distinct (ibid., p. summary xxi). The report describes: the Rwandan case of land mapping and titling, that included the digitization of records; the Ukraine efforts to improve its soviet style influenced health

system, to raise health professionals' remuneration, and Nigeria's reform of port administration, to better develop corruption risk assessments and improve the functioning of ports (ibid., pp. 158-175).

In part II, about the five selected policy tools governments use or should use, the WB (2020) Anti-corruption reports:

1) About open government, that the aim is to shift norms in a sustainable manner leading to more transparency, and less conducive to corrupt activity. More transparency, inclusiveness and collaboration can provide more relevant information, create opportunities for citizen engagement, and strengthen accountability (ibid., p. summary xxii). Two case studies are presented: about Kenya whose aim is to engage more citizens in the budgeting process, and Ethiopia's effort to better engage citizens and improve public service delivery (ibid., pp. 186-201). The WB experts conclude that transparency can hardly address corruption by itself but may be a step to involve more stakeholders to better address corruption in service delivery (ibid., p. summary xxiii).

2) About Gov Tech: in this domain, institutional incentives and capacities and strong leadership seem to be the keys for enhanced efficiency (ibid., p. summary xxiii). In principle, reducing the interface in service delivery supports the governments' effort to curtail the risks of rent-seeking behaviour. Digitalization can help to improve transparency, with real-time feedback helping to expose illicit behaviour. But such endeavours depend on the institutional context. At best, developing countries could leapfrog and introduce new disruptive technologies, aiming to address public sector challenges (ibid., p. summary

xxiii). The WB report recalls the effort led in the Indian province of Andhra Pradesh, which used drones to collect geospatial data to reduce opportunities for fraud and corruption, and efforts made such as taxation and construction permits that helped to improve revenue for local governments (ibid., pp. 214-223). The WB experts consider that the full impact of new technologies lies in breaking technology silos and implementing interlinked approaches across sectors and services (ibid., p. summary xxiv).

3) About asset and interest declarations (AID): gestures are necessary to prevent conflicts of interests, and detect unjustified assets acquired, leading to a broader integrity of public service (ibid., p. 225). Even though many countries have AID systems, little evidence of effectiveness was found all in all, by means of disguising unjustified wealth. Nevertheless, WB suggest governments to use more public perception surveys, expert opinions, and quantitative reviews of compliance. Two case studies are presented in the report: as for Ukraine, which has overhauled the country's anti-corruption infrastructure since 2016, results are still expected. For Romania., which also has a long history of inactivity for tackling corruption, a new system to warn authorities about potential conflicts of interests in procurement procedures has been put in place (ibid., pp. 232-247).

4) About beneficial ownership transparency: it concerns the extensive use of anonymous companies to conceal corrupt practices and proceeds, as we illustrated in the previous part of this thesis for elite capture (see Andersen et al., 2020 in part 2.3.8.1). Illicit financial flows (IFFs) are not constrained by national borders; indeed, illicit funds can still find safe havens. The use of publicly available registers can inform the public about the beneficial owners of corporate entities. A double impact can ensue: helping to enforce illicit enrichment laws, detecting and preventing conflicts of interest in public procurement

(World Bank, 2020, p. summary xxv). Three case studies are presented by the WB report (2020): 1) in Nigeria, notably the effort at transparency in the extractive sector; 2) in Slovakia where companies are required to register as a partner of the public sector; and 3) in the United Kingdom, which offers an example of how to balance data protection and privacy in a disclosure (ibid., pp. 258-261).

5) About the exchange of tax information on collaboration on tax crimes (ibid., p. 267). The impact of inter-agency collaboration can be significant, as it was illustrated in the Brazilian Petrobras investigation, that allowed officials to uncover evidence of money laundering, tax evasion and hidden assets. Two case studies are presented: 1) one is about enhancing collaboration and improving inter-connectivity, so agencies can share information through agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs); 2) to ensure the exchange of information between tax administrations and other domestic law enforcement agencies (ibid., pp. 268-287).

In part III of the report, three oversight institutions governments can use are presented.
The WB (2020) Anti-corruption reports:

1) As for anti-corruption agencies (ACAs), the WB experts consider that political will and high-level commitment are necessary for their success (ibid., pp. summary xxvii-xxviii). Also, inter-agency coordination and cooperation among different jurisdictions are required. ACAs must position themselves within the institutional environment, with a clear mandate. Otherwise, ACAs will not be efficient. Despite high expectations, most ACAs have not succeeded in achieving the organizational standards set by the United Nations Convention

against Corruption (UNCAC). A favourable institutional environment is needed, such as an honest judiciary, and independent and functional bodies of governance (e.g., budget system, appointments, human resources). Such pervasive institutional limitations show the fickleness of counting on a stand-alone ACA in most countries. The report presents case studies about the UK: its International Corruption Unit (ICU), part of the National Crime Agency, was given a dedicated staff and budget, which yielded positive results. In Lithuania, a dedicated ACA was set up with strong leadership and technical expertise and was rather successful to obtain results. Though, in Bhutan, a lack of strategic planning led to meager results for its ACA, and many reforms did not address cultural heritage issues (ibid., pp. 294-300).

2) About Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) (ibid., p. 305): the SAIs constitutes important foundations that provide fiscal oversight by the presentation of credible and timely audit results to legislatures, government, civil society and the large public. Their work is useful and important, by checking government accounts, the verification of regulatory compliance and through the assessment of various government entities. Again, their usefulness depends much on their environment: when corruption is nationally rampant, establishing their operational and financial independence is a real challenge. In the WB report, case studies examined the situation in Ghana where SAI Ghana was led by a reform champion in the fight against corruption, who succeeded to investigate irregularities and build alliances with the civil society. In the case of India, also following the Westminster model, the Comptroller and Auditor General unearthed inappropriate transactions that had cost the government huge sums of money (ibid., pp. 307-313).

3) About the Justice System: The Justice System (that includes courts, prosecutors, police and the supporting bodies) needs the support of the political leadership to play a useful role in the fight against corruption (ibid., p. 317). Many reforms are needed: ensuring judicial and prosecutorial independence, encouraging judges and prosecutors to be accountable to the public for their performance. The fight against corruption must also target the selection, evaluation and promotion of judges, prosecutors, and court staff. Many citizens in developing countries have experienced first-hand police corruption, for example having met policemen stopping drivers to extort bribes from them under false pretexts.

In the conclusion of the WB report (ibid., p. 328), the following points are advanced:

- The necessity for a strong political leadership to lead reform and resist opposition from vested interests.

- To ensure the building of strong institutions to provide checks and balances, and foster accountability.

- Transparency, to promote greater compliance and improve human behaviour. Open government policies and access to information are levers to render corruption practices harder to hide.

- Incentives to change social norms and focussing more on the micro-levels of corruption, and its manifestations in specific sectors of society.

- Technology to foster better collaboration among multiple stakeholders in the fight against corruption.

2.3.9   To Reduce Corruption in Procurement Issues, and the Importance of Party System

Institutionalization

2.3.9.1   How Does Opening Up Access and Increase Oversight at the Bidding Stage

Decreases Corruption Risks?

In 2003, the World Bank initiated an anti-corruption program intended to better regulate the procurement practices of the countries receiving loans for public procurement. It must be recalled that wider advertisement and easier bid submission represent the main treatment in the 2003 reform. The World Bank is a significant spender; its procurement system affects a portfolio of around USD 42 billion in over 1800 projects in 172 countries (World Bank, 2015b).

Also, at the World Bank, today, good governance standards are enforced by the Office of Anticorruption and Integrity, which reports directly to the President of the Bank.

Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020) have tested the effectiveness of two widely pursued reform efforts by the WB to reduce corruption with regard to procurement bidding processes. Their first hypothesis (H1) (ibid., pp. 3-4,6) was that: The reform to open up access and increase oversight decreases corruption risks associated with lack of competition during the bidding stage. (H1) was confirmed. The share of tenders attracting only a single bidder decreased from 22,4 % to 18,7 %; and the average number of bidders went up from 4,5 to 5,0. The pool of bidders also increased. But the number of foreign firms did not go up, going from 15,8 % to 13,7 %, the newly winning bidders being mainly domestic firms. Also, the share of repeat winners fell from 71,8 % to 65,4 %. However, they found evidence of tactics cancelled out these positive direct effects.

Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020, pp. 4, 6)' second hypothesis (H2) was: The reform to open up access and increase oversight displaces corruption risks to untreated phases of the procurement process such as (a) pre-bidding procedure choice and (b) post-bidding contract signature negotiations. (H2) was confirmed. The use of non-competitive or closed procedure types went up from 7,3 % to 9,6 % in the matched samples (which is consistent with H2a), while the frequency of high-risk signature periods also increased from 25,0 % to 29,4 %, consistent with H2b). These data suggest that corrupt actors respond to a direct curtailment of their corruption opportunities by moving on to other tactics not affected. They either limit competition prior to advertisement (pre-bidding) or engage in corruption during the contract signature period (post-bidding).

Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020, pp. 4, 6)' third hypothesis (H3) was: The reform to open up access and increase oversight intensifies corruption exploiting existing loopholes such as risky non-competitive procedure types. (H3) was partly confirmed. On one hand, for foreign winners, there was no significant change in competitive procedures but a marked and significant drop from 29,9 % to 20,9 %. However, non-competitive procedures appear to be more intensively exploited, which is in line with H3, resulting in further clustering of risks.

Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020, pp. 4, 7)' fourth hypothesis (H4) was: As a net effect, the reform to open up access and increase oversight leads to an increase in participation by foreign bidders at the expense of domestic bidders. This hypothesis was not confirmed, since there was no change observed. The broader access favours those who were more able to exploit connections (the domestic firms), at the expense of those who were more likely to lack connections (the foreign firms).

2.3.9.2   How Does the Recipient Country Political Economy Affect Corruption?

The Party System Institutionalization (PSI) is of central importance. The PSI score is composed of six indicators. with party strength measured as the extent to which parties have: (1) permanent national party organizations, (2) permanent local party branches, (3) centralized mechanisms of candidate selection, (4) legislative cohesion, (5) minimal party switching and (6) programmatic, rather than clientelist, linkages to their social base (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020, p. 493).

Dávid-Barrett et al. (2020) advanced the following hypotheses:

H1)   Please take note that their H1 is similar to Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020)' Hypothesis 1 - already commented in section 2.3.9.1.

H2)   Higher party system institutionalization is associated with lower corruption risks in aid-funded public procurement (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020, p. 486).

H3)   Higher state capacity is associated with lower corruption risks in aid-funded public procurement (ibid., p. 487). H3 was partially confirmed. Contracts awarded in single-bidder tenders tend to take place in countries with lower state capacity. Countries with low state capacity typically have less technologically advanced procurement systems (e.g., paper-based tender submission). Hence, increasing the use of electronic submission is likely to widen access to tenders in particular in such countries. We have to consider that in low state capacity countries, national elites may lack the capacity to control corruption in some parts of their bureaucracies.

H4)   Increased donor oversight and wider access to tenders decrease corruption risks most where party system institutionalization is high (ibid., p. 487). H4 was confirmed. The

political context in recipient countries affects corruption risks in aid. In countries with high PSI, which is a proxy for elites having longer time horizons, the prevalence of single bidding is lower. The same holds true for countries with greater state capacity (ibid., p. 498). These findings strengthen previous studies on that matter (Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Rock & Bonnett, 2004), and emphasize the importance of a two-dimensional framework to understand the prevalence of corruption: elites' time horizons (measured by using the PSI indicator), and their ability to enforce anti-corruption regulations (measured by the indicator of state capacity). Dávid-Barret et al. (2020, p. 499) conclude that corruption organized through single bidding is not necessarily incompatible with economic growth. In some cases, elites in institutionalized party systems, and with long time horizons, might work toward growing the economy, while at the same time engaging in corruption through manipulation of procurement. Secondly, corrupt forms of single bidding can be an important source of funding for institutionalized parties - both in authoritarian regimes, and in democratic political systems.

H5) As for this hypothesis (ibid., pp. 488, 496), increased donor oversight and wider access to tenders decrease corruption risks least where state capacity is high. H5 was confirmed. Evidence was also found supporting H5, the 2003 intervention by the World Bank had an effect in countries with low-state capacity, while the effect was insignificant in high-capacity countries. In countries with low-state capacity, donor controls effectively substitute for weaknesses in state control for over funds by increasing oversight, ensuring better that aid reaches the right destinations. However,

this may impede or handicap local institutions to build up by themselves capacity to monitor and control themselves.

Single bidding in competitive tenders, nevertheless, only captures one form of corruption that is closely aligned with closed access and institutionalized corrupt relationships between public and private elites. There are other types of corruption where competition occurs among oligarchic groups, with multiple firms competing on official tendering criteria as well as bribes (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020, p. 493).

Donor efforts to control corruption in aid spending through national procurement systems, by tightening oversight and increasing market openness, were indeed effective in reducing corruption risks. This suggests that theories of corruption control based on reducing opportunities and increasing constraints on the power of public administrators have merit (Dávid-Barrett et al., 2020, p. 498).

Crucially, studies have shown that PSI matters both in democratic and non-democratic regimes (Bizzarro et al., 2018; Kuhonta, 2011; Rasmussen & Knutsen, 2021). It is understood, after many studies, that PSI, compared to other institutional factors, such as electoral systems or the distinction between parliamentary and presidential systems of government - spans a much wider spectrum of political regimes, such as multiparty democracies (as in Denmark) to single-party totalitarian systems (such as China).

To characterize recipient-country political economy contexts, Dávid-Barret et al. (2020) followed prior literature (Kelsall, 2013; Khan, 2010; Rock & Bonnett, 2004) which focused on two key

dimensions: 1) party system institutionalization (PSI), defined as 'the degree of stability in who the main parties are and in how they behave' (Mainwaring, 1998), and 2) state capacity, defined as the state's ability 'to implement official goals, especially over the actual or potential opposition of powerful opposition groups' (Skocpcol, 1985).

While the first-dimension shapes elites' time horizons (time horizons become longer as PSI increases), the second captures elites' capacity to enforce anti-corruption laws at all levels of government. Regulatory bodies typically lack the independence to challenge political interference, while aggrieved losing bidders refrain from making complaints for fear that it will prejudice their chances of winning future contracts.

As reported by Dávid-Barret et al. (2020, p. 486) in autocratic regimes, dictators who can rely on a highly institutionalized party generally sustain themselves in power for longer than dictators who only have a weakly institutionalized party at their disposal.

Indeed, an efficient way for a strongly institutionalized party may be to maintain a large support base, and "buy" electoral loyalty with public goods such as economic growth, rather than clientelist goods (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; Haber, 2008). In highly institutionalized party systems, where parties usually have high longevity, citizens can more easily attribute responsibility for government mismanagement and corruption to political parties (Schleiter & Voznaya, 2018; Tavits, 2007). Also, strongly institutionalized parties can curb corruption by providing stable and clearly identifiable career paths. This way, strong parties can promote norms that reward non-corrupt behaviour through political career advancement.

Political parties play a critical role in determining political elites' time horizons and, accordingly, the incentives to engage in corruption. So, the strength of political parties plays an important role in explaining the differences in the quality of governance.

No evidence was found that higher levels of PSI amplify the effect of the reform. Less institutionalized parties may more readily evade responsibility for corruption and hence respond less to increased oversight, but more institutionalized parties may be better able to strategically circumvent efforts to increase oversight. The cases of South Korea and Malaysia are interesting to consider. After World War II, power became highly centralized in both countries - under a military regime in South Korea, and a dominant-party dictatorship in Malaysia. But, in both cases, as for the model of developmental state model, (Arrighi, 2005a, 2005b; Bagchi, 2004; Chang, 2002; Evans, 1995; C. Johnson, 1982; Reinert, 2007; Wade, 1990) we see that in some cases, long time horizons incentivized elite to invest in economic development and industrialization. Paradoxically, in the 1960s and 1970s, in these two countries, growth coexisted with systemic political corruption (Gomez & Jomo, 1997; Kang, 2002; Khan, 1998; Wederman, 1997).

2.3.10 Factors Conducive to Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa

2.3.10.1 Self-Reinforcing Corruption

Corruption is now one of the most discussed issues about underdeveloped countries in Africa. Corruption is commonly defined as the misuse of public office for private gain, or the illegitimate exchange of private goods for political considerations, i.e., clientelism. The common forms of

corruption in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are bribery, extorsion, embezzlement, theft and fraud, influence peddling, illicit enrichment, and nepotism (Musila, 2019, p. 181).

Gök (2020, p. 16) finds relevant the theory of self-reinforcing corruption, in the sense that past corruption levels become significant determinants of current corruption. It means that presently very corrupt countries will probably be very corrupt still in the near or medium-long future and vice-versa.

When political or bureaucratic power is flexed, corruption can be regarded as political or grand corruption. According to Swaleheen (2011), political corruption involves relatively large bribes paid to influence policy formulation and major contract awards tailored to favour private interests. There is also bureaucratic and judicial, done by bureaucrats and judicial officials involved in implementing existing policies in their daily interaction with citizens of the country (Dhillon & Rigolini, 2011).

Three conditions are necessary for corruption to arise and persist: discretionary power, economic costs and weak institutions (Aidt, 2003; Jain, 2001). Aidt (2003) argues that in weak institutions, the incentives embodied in political, administrative, and legal institutions must be such that officials are left with an incentive to exploit this discretionary power to extract or create rents.

The burden of corruption falls disproportionately on low-income individuals, who pay a larger proportion of their income in the form of bribes than high-income individuals. Also, corruption distorts indirectly the redistributive role of the government by diverting government resources

away from education and health services that would benefit mostly low-income individuals if well managed (Apergis et al., 2010). Accordingly, the benefits of corruption are likely to accrue to the better connected individuals within the high-income groups of society (Gupta et al., 2002; Klitgaard, 1998).

Corruption can also have negative consequences for the natural environment when public servants are bribed to distort pollution control measures in order to favour certain groups (Wilson & Damania, 2005).

According to Transparency International, corruption in Africa is widespread, compared to other parts of the world (Transparency International, 2018). Since the launch of the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in 1995, many African countries have performed very poorly in the CPI rankings over the years (Musila, 2019, p. 180). As in 2017, the sub-Saharan African region was the worst performing region with an average score of 32. Only six SSA countries posted a CPI of 50 or above in 2017: Botswana (61), Seychelles (60), Cape Verde (55), Rwanda (55), Namibia (51) and Mauritius (50).

Most of the people in the region believe that corruption is on the rise. All sectors of society are affected by this phenomenon: public servants, the police, the courts. In many SSA countries "you can pay off police officers to ignore any crime, however horrific and devastating" (Pring, 2015, p. 2).

According to Gani (2017, p. 393), corruption is still endemic in many SSA countries, and signals government's malfeasance in controlling corruption. Where progress has been achieved, it has been rather slow.

According to Gök (2020, p. 5), voice and accountability have a negative effect on corruption (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012), greater political freedom decreases corruption (Fréchette, 2006), democracy has a negative significant impact on both in developed and developing countries (Ghaniy & Hastiadi, 2017). Better rule of law increases the likelihood of detection and punishment of illicit rent-seeking behaviour and a perception of strong rule of law decreases the incentives of corrupt acts (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012).

A large body of research, notably by political economists, shows the extent of corruption, and the consequences of that informal institution on the level of education, health, and the living standards of the inhabitants of this region.

Corruption can also lead to business inefficiency by forcing firms to spend resources (human and financial) to court public officials. Such expenses inflate labour and operational costs and contribute to the increase of costs for business.

2.3.10.2 Economic Factors Related to Corruption in SSA Countries

This section is based on factors compiled by various authors (Musila, 2019; Gani, 2017; and Gök, 2020). Most empirical studies have concluded that corruption adversely affects growth, investment and trade (e.g. J. E. Anderson & Marcouiller, 1999; Campos et al., 1999; Mauro, 1995; Musila &

Sigue, 2010; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). In terms of direct costs, the African Union estimates that about a quarter of the GDP of African countries (about USD 550 billion in 2017) is lost to corruption. Such money would have been better spent on safe drinking water, free primary education, etc.

The economic determinants of corruption range from income to economic institutions and socio-demographic factors. A majority of empirical studies show that a higher income reduces corruption and is a significant predictor of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Alt & Lassen, 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Knack & Azfar, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Treisman, 2000).

But the impact of government size on corruption is uncertain: Ali and Isse (2003) find that a large government increases corruption, while Fisman & Gatti (2002) find the opposite effect. But richer countries have more financial capital resources to improve government regulations or to fight corruption (Busse & Gröning, 2013). Also, Treisman (2000) notes that people living in more advanced countries where incomes are higher, are likely to have preferences for strong governance, with proper institutions (rule of law, transparency, a stable government) (Freidman, 2006; Serra, 2006).

The economic institutions that are determinants of corruption include foreign aid, import share, raw material export, trade openness, economic freedom and entry barriers (competitiveness). While Ali and Isse (2003) find that corruption rises with the surge in foreign aid, Tavares (2003) obtains the opposing effect.

As for foreign direct investment (FDI), multinational corporations, in order to evade red tape and entice investment policies in their favour, can bribe officials, bureaucrats and politicians. The presence of grabber-friendly institutions augments the likelihood of accepting bribes (Ahmad, 2008; Hines Jr., 1995; Mehlum et al., 2006).

A rise in imports' share is associated with low levels of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Fisman & Gatti, 2002). Economic freedom lowers the rents from economic activities, hence it lessens the motivation of public officials to have a corrupt behaviour by grasping a reduced amount of rents (Shabbir & Anwar, 2007).

A high composition of raw material in exports is associated with high levels of corruption (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Tavares, 2003). On the other hand, increased trade openness is associated with low levels of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Knack & Azfar, 2003). In developing countries, wealth derived from large natural resources exports, also called the 'resource curse', can contribute to corruption, poor and uneven economic development, authoritarianism, and violent conflict (Auty, 1993; Busse & Gröning, 2013; Leite & Weidmann, 2002).

As for economic integration, restrictions on foreign trade, foreign investment and capital market stimulate corruption since such restrictions create rents-related corruption by offering an opportunity to bribe. The mechanism is that greater barriers of entry and exit create greater distortions in competitive environment, resulting in more widespread corruption (Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006).

Weak economic development of a country, proxied by per capita income, will make some poor countries more prone to corruption. In consequence, public officials, ill paid, will, for most of them, consider the marginal income coming with a corrupt behaviour more attractive than in richer countries (Kraay & Van Rijckeghem, 1995; Seldadyo & de Haan, 2006). Moreover, poor countries lack well established institutions to detect and prevent corrupt acts.

As for the impact of economic freedom on corruption, it is still unsettled - with some studies obtaining a positive association (Graeff & Mehlkop, 2003; Paldam, 2001), while others obtain a negative association (Ali & Isse, 2003; Goldsmith, 1996; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005).

The socio-demographic determinants of corruption have been extensively investigated, including schooling and population. Schooling (as a proxy for human capital) is associated with lower levels of corruption (Ali & Isse, 2003; Alt & Lassen, 2003; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Jetter & Parmeter, 2018; Rauch & Evans, 2000). Some studies have found a positive correlation between population demographic levels and the level of corruption (Alt & Lassen, 2003; Fisman & Gatti, 2002; Knack & Azfar, 2003), while others find a negative correlation (Tavares, 2003).

In countries with inadequate infrastructure, corruption is pervasive for many people, even being a weekly event since citizens must bribe to have access to electricity and power. In such cases, infrastructure projects are allocated not by efficient market projects, but to the contractors who pay the greater bribe to extract rents.

2.3.10.3 Political Factors Leading to Corruption

Most empirical studies on political causes can be divided into two broad groups: those investigating the impact of political-civil liberty (i.e., democracy) and those examining the impact of decentralization (i.e., federalism) on corruption. There seems to be a consensus that democracy (proxied by various variables such as civil liberty, political freedom, political rights, length of democratic regime, etc.) and other factors related to democracy such a freedom of the press, contribute to reduce the level of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1997; M. Braun & Di Tella, 2004; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Damania et al., 2004; Goldsmith, 1999; Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Knack & Azfar, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman et al., 2005; Musila, 2013; Paldam, 2002; Swamy et al., 2001; Treisman, 2000; Wei, 2000).

Democracy works to reduce corruption because it imposes transparency and provides checks and balances within the political system. Political participation, political competition and constraints on the executive help to increase the ability of the population to monitor and legally limit politicians engaging in corrupt behaviour (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005). Fair elections in democratic societies guarantee that politicians can be held responsible for the actions taken in public office. The possibility of elections or being overthrown may require politicians to align their own interest with the interest of the public (Lederman et al., 2005).

Also, separation of powers provides checks and balances, preventing politicians to abuse their authority through the mechanisms that different governmental bodies discipline each other in favour of citizens (Lederman et al., 2005).

Political rights allow people to join political parties and organizations, compete for public office, vote freely for distinct alternative candidates in legitimate elections and elect representatives who will have a real impact on public policies and be accountable to voters (Freedom House, 2017).

Other studies have found that political instability is positively correlated with the level of corruption (Leite & Weidmann, 2002; Park, 2003) since political instability breeds corruption. Political instability also decreases the perceived cost of corrupt behaviour since it decreases the probability of public officials to remain in office for more than a short period, with opportunistic tendency to act irresponsibly (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012). A greater number of women in public office seems to decrease the level of corruption (Jetter & Parmeter, 2018; Swamy et al., 2001). Also, the institutions must be weak to allow public officials to extract or create rents by exploiting their discretionary power (Aidt, 2003).

2.3.10.4 Bureaucratic and Regulatory Factors Leading to Corruption

Most empirical studies on bureaucracy and the regulatory causes of corruption have focused on the judicial system (i.e., the rule of law) and the quality of bureaucratic actors on corruption. A strong rule of law and a high-quality bureaucratic system are believed to reduce the occurrence of corruption. It is also accepted by most that high level of government wages reduces corruption (Alt & Lassen, 2003; Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Rauch & Evans, 2000). In SSA countries, bureaucrats receive wages so low as to easily entice them in corrupt behaviour.

Empirical results also show that a higher quality of bureaucracy reduces the level of corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Jetter & Parmeter, 2018). Also, as for bureaucrats, a system of merit

reduces the likelihood of corruption (Rauch & Evans, 2000). The rule of law also works to reduce the level of corruption (Ades & Di Tella, 1997; Ali & Isse, 2003; Broadman & Recanatini, 2001; Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Damania et al., 2004; Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; Jetter & Parmeter, 2018; Park, 2003). But in most SSA countries, their economies suffer from a lack of institutions for detecting corruption.

2.3.10.5 Religious, Cultural and Geographical Factors Leading to Corruption

Freedom of speech, freedom of press in democratic societies allow citizens to ask questions, demand inquiries, uncover information and broadcast their findings with the public (Shabbir & Anwar, 2007). Freedom of press decreases the asymmetry of information between citizens and government officials by publicizing the right and wrong doings of the government (Lederman et al., 2005).

Some researchers have found that predominantly protestant countries tend to have lower levels of corruption (La Porta et al., 1999; Treisman, 2000). Many studies have found that ethno-linguistic homogeneity in a country tend to reduce corruption (Herzfeld & Weiss, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Lederman et al., 2005; Treisman, 2000). In ethnically diverse communities, a public official may behave sequentially: first to his close kin, to his ethnic group, than sometimes to his country (Ali & Isse, 2003).

Empirical evidence shows that corruption is positively correlated with the distance from the largest exporter (Ades & Di Tella, 1997), as well as with dominance of natural resources in the economy (Leite & Weidmann, 2002). But it is also mentioned in some studies that an explanatory variable

can be significant in a particular specification of the model but may lose its significance when other variables are incorporated.

As for country size, some researchers argue that larger countries may have greater financial resources and human capital, and take advantage of scale economies in the public sector to push through necessary reforms or required rules to improve governance (Busse & Gröning, 2013; Knack & Azfar, 2003; Srinivasan, 1986).

Education can also matter indirectly to control corruption. The general level of education in a country contributes to augment the human capital of a society, people becoming more vigilant by better scrutinizing government activities, the spending of public funds, as they better grasp and judge various forms of political or grand corruption (Brunetti & Weder, 2003; Gatti, 2004).

According to Gök (2020, p. 2) colonialism is at the source of pervasive grand scale systematic corruption in sub-Saharan African countries. In most SSA countries, the leadership has turned into an enterprise of corruption. Leaders in power held their trust from the colonial authorities instead of the people they rule. Institutions were used as a tool for extorsion and coercion for citizens to forcefully obey the rule of the powerful elites.

So, the African people, since the colonial era, are used not to trust the representatives of the state (Aborisade & Aliyyu, 2018). The result is that nowadays, with bad governance and high levels of corruption, most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa have low economic development, high

unemployment and widespread poverty (Gök, 2020, p. 3). Among SSA countries, corruption is more pervasive in Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, and Somalia.

Often, in general, researchers have found that the economic and institutional factors are much more powerful determinants of the level of corruption than the inherent, largely unchangeable religious and geo-cultural factors at play (Jetter & Parmeter, 2018). They see the rule of law as the most persistent predictor of low corruption levels, followed by government effectiveness, urbanization, the share of women in public positions (including parliament), and primary education (especially in less developed countries).

2.3.11 Donors

Donors provide foreign aid to developing countries to promote sustainable economic and social development. Most recipient countries are developing economies, and many are highly dependent on foreign aid that, on average, amounted to more than 10 % of their gross national income (GNI). For the issue of not providing aid to corrupt governments, the Monterrey Consensus of 2002 has become the reference point for international development cooperation.

Some studies advance that corruption and poor governance deter aid (Clist, 2011; Neumayer, 2003a; Winters, 2010). Some donors might allocate foreign aid to corrupt recipients to further their own political or strategic interests and extract policy concessions (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2009; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Heinrich, 2013; Milner & Tingley, 2013; Neumayer, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c). Some donor states tend to use bilateral aid to favour their former colonies as well

as political allies in the United Nations (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Bermeo, 2017, 2018; Neumayer, 2003c).

In their research, Ferry et al. (2020) have confirmed two hypotheses. In their first hypothesis (H1), IDOs composed of donor states with lower levels of corruption will be less willing to allocate aid to corrupt recipients than organizations composed of corrupt donors, which are not likely to refuse aid to a recipient on the basis of corruption allegations. There are reasons for that: first, it is well established that states often value and support governance styles that are like their own. By contrast, groups of corrupt donors are unlikely to purposively deter aid to corrupt recipients based on corruption itself, since good governance is not a concept, they collectively value, embrace, or seek to spread (ibid, p. 771).

Ferry et al. (2020, p. 774)'s research also confirmed their second hypothesis (H2): Less corrupt donors are more likely to enforce formal organizational rules designed to redistribute aid away from corruption. By contrast, anti-corruption mandates amount to cheap talk by corrupt IDOs; such rules will not deter them from allocating aid to corrupt recipient countries. For instance, China, a highly corrupt country according to International Transparency, gives substantial aid to corrupt and even violent regimes like Sudan in exchange for favourable rights to develop oil and mining projects. The Chinese government knows that it will not encounter a hostile public opinion in China itself, nor have medias criticize the government, as it may happen in Western countries. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the biggest recipients of Chinese aid are Ghana, Nigeria, and Sudan.

Also aid by corrupt countries to developing countries can help to obtain favourable votes at the United Nations, a phenomenon called vote buying (Dreher et al., 2009b; Lockwood, 2013).

According to Ferry et al. (2020), organizations composed of corrupt donors are just as likely to adopt, but less likely to enforce anti-corruption mandates. Organizations composed of less corrupt donors, by contrast, tend to divert aid away from corrupt states, with or without formal anti-corruption rules. Their research turns around the debate over whether international efforts to institutionalize "good governance" standards are sincere of cheap talk, whether multilateral strategies are in fact less politicized than bilateral aid allocation strategies, and whether international organizations should be inclusive, open to membership by many or even all states, including those with dubious records.

According to Ferry et al. (2020), in most IDOs, aid allocation decisions are shaped by the powerful donors, but consensus is the norm, as much as possible. It is often the case that former colonial relationships, geographic proximity and higher trade volumes between donors and recipient countries, will correspond with higher IDOs aid receipts (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 778). IDOs also provide significantly more aid to recipients that are very poor or that have higher democracy.

These authors consider that as average IDO corruption declines (measured by the ten principal donors), so does the organization's aid to more corrupt recipient countries (ibid., p. 779). For instance, IDOs comprised of the least corrupt donors, as for NORAD, the Norwegian aid agency, are likely to lower their aid by over 50 % to potential recipient countries that experience a one-unit increase in national corruption.

On the other hand, for the most corrupt donors, IDOs will provide more aid to recipients with higher levels of corruption. OPEC, for instance, has provided substantial aid to Ethiopia, a highly corrupt country, according to Transparency International. They conclude that IDO responsiveness to corruption concerns depends on their members' own quality of governance.

As the good governance movement expands, many scandals were revealed (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 785). The British government has provided Pakistan hundreds of millions of pounds to fund education in the state of Punjab, only to recently discover that the money has been mainly used to fuel massive corruption (Chamberlain, 2016). Canada gave many millions of dollars intended to help fund education in Kenya, that corrupt officials inside the Ministry of Education siphoned off (O'Neill, 2010). USAID recently pulled the plug on cross-border foreign aid to Jordan and Turkey – intended to provide humanitarian relief to neighbouring Syria - due to revelation of corrupt practices including bid-rigging, bribery and kickback schemes (U.S. Office of Inspector General, 2016).

Influenced by public recriminations toward foreign aid, Agencies like USAID now routinely pull the plug on aid projects under charges of corruption, including recent aid to Afghanistan Ministry of Health, where USD 63 million out of USD 263 million went unaccounted (NPR, 2017; SIGAR, 2013). It explains also that the U.S. has played a central role to bring a focus on anti-corruption into IDOs such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, both of which now have extensive good governance guidelines in large measure piloted by the U.S. initiative.

As for the European aid, recently in Uganda, the EU cut aid following the alleged embezzlement of USD 13 million in aid funds by officials in the Prime Minister's Office (Reuters, 2012), while they froze the equivalent of nearly half a billion dollars in aid to Tanzania, following accusations that high-level government officials siphoned off the money from the central bank (The Guardian, 2014).

The emergence of new development donors, such as China, a corrupt country, accounts for a rising share of funds to the world's poorest and most corrupt countries (Prizzon et al., 2016), as well as to the large supply of International Donor Organizations (IDOs) that provide a growing share of the financial resources. Some of these IDOs are comprised of corrupt donors. Some of the most prominent IDOs have been repeatedly accused of engaging in corrupt lending practices. For instance, some of the development banks, such as the Islamic Development Bank and the Caribbean Development Bank have a less than sparkling record, compared to more regulated ones such as the Asian Development Bank and the European Community Aid Fund (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 779).

As for the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), many of its donor members are countries which have obtained low marks from Transparency International, such as China (ranked 77th), Brazil and Colombia (tied for 96th), Mexico (ranked 135th), and Venezuela (ranked 169th). In practice, despite good governance pledges on paper, the CDB will regularly channel substantive resources into highly corrupt states such as Haiti, with minimal sanctions or repercussions (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 775).

Ferry et al. (2020, p. 785) claim that the extent to which corruption factors into IDO allocation decisions depends more on the composition of the donors than on the organizations' aid-giving rules or the donors' strategic interest in individual recipients. Organizations comprised of highly corrupt donors are just as likely to adopt but are less likely to enforce anti-corruption standards as are organizations composed of less corrupt donors. Less corrupt donors, by contrast, punish states for corruption by withholding aid, even when that does not correspond to their strategic purposes, and they do so with or without formalized anti-corruption rules in place.

While strategic factors do shape aid allocation decisions, Ferry et al. (2020)' study suggest that their importance is reduced in a multilateral setting, where the membership composition of donors play a larger role. There are three implications advanced:

1) there exists enough evidence that multilateral donors are far from being neutral or depoliticized aid-givers (Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kilby, 2013; Schneider & Tobin, 2013). It is sufficiently clear that powerful donors can and do capture their IDOs' agendas, which helps to explain why certain IDOs are punitive toward corruption, and others are funnelling money into very corrupt places, turning a blind eye to the problem. This explains why some IDOs are likely to be much more effective in supporting economic development, while others are much less effective and, worse, even fuel corruption by supporting the groups who are at the source of the problem (Dreher et al., 2009a, 2009b; Svensson, 2005).

2) A second implication of the Ferry et al. (2020, p. 787) study concerns the power of international law and regulatory standards, more generally, to shape good governance behaviour. There is a

tremendous debate over whether international institutions can spread protections for good governance concepts such as human rights, the rule of law, democracy and civil society and if so, how? (Gilligan, 2006; Hafner-Burton, 2013; Hafner-Burton et al., 2016; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005, 2007; Neumayer, 2005; Simmons, 2009; Smith-Cannoy, 2012).

3) Finally, according to Ferry et al. (2020, p. 787), in the contemporary context of corruption, compliance with international legal rules may be more a function of who is adopting those rules than what the rules say. They add that more attention should be put on the characteristics of IDO membership. Indeed, ''corruption factors into IDO allocation decisions depends more on the makeup of the donors than on the formal rules or strategic considerations'' (Ferry et al., 2020, p. 768). They conclude that a substantial amount of aid goes to corrupt places without real strings attached. Such aid is unlikely to be used by corrupt recipient governments to foster long-term sustainable development. More likely, such aid may very well exacerbate corruption locally by providing resources to fuel bad practices.

2.4 Anti-Corruption and Project Studies

2.4.1 Introduction

In section 2 of this chapter (called 2.4.2 more precisely in the text), we recall that several studies have reported a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth. Nevertheless, according to Pavlik (2018), we must make an exception for situations in some corrupt countries where there is a monopoly over the goods to be provided and to whom bribes should be paid. In those circumstances, economic growth can be obtained in cases of extremely low levels of uncertainty since it helps entrepreneurs to circumvent tedious and time-consuming regulations.

In section 3, Adam (2020)'s study recalls that e-government has a potential to promote access and delivery of government services and operations to its citizens, in the best context. But in most sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, insufficient knowledge and use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), poor institutional quality of the public services and poor literacy levels play essential mediating factors for the capacity of E-government in the fight against corruption.

In section 4, Senu (2020)'s study looks for the reasons that the United Nations Anti-Corruption strategies to fight corruption in sub-Saharan African countries did not succeed. In most cases, there was a weak implementation to enforce the rule of law. Such stiff resistance to anti-corruption reforms was due mostly to maladministration and large-scale corruption endemic in that region of the world. Large examples of maladministration of aid funds are shown in the cases of Kenya and Nigeria related to DFID aid operations.

In section 5, Winters (2014) shows that better project targeting increases accountability by the various actors implicated and makes project capture less likely. Also, improved accountability comes with greater clarity of responsibility, better information about outcomes, and improved identifiability of stakeholders.

In section 6, Winters and Martinez (2015) recommend to aid donors to be selective about the types of aid provided to recipient countries, warning them that poorly governed countries waste a good part of the aid provided for their own rent-seeking purposes. For other better governed countries, higher types of aid can be provided by bilateral donors, by using a larger number of aid modalities

such as budget support, either global or sectoral, economic infrastructure aid, aid to productive sectors and reinforcing social services.

In section 7, a seminal study by Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005) report that in a World Bank project enacted in the mid-1990s to Uganda's 8500 primary schools, that provided grants to that sector for school non-wage expenses, only 13 % of the grants effectively reached the local schools. The main part of the money was captured by local officials and politicians, for private gain or financing patronage politics and political activities. A subsequent experiment was carried out by the authors, with the establishment of an information and surveillance system of following the money, with the collaboration of local and regional newspapers. This contributed to reduce the capture of the public funds from 87 % to 20 %.

In section 8, Rist (2013) considers that international aid has become a large industry employing thousands of people. As for development aid agencies, according to Monkam (2012), they have strong incentives to 'move the money' to attain organizational imperatives of survival, growth and promote their status with politicians and citizens.

In section 9, Moyo (2009) considers that international aid has a negative effect on aid recipient countries' elites, making them complacent in the handling of the money transferred. According to her, many projects are chosen less on their potential to reduce poverty and enhance economic development, than for extorting bribes and diverting funds for the politicians and their cronies. Please find in Table 4 some of the main points advanced by specific researchers presented in section 2.4.

Table 4: Factors Impacting Corruption and Anti-Corruption

Authors	Institutional Factors
Monkam (2012)	International development agencies' actors encounter strong incentives to 'move the money' to developing countries. Such a "Money-Moving Syndrome" can be explained by various factors, either related to 'organizational imperatives' for the agency's survival and growth, to maintain a high status with the donor country's politicians and citizens, and to ensure professional aid agents' recognition and promotion.
Moyo (2009)	According to the author, the African culture of aid-dependency, at the high level of the governments, leads to a perpetual state of corruption and lack of sound public policies, killing the chances of developing this region. A large portion of the national budget goes to politicians, their cronies, and allied generals, instead of being usefully invested in the education and health sectors, and to eliminate poverty.
Pavlik (2018)	According to this author, the usual negative correlation between corruption and economic growth is likely smaller in magnitude when outcomes of corruption are more certain. In regimes where bribery "works", corruption will likely have less of a negative impact as it acts as a mutually beneficial transaction, since the firm gets something beneficial for its bribery payment.
Senu (2020)	The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) measures did not attain a sufficient measure of success in most SSA countries, because numerous resistances to these anti-corruption reforms have come from maladministration, illicit activities, nepotism and refusal to enact or apply anti-corruption legislation.
Authors	Governance Factors
Adam (2020)	Adam's study reveals a positive impact of e-government on corruption when the context is supportive. But it is rarely the case in most sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries because of low e-

	government and ICT development, poor institutional quality, low information technology literacy, and political corruption.
Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005)	They found that a large part of a World Bank grant-based project to fund non-wage expenses of primary schools in Uganda did not reach the targeted schools and was instead captured by local politicians and officials (at a rate of 87 % of the money). One reason for this situation, according to the authors, is the poor functioning systems of service delivery in many developing countries, implying that increased spending (foreign aid) does not necessarily reach the targeted groups, particularly the poorer.
Winters (2014)	Superior accountability goes with improved identifiability of stakeholders, notably when they can organize for collective action. When aid recipients are well identified and do defend well their interests in development projects, it creates incentives for politicians and agents of government to avoid abusing public office by acts of corruption.
Winters and Martinez (2015)	Their research found that bilateral donors substitute programmatic aid for technical assistance and project aid in well-governed countries and found evidence that better governed countries receive aid through a greater number of sectors.

2.4.2   Bribery, Corruption, and Economic Growth

In an effort to give an approximation of the importance of corruption, the World Bank Institute estimated that worldwide total bribery alone is about USD 1 trillion per year (Kaufmann, 2005). A common definition of corruption is the abuse of public office for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2004). Since bribery is just one form of corruption, it is likely to underestimate the true cost of corruption.

As for business matters, bribery payments and the uncertainty regarding the delivery of services in exchange for these bribes show that corruption has a negative association with growth, unless the uncertainty is minimal. Furthermore, the negative association becomes larger in magnitude with a higher level of uncertainty (Pavlik, 2018, p. 311). In countries that experience the most uncertainty, corruption will likely have a strong negative association with growth. (ibid., p.329).

The idea that corruption is negatively associated with economic growth is widely held and acknowledged according to Pavlik (2018, p. 311). The World Bank has supported over 600 anti-corruption and governance initiatives developed by member countries since 1996 and has launched the Strengthening World Bank Group on Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) since 2007. The GAC strategy was updated in 2012, making GAC an integral part of the World Bank's operations.

Other international organizations, for example the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) also pursue anti-corruption initiatives, such as the OECD's Anti-Bribery Convention and the UN's Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).

Beginning with Mauro (1995), several studies report a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth (Abed & Davoodi, 2002; Li et al., 2000). However, other studies find that this negative relationship disappears once additional factors are controlled (Mo, 2001; Mocan, 2008, 2009).

There are two important aspects of uncertainty surrounding corruption, from uncertainty regarding the requirement of a bribe to uncertainty regarding the success of the bribe. According to Pavlik (2018, p. 327), the empirical literature about the relationship between corruption and economic growth is mixed. He concludes that the mixed results in the previous literature come from the fact that most studies did not control for the uncertainty regarding corruption. First, in regimes where bribery "works", corruption will likely have less of a negative impact as it acts as a mutually beneficial transaction, since the firm gets something beneficial for its bribery payment. Second, countries with minimal corruption uncertainty may not perceive corruption as a major detriment to development.

For instance, two countries such as Brazil and the Czech Republic are classified by the World Bank as upper-middle income and high-income economies, respectively. Both countries received similar scores in the frequency of corruption experience (2,57 and 2,58 respectively). But Brazil experienced 77 % more corruption uncertainty than the Czech Republic. In addition, the growth rate of GDP per capita from 2000 to 2005 in the Czech Republic is almost three times that of Brazil (ibid., p. 313).

A similar example occurs when comparing two of the most corrupt countries, Bangladesh, and Madagascar, according to the frequency of corruption experience measure. Paradoxically, Bangladesh experiences more corruption than Madagascar, but experiences far less uncertainty. Notably, the yearly growth rate of GDP per capita, from 2000 to 2005, in Bangladesh is 3,7 %, while the growth rate of Madagascar over the same period is -0,74 %.

There are two different types of corruption regimes, according to Shleifer and Vishny, (1993):

1) The first regime is one in which there is a monopoly over the goods to be provided and to whom bribes should be paid. Thus, while there is a high level of corruption, there is a low amount of uncertainty.

2) In the second regime, an individual may need numerous complementary goods that come from several different monopolistic providers. All these providers are attempting to maximize their own revenue rather than combine revenue, causing uncertainty regarding bribe payments to be extremely high. This is because, in the second regime, there are several different monopolistic providers that may or may not ask for bribe payments. As a comparative demonstration, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) contrast Communist Russia with post-communist Russia, where more uncertainty exists regarding corruption.

The second regime is more susceptible to rent-seeking activities that further increase uncertainty. In such a case, incentives often exist to set up new government organizations that create new laws and regulations simply to enable the officials in these organizations to become providers of some government good or service and extract bribes. A regime that is more susceptible to rent seeking will also likely have firms that are less efficient than the first.

With incentives in place that encourage rent-seeking behaviour rather than growth, we often see a vicious cycle appear where corruption reduces growth, which further increases corruption (Mauro, 2004). When a country instead experiences economic growth, perhaps even for reasons unrelated to corruption, we may see corruption on the decline. It is likely that growth has a larger effect on

corruption in these highly uncertain environments, as these environments are ones where corruption is most detrimental to development Pavlik (2018, p. 315).

A common finding in the literature is that investment is the primary channel through which institutions impact growth (Dawson, 1998; Gwartney et al., 2006; Hall et al., 2010). We can intuit behind this finding that "good" institutions, the ones that enforce and protect property rights, encourage more productive investment and make current investment more productive (Pavlik, 2018, p. 315).

Pavlik's research (2018) finds that, in some cases, an increase in the frequency of corruption experience is positively and statistically associated with economic growth at extremely low levels of uncertainty. For example, Leff (1964) refers to corruption as a "safeguard" against the losses of "bad policies", meaning that in an environment with ill-functioning institutions, corruption in those cases can be beneficial since it helps entrepreneurs to circumvent tedious and time consuming regulations. This is referred as a 'grease the wheel' stance (Kaufmann & Wei, 2000; Méon & Sekkat, 2005; Méon & Weill, 2010; Murphy, 2010).

However, firm level empirical evidence suggests the opposite: higher levels of corruption result in more wasted time and higher costs (Kaufmann & Wei, 2000), as well as lower firm growth in general (Fisman & Svensson, 2007).

Venard (2013) intends to investigate the impact of both institutional framework quality and corruption on economic development. He presents two opposing views, that are objects of debates

in the epistemic community: 1) the ''grease in the Wheel of Commerce'' view and 2) the ''sand in the Wheel of Commerce'' view.

About the first view (the ''grease in the Wheel of Commerce''), proponents advance the argument of the potential positive influence of corruption on economic development, since bribes attract a better quality of public servants, looking for a better remuneration for their services than their poorly paid job by accelerating bureaucratic processes (ibid., p. 2547). Consequently, corruption could allow bureaucratic procedures to be speeded up, shortening the time lost in queues. Finally, such corruption could thus introduce an element of competition for government resources.

At the conclusion of his research on the prospects of economic development, Venard (2013) does not agree with the ''grease in the Wheel of Commerce'' position. On the contrary, his conclusions are to confirm the validity of his three initial hypotheses: 1) the higher quality of institutional framework, the less corruption there is in a country; 2) the higher the quality of the institutional framework, the higher the economic development of a country; and 3) the less corruption there is, the higher the economic development in a country. Consequently, he goes along with the ''sand in the Wheel of Commerce'' view.

To reach his conclusion, the researcher used the various measures of the quality of the institutional framework, by using the 'governance indicators' of the World Bank, based on the following dimensions, law enforcement quality (Becker & Stigler, 1974), central government quality (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), regulation quality (S. Johnson et al., 1998) and political freedom (Méndez & Sepúlveda, 2006).

2.4.3 Can E-Government Reduce Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa?

According to Adam (2020), although some studies have provided evidence of how e-government (E-gov) development contributes to reduce corruption, few studies have analyzed the mediating effects of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) development and institutional quality on E-gov development impact.

E-government refers to the use of ICTs by government to promote access and delivery of government services and operations for its citizens. E-government can similarly be viewed as the use of technology to improve public service delivery and communication capabilities and to make governments more efficient and effective (Bélanger & Carter, 2012; Srivastava & Teo, 2010).

Moreover, in a well functioning e-government context, the Internet can have a deterring effect on corruption, since corrupt practices can easily be reported or exposed through social media network (Goel et al., 2012).

In ideal conditions, successful E-gov can lead to internal efficiency, service improvement, and citizen satisfaction because operational processes will be streamlined, paper-based information will be transformed into electronic form, disparate data bases would be linked in making it easy for citizens to access government services (Iqbal & Seo, 2008).

Adam's study (2020) reveals that there can be a positive impact of e-government on corruption. But this is the case only when a significant relationship exists between e-government development

and ICT development, e-government development, and institutional quality, as well as ICT development and corruption.

Whilst many researchers have identified the main drivers of corruption to be economic, political and cultural factors, the work of Kaufmann (2005) and Lambsdorff (2001) posit that corruption could be a result of monopoly of power, discretion and a lack of accountability.

Adam's findings demonstrate the significant role ICT development and institutional quality play as essential mediators of e-government effects on corruption. His study reveals that there are no direct effects of E-gov on corruption, meaning that it is not by itself significant, without taking account of the context. His research suggests that the ICT development in countries should be strengthened, if E-gov could play a significant effect on corruption, as would be the case for developing countries, such as the ones in the sub-Saharan African (SSA) region.

Elbahnasawy (2014) notes that telecommunication infrastructure and the quality of online service, as well as Internet adoption, are complementary in the anti-corruption fight in the public service.

The ICT infrastructure includes basic access to ICT and penetration in rural areas as well as the speed available for the public to access the Internet (Mohammed et al., 2016); consequently, lack of ICT infrastructure is one of the most commonly experienced supply-side impediments to government implementations in developing and less developed countries (Rana et al., 2013).

In most SSA countries, due to the contemporary state of ICT development, literacy among citizens, and the poor institutional quality of the public sector, among other factors, E-gov by itself cannot play a significant enough impact in reducing the current level of corruption (Adam, 2020, p. 8).

2.4.4 United Nations Anti-Corruption Strategies Not Followed in Most SSA Countries

Many countries in sub-Saharan African (SSA) having experienced thwarted economic development and corrupt public administration, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) has focused its attention on anti-corruption implementation mechanisms, to assess setbacks in anti-corruption strategies to advance economic development in SSA countries. Senu (2020) has used case studies in Kenya and Nigeria to explain how far the objectives of anti-corruption strategies have succeeded or not, and why.

The conclusions of UN experts are hard to separate from maladministration and large-scale corruption in that region, leading them to address and condemn the resistances to anti-corruption reforms coming from dishonesty, maladministration, illicit activities, nepotism and refusal to enact or apply anti-corruption legislation.

Most countries in SSA have ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), but in most cases, there was weak implementation to enforce the rule of law.

Mostly, there have been few studies that explicitly discussed why anti-corruption laws or economic development strategies have been unsuccessful (Dimant & Schulte, 2016; Johnston, 1996; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Mostly, academic analysis has shown that corruption was one of the

most significant impediments to gathering data to prosecute corruption cases, which consequently constrained economic development (Dimant & Tosato, 2018). According to Cann and Fries (2016), in most of the countries concerned, official statistics and efforts to improve access to justice need to be strengthened.

Even though an Implementation Review Mechanism (IRM) was adopted by the Conference of the State Parties for UNCAC, corruption has since increased, and economic development has been hampered. Further analysis is required in relation to Kenya and Nigeria, where corruption persists despite having numerous laws and legal instruments for fighting corruption and encouraging economic development (Senu, 2020, p. 666).

This has consequences for the effectiveness of foreign aid. An example is British DFID (Department for International Development) 2018-2019 programs for reducing poverty in Kenya and strengthening the educational system. The DFID report claims that it has contributed to global goals, having 270 000 children helped to gain a decent education, and also feed 313 000 under-five children, and for women and adolescent girls to attain adequate and safe nutrition. DFID also noticed the need for expertise, robust government systems and accountability to tackle corruption and reduce conflict.

The DFID report stated that public officials are very corrupt in Kenya and cannot tackle corruption. DFID recognized the need for more work to ensure that the government takes responsibility for financing and managing poverty-reduction programs without external aid. DFID acknowledged

the challenges that corruption presents for its development projects and programmes, taking note of the conflicts of interest at stake (DFID, 2018a, as reported by Senu, 2020, pp. 674–675).

The same conclusion stands for DFID planned spending program in Nigeria for the 2018-2019 period. For the Northern Nigeria's region 'Transition to Development' Program GBP 85,9 million were recorded: for a maternal and new-born Child Health Programme GBP 28 million; and for a Sanitation, Hygiene and Water programme GBP 21,1 million. These aid endeavours fall under the heading of humanitarian assistance and building resilience to crisis, providing lifesaving support to millions of people facing famine in north-east Nigeria, providing them basic services to improve the lives of most vulnerable people, creating jobs and providing health and education services. The DFID report also stresses the need to establish better institutional stability to enable federal and state governments to be more effective, transparent and accountable in their dealings with citizens (DFID, 2018b, as reported by Senu, 2020, p. 675). Such diplomatic language means that it was difficult to count upon the Nigerian officials' honest and competent collaboration.

Over the years, strategies, and policies to fight corruption have faced numerous setbacks, due to a context dominated by corrupt practices (ibid., p. 677). In consideration of developmental programs and policy challenges, corruption patterns in SSA are both long established and current. Senu (2020, p. 677) adds that less developed or emerging economies that have little respect for the rule of law or to enforce anti-corruption laws, are likely to be the most affected by corruption, as it usually affects also data collection, economic development and impede justice for all.

This author concludes that corruption in SSA can now be described as systemic and endemic, requiring a generational solution. The lack of success in combating corruption has lately and alarmingly increased economic migration around the world (Boswell, 2002; G. Brown et al., 2011; Edwards, 2016; Weiss & Korn, 2006).

2.4.5 Targeting, Accountability and Capture in Development Projects

Winters (2014) recalls that a minimum requirement for good governance is that the funding for projects reaches its intended destination. In fact, it is not what always happen. He has established, by his study, that better defined targeting for projects will result in superior accountability of these projects, leading to greater clarity of responsibility, clearer information about outcomes, and also improved identifiability of stakeholders, data showing a clearly negative relationship between targeting and capture (ibid., p.393).

This author compares a January 1996 World Bank (WB) Project (ID P001319) in Kenya whose goal was routine maintenance of 2,400 km of a road and rehabilitation of an additional 400 km. By the end of the project, however, little of the work had been done. The main problem was a dubious bid-rigging of that project. On the other hand, at the same period, another World Bank project (PO35691) consisting of a USD 50 million credit, was destined to the improvement of a segment of 500 km of the road linking Nairobi to Mombasa. In comparison to the preceding project, that project was rated by the WB as 'highly satisfactory' (ibid., p. 393).

The more focused design of the second WB project led to superior accountability relationships, in which corruption did not interfere in a problematic manner as in the first project.

The concept of capture is used in political and economic sciences to refer to special interest group domination in policymaking (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2000; Laffont & Tirole, 1991; Svensson, 2000b).

For politicians, 'clarity of responsibility' creates an incentive to avoid their abuse of public office and combat bureaucratic corruption (Powell, 2000; Tavits, 2007).

Better project targeting does increase accountability by the various actors implicated and makes project capture less likely. Accountability also refers to the citizens' empowerment and ability to identify those actors responsible for policy decisions and outcomes, and being able to sanction the actors (individuals, aggregate groups, political parties) if outcomes are found to be lacking (T. Persson & Tabellini, 2003). On the other hand, accountability declines when outcomes are difficult to observe, and blame is difficult to attribute.

Also, numerous projects are harder to follow up when they are bunched together. Specificity facilitates better government implementation (for example, funding the construction of a single bridge instead of funding a regionwide or nationwide project of small-scale infrastructure improvements).

"Political corruption depends on the effectiveness of the democratic process, the ability of voters to monitor their representatives, to detect those responsible for unsatisfactory outcomes, and to hold them accountable by voting them out of office" (Tavits, 2007, p. 218). Sanctions can also be electoral.

In more-focused projects, outputs are easier to monitor. Also, superior accountability goes with improved identifiability of stakeholders, notably when they can organize for collective action. When aid recipients are well identified and do defend well their interests in development projects, it leads to create incentives for politicians and agents of government to avoid abusing public office by acts of corruption.

Also, a more delimited and well-defined project facilitates potential stakeholders to identify each other and organize, thus capitalizing on their social capital, by counting on collective action and defending their interests around that status (Winters, 2014, p. 395). Facing such mobilization, governments are less likely to divert money from targeted projects, as was the case of the newspaper campaign and local watchdogs in Uganda (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005).

The projects that are doing best against capture risks are the ones when the targeted beneficiaries are clearly identified groups, or the beneficiaries are well organized and educated, as is the case of those intended for business groups, who are well educated in financial matters, or social projects of limited economic scope (e.g., construction of a school; of a water purification plant), being projects aimed at well targeted and organized communities. On the other hand, foreign aid is, in general, more misappropriated when it comes to large infrastructure projects, direct budget support, or when the beneficiaries are poorly targeted (water supply, health clinics or schools) nationwide.

Generally, there is a greater likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt according to commonly used survey-based measures by Transparency International and the Worldwide Governance Indicators.

More educated citizens usually have more political and professional capacity to organize well to face political corruption risks. A largely middle-income city is better equipped than a largely poor city to defend their interests (Graham, 2000; Tendler, 2000; Weitz-Shapiro, 2006).

Winters (2014, p. 396) has studied World Bank's Implementation Completion Reports (ICRs) looking for indices of dubious appropriation of money. The loci of interest were on financial management of the project, audit, procurement issues, political interference, and generally not meeting fiduciary and financial management standards. For the period covered by the research (2002-2005), the proportion of projects suffering of capture ranged from 15 to 32 %, for an overall mean of one out of five projects (ibid., p. 398).

2.4.6   The Importance of Governance to Determine Foreign Aid

Winters and Martinez (2015) recommend donors to be selective about the types of aid provided to developing countries, warning them that poorly governed countries waste a good part of aid provided for their own rent-seeking purposes. They suggest calibrating aid according to the type of governance found in aid recipient countries (also Dietrich, 2013).

As for corrupt or incompetent recipient countries, they suggest not to work directly with them, by using other aid conduits to reach aid recipient people. In these cases, indeed, to bypass the states

and using non-state actors to deliver aid is appropriate (Dietrich, 2013). Donors can channel aid through NGOs and multilateral organizations in poorly governed countries (Bermeo, 2010). For instance, capacity building development assistance is relevant in poorly governed countries.

For other better governed countries, higher types of aid can be provided by bilateral donors, using a larger number of aid modalities such as budget support, global and sectoral, economic infrastructure aid, aid to productive sectors, and reinforcing social services. In their study, Winters and Martinez (2015, p. 523) found that better governed countries receive more diverse aid, either from bilateral and multilateral donors, using a larger variety of modalities, and in a larger number of sectors.

For the best-governed recipient countries, receiving general budget support makes sense (Nordveit, 2014). Clist et al. (2012) suggest calibrating the amounts of general support according to recipient government effectiveness to manage that type of aid.

But budget support is susceptible to grand corruption when corrupt government officials pick directly from the national budget to line their pockets (Berkman, 2008). Other programmatic types of aid may fall prey to waste or petty corruption in certain cases (Winters & Martinez, 2015, p. 519).

Winters and Martinez (2015) found evidence that bilateral donors substitute programmatic aid for technical assistance and project aid in well-governed countries, and found evidence that better

governed countries receive aid through a greater number of sectors. Moreover, Freitag and Pehnelt (2009) found that well-governed countries receive more debt relief.

Technical assistance projects, given to support capacity building and knowledge transfer may be appropriate for inadequately governed countries. Donors can keep control in these cases, such assistance projects aiming to help countries to upgrade the quality of their governance. Moreover, bilateral donors tend to give less to poorly governed recipients, and for fewer fungible types of aid. For countries poorly governed, aid will often go more through non state NGOs for specific projects.

For Winters and Martinez (2015, p. 395), project capture relates more to deliberate acts done by corrupt actors. In the case of incompetent public servants, the concept of poor administrative capacity corresponds better to such behavior.

Political, institutional, and personal dimensions are also at play. Examples abound about politicians who prefer favouring localities and regions that are more favorable to their parties. Donors provide larger and more diverse aid flows to military allies and former colonies, in the form of programmatic assistance, which is quick-disbursing and with fewer-strings-attached money (ibid., p. 524).

It may happen sometimes that turf mentality plays a role - for instance, at the World Bank or in other aid agencies, some managers may deliberately under-estimate the part of aid that was

captured in their field, to make it more probable that their office will go on providing aid on some favored projects or programs(Winters, 2014, p. 397).

Large infrastructure projects are susceptible to grand corruption when high ranking officials find accomplices for project funding, in collaboration with preferred cronies and contractors. Such large projects are also difficult to implement in countries lacking national systems to handle such large-scale projects. Selective donors will then use types of aid over which they have more control when providing assistance to poorly governed countries (Winters & Martinez, 2015, p. 516).

Generally, the literature considers that poorer countries are often more corrupt and more poorly governed (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000, 2007).

Evidently, other interests can be at play, such as corrupt donors helping friends, strengthening commercial ties, having military alliances, helping former colonies, etc. (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2007, 2009; Dreher et al., 2009a; Fleck & Kilby, 2010). In the case of military allies and former colonies, donors may provide programmatic assistance, which is quick disbursing and with fewer strings attached (Winters & Martinez, 2015, p. 528).

Finally, better governed countries are more likely to receive industry aid relative to infrastructure aid from bilateral donors. On the other hand, multilateral donors allocate more technical assistance aid relative to project aid for donors with higher scores on the governance measure (Winters & Martinez, 2015, p. 527).

2.4.7   Local capture: about a World Bank transfer program in Uganda

According to official statistics, 20 % of Uganda' total expenditure was spent on education in the mid-90's (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, 2005). A World Bank program transferred money for non-wage Ugandan primary schools. The capitation grant was given priority, being part of the World Bank's structural adjustment programs. But the survey data done by Reinikka and Svensson (2004) showed that on average only a meager 13 % of the grants reached the local schools.

Most schools received nothing, since the bulk of the school grant was captured by local officials and politicians. Schools in better-off communities experienced a lower degree of capture.

The authors explain that one reason of this situation is the poor functioning systems of service delivery in many developing countries, implying that increased spending (foreign aid) does not necessarily reach the targeted groups, particularly the poorer. The average primary school size in Uganda is 486 students. A core problem is that public funds may not reach the intended end-users. Particularly, poor students suffered disproportionately because the schools they attend received even less funds than others.

This study carried out by Swedish researchers in the years 1991-1995 revealed that the Official Development Assistance (ODA) sums entrusted to the Ugandan central government by the World Bank for the country's primary schools were diverted 87 % by local actors. Precisely, 73 % of the schools received less than 5 %, while only 10 % of the schools received more than 50 % of the intended funds. Those who received the money often had a school director (or directors) close to the ruling party agents.

History tells us that Uganda had a reasonably well-functioning public system in the 1960s. Various political and military turmoils hurt that system in the following decades, from the 1970s on (e.g., the reigns of Idi Amin Dada, followed by Milton Obote, the expulsion of Ugandans of Indian origin, the lost war with Tanzania, the guerilla war led by Yoweri Museveni, now President since more than 30 years).

Parents-teachers associations are the main decision-makers in primary schools, and parental contributions account for 60 % of total expenditures in the government-aided primary schools (ibid., p. 683). The central government exercises weak supervision on the system.

Teachers are badly paid, and a significant portion of "certificated" teachers have not received an adequate schooling. Moreover, according to Reinikka (2001), 20 % of salaries were paid to "ghosts", i.e., to teachers who did not exist.

At the time of the survey, about 8500 government primary schools were supposed to receive funding from the central government. But little information was transmitted to parents and school directors, so most schools did not know they were entitled to receive capitation grants, to help finance the needy schools.

Since local district officials were used as distribution channels, this gave local officials and politicians the opportunity to capture the funds granted to the schools. 87 % of the sums either disappeared for private gain or were used for purposes unrelated to schooling purposes. Anecdotal evidence showed that most of the funds captured in private hands were used for their own

consumption, or to finance patronage politics and political activities, including distribution of private goods such as salt, sugar and beer, to obtain voter suffrages.

No evidence was found to show that the captured money served other useful purposes for the local community (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, p. 687). The local power elite is composed of people interconnected by common schooling, marriage, friendships, shared ethnicities, or religion, according to a neo-patrimonial pattern common to sub-Saharan Africa.

According to Reinikka and Svensson (2004, p. 700), local capture in educational programs also appears to be a serious problem in most of other African countries.

A subsequent experiment, carried out by the same authors, in 2002 (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005), was based on the establishment of an information and surveillance system via local and regional newspapers informing concerned citizens (of the localities where the primary schools are located) about the financial grant aid flows intended for the non-salary expenses of these schools.

This survey endeavour, which reached 170 schools from 9 of the original 18 districts surveyed, was linked to the Millennium Development Goals to provide universal primary school enrollment by 2015. It aimed at reducing the capture of public funds by providing schools' parents with information to monitor local officials' handling of a large education grant program. It was a success that reduced aid capture to only 20 %, versus 87 % before.

2.4.8 The Aid Industry, Aid Agencies, and Project Evaluation

There are thousands of people working in the international development 'business', according to Rist (2013, p. 385): United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) public servants, program and project managers in developed countries and in the field, bureaucrats and experts, NGO volunteers, agriculture facilitators, financial advisers, trainers, agronomists, forest experts, university professors, planning experts, health experts, etc.

According to Monkam (2012), international development agencies' actors encounter strong incentives to 'move the money' to developing countries. This can be a potential cause of the low performance of foreign aid in reducing poverty and promoting sustainable economic growth in developing countries (ibid., p.420). This study, based on principal-agent and institutional theories, introduces the notion of aid agencies' 'organizational imperatives' to attain survival, growth, and achieve or maintain higher status or leadership in the donor country.

Consequently, according to Monkam (2012), the "Money-Moving Syndrome" (MMS) plays a significant role for the professional aid agents, to ensure their professional promotion and recognition, by focusing on the money disbursed. Other factors are at play to sustain that syndrome, such as the regular rotation of postings (inside and outside the country) to ensure professional maturity and recognition (ibid., p.418). Since aid workers' contribution to development is complex and difficult to observe and evaluate, this creates a tendency to measure performance according to the budgets allocated to implement and finance development projects and programs (ibid., p. 412).

Moreover, it takes time, years in fact, to evaluate the soundness of having chosen such and such projects to finance. The new trend, to favour development programs instead of projects, renders evaluation even more difficult (ibid., p. 413).

In the early decades of development assistance, economic growth was the standard measure of national development, and economic cost-benefit analysis (ECBA) was the nearest approximation to a standard project evaluation framework (Clements, 2020, p. 1). Today, most aid evaluations, according to Clements (ibid., p. 1), are organized along the terms of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria: relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, and sustainability.

According to that evaluation specialist, the definitions of 'efficiency', 'impact' and 'sustainability' are deeply problematic, and differ from project to project, which constitutes a handicap for learning and accountability in foreign aid. Moreover, according to him, instances of widespread corruption and severe mismanagement are too often white-washed in evaluations and top-level reports (Clements, 1999, p. 1377). He adds that more than half of the evaluations studied in his dissertation appears to present significant positive bias. Also, too often, ratings and top-level findings in executive summaries are inconsistent with more critical analyses found in the body reports (Clements, 2020, p. 2). He adds that "the structural weakness of aid's intended beneficiaries, in particular, and the complex, long term nature of impacts for most projects, makes effective accountability unusually challenging" (ibid., p. 9).

As for the severe accountability situation in SSA countries, two solutions are advanced by Monkam (2012, p. 422): 1) to allocate a portion of aid resources directly to recipient countries (civil society or ultimate beneficiaries of aid) so that they could provide independent feedback to donor agencies, thus creating a direct communication channel between recipients and aid agencies (Qiao et al., 2005); 2) aid selectivity in donor agencies should be strengthened around criteria such as high levels of poverty, good governance (such as low levels of corruption, transparency, ownership and high bureaucracy quality).

2.4.9   The Adverse Effects of Aid-dependency Culture in Sub-Saharan Africa

According to Moyo (2009), the African culture of aid-dependency, at the high level of the governments and their cronies, leads to a perpetual state of corruption and lack of sound public policies, killing the chances of developing this region. In the present situation, she concludes that foreign aid does not play a useful role in these countries.

A high level of corruption exists in most political regimes in the sub-Saharan African countries. According to her, the perverse consequence of aid is to enrich the members of the ruling kleptomaniac elite in these countries. Indeed, corruption has practically become a lifestyle for many African leaders once they come to power.

For Moyo, aid is one of the main ways for members of the kleptomaniac elite to line their pockets. This way, new money is coming to them all the time, without having to worry about designing useful policies for the development of their country. Projects are less chosen based on public welfare than for opportunities for extorting bribes and diverting funds (ibid., p. 51). The projects

not sufficiently monitored offer lucrative opportunities for corruption, as the money siphoned off large infrastructure projects.

Kurtzman et al. (2004) found that every one-point increase in a country's opacity index (the degree to which a country lacks clear, accurate and easily discernible practices governing business, investment and government) is correlated to a lower per capita income of USD 986, and a 1 % decrease on net foreign investment as a share of GDP (Moyo, 2009, p. 51).

Moreover, too often, aid is fungible, the monies involved being set aside for other purposes (as for the self enrichment of the elite or transferred to the top military allies to stay in power, etc.). When it happens, no real punishments or sanctions are imposed by donors. So, more grants lead to more graft (ibid., p. 46).

The aid, she says, helps pay the military, as well as officials loyal to the regime, allowing regime members to stay in power (ibid., p. 60). A large portion of the national budget goes to cronies, generals, and military paraphernalia, instead of being invested in the education and health sectors. In such fundamentally flawed systems, projects are chosen less based on criteria related to the public good than on the desirability of making illicit profits, which creates serious distortions to the laws of the market.

According to Moyo, the money embezzled by African rulers each year is not even reinvested there. At least USD 10 billion leaves Africa each year, or about half of the annual aid. These monies are placed in safe places such as the USA, UK, Canada, Switzerland, and tax havens. The rest vanishes

into lavish spending for members of the elite (economic and government) and those who support it.

This situation discourages foreign investors in the face of the weak institutional framework of these countries (cf. poor governance, poorly enforced laws, poor public infrastructure, low labor productivity).

This dynamic contributes to lowering the level of social capital (the trust that reigns between the members of a community, and their participation in civic affairs), beyond the narrow allegiances of clans and extended families close to the power structure. (Moyo, 2009, p. 58). Little social capital seems to exist beyond the confines of the African collectivist culture, for instance the ethnic allegiances.

Also, aid dependency makes political and bureaucratic jobs lucrative, in a sea of poverty in the most deprived countries, siphoning off scarce talent from the employment pool. Foreign aid also may foment conflicts to enjoy such a money grabbing opportunity (Moyo, 2009, p. 59). Without aid, you take away one big incentive for conflict, according to this author (ibid., p. 144).

Moyo (2009, p. 54) advances, as for development agencies, that there is a significant pressure for them to lend money. The World Bank, the IMF, the UN agencies employ thousands of people, who appreciate their job. Moreover, these aid agencies are bureaucracies whose primary mission is to transfer funds, being what gives them public legitimacy and favour with politicians.

"Aid", according to Moyo, has the effects of: 1) reducing domestic savings and investment, in favour of greater consumer spending, which is often lavish, 2) creating inflation; 3) contributing to the diminution of exports, and 4) creating difficulties to absorb such large inflows, which facilitates corrupt practices (Moyo, 2009, p. 60).

There is an urgent need for liberal democracy, with the political freedoms it bestows, to protect property rights, ensure power checks and balances, defend a free press and safeguard contracts (Moyo, 2009, pp. 40–41).

Among the ways suggested by Moyo to get out of the present deplorable situation are: 1) seizing the opportunity to get into the world capital markets (thus acquiring for the country a better reputation, greater investment capital, reduced borrowing costs, and getting better at international finance) (ibid., p. 88-89); 2) wooing investors, getting more FDIs, as an engine for economic growth, more jobs and better wages, transfer of new technology, improving national human capital, and creation of indigenous firms, etc. (ibid., p. 101-102); 3) having greater transparency in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, as from organizations such as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (ibid., p. 49); 4) the setting of a transparent and functional legal framework, notably for the regularization of rural land property (ibid., p. 138) and property rights as for private investments, since investment money is not as easy to steal as the one obtained from aid (ibid., p. 142); 5) setting up a system of micro-financing for small entrepreneurs (ibid., p. 145); 6) improving intra regional trade with neighbour countries (ibid., pp. 114-115); 7) finding new markets in the world for various African crops, such as cotton, sugar, coffee, tea, and minerals (ibid., pp. 116-118).

Remittances sent from abroad by national migrants also help families pay for necessities at home. According to Moyo (ibid., p. 133), around 5 % of the native African population now lives out of their national frontiers, either to find a job, or for economic, political, climatic reasons. In 2006, USD 20 billion were sent home by African-born migrants (comparatively to USD 68 billion to Latin America, and USD 113 billion to Asian countries. 34 % of African migrants send money at home, for an average of USD 1 800 per migrant for those who send money back home. So, objectively, emigration has become a functional way to augment the families' resources back at home. It is considered that an increase of 10 % of remittances sent home leads to a 3,5 % decline of the proportion of poor people.

In sub-Saharan Africa, because of corruption and neo-patrimonial regimes, competent and honest people are forced by circumstances to participate in questionable activities, or must emigrate, in order to preserve their career prospects and for the good of their families. Otherwise, they risk vegetating on the spot in difficult conditions. According to a recent Afro-barometer survey, 42 % of young Africans aged 18 to 25 say they want to emigrate to the North (Economist (The), 2020c, p. 47).

To counter the current situation, Moyo also believes that the constitution of a real middle class in sub-Saharan Africa would facilitate to better monitor and control the abuses of the rulers.

In conclusion, it is suggested, by Moyo (2009), to African countries that want to get out of this vicious circle to stop playing the game of international aid, which only leads to dependence on

actors outside the country and fosters irresponsibility as for the economic and political elites in power.

To conclude, Moyo (2009, p. 147) recalls David Landes' The Wealth and Poverty of Nations (1999) recommendations for healthy nation-building:

> "secure rights of private property, the better to encourage savings and investment; secure rights of personal liberty… against both the abuses of tyranny and … crime and corruption; enforce rights of contract … provide stable government … governed by publicly known rules … provide responsive government … provide honest government … with no rents to favour and position; provide moderate, efficient ungreedy government … to hold taxes down and reduce the government's claim on the social surplus."

2.5 Integrating Studies of Corruption and International Development Projects

2.5.1 How Corruption is Defined and Identified

We have seen previously that a general definition of corruption is the misuse of power for private gain at one's instigation or in response to inducements (Sohail & Cavill, 2008, p. 730). For Jancsics (2014, p. 359) money, goods, or other resources, which are considered to belong to an organization or collectivity, are instead handled or exchanged in ways that benefit one or more persons who are not the formal owner. Among the negative consequences of corruption, it represents a form of income redistribution, increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, and is against social fairness and justice (Liu & Lin, 2012, pp. 165–166).

In this literature review, we integrated findings from both social and administrative sciences to focus our attention on the governance challenges involved in both business and public administration of such projects. We also asked to what extent project management methods can effectively be harmonized with broader anti-corruption initiative in both donor and receiving countries.

We found that within international development projects (IDPs), corruption and project management, it allows us to propose a research agenda for the several disciplines and fields concerned with solving this phenomenon. Several gaps in the literature need to be addressed to shed more light on the "what, where and how" of corruption in IDPs.

For example, Nystrand (2014) notes that most empirical studies have primarily analyzed the role of transnational and national companies, or else the micro-level dynamics of households, but that very few studies explored the perceptions and role of local-level business actors. Also, according to Carr and Jago (2014), petty corruption remains an under-researched area, even though there have been numerous in-depth studies on corruption in the past ten years by economists, political scientists and lawyers. Most of these studies concentrate on grand corruption, in the private sector (mostly MNCs - as for Multinational corporations) and high-ranking public officials and the political elite. Finally, Jancsics (2014, p. 366) says that there is a need for innovating corruption research to analyze real-life cases.

Therefore, as opposed to restricting studies of corruption to ever more narrow problems, a more transdisciplinary approach can help to enrich our understanding of the causes and how to mitigate it.

2.5.2 Knowledge Management Related to Corruption

Among the many factors to mitigate corruption in IDPs is the use of more agile and systematic Knowledge Management (KM) methods in PM. For example, Marquette and Doig (2004), studying the past performance of the European Union (EU) in development projects, stress the unrecognized importance, until now, of records and record keeping in developing countries for combating corruption and promoting participation. When they went through the examination of many evaluation reports of aid projects, as was their mandate, they were taken aback by the absence of traces of justification for expenses made in various projects funded in the recent past by the European Union. They were aghast to realize the huge lack of coordination among the European donor countries as for an effective evaluation of past projects they funded. They add that this cannot be done if the quality, accessibility, and usability of records does not become a real concern. Accordingly, they recommend to the European Union to consider the importance of records and record keeping supporting the evaluation process and develop a better coordinated funding process. They also stress that a comparative approach is needed, to be able to maximize the identification and use of the expertise developed in the various countries comprised in the EU. They hope that their recommendations will help donor countries to build from now on a better institutional memory to take stock of past experiences. This impedes, among other things, the necessary strategic overview to devise about development aid in the recipient countries.

2.5.3   Epistemological Issues in Studying Corruption

As was outlined by studies of corruption in other economic sectors and activities, studying this phenomenon in IDPs will undoubtedly require overcoming some epistemological issues. Among other authors, Jancsics (2014) advances that although the study of corruption has become a popular topic in social scientific disciplines, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication between these academic disciplines about it. Reviewing the major approaches found about corruption, he concludes that most studies of corruptions fall into three major categories: (1) the rational-actor models where corruption is viewed because of a cost / benefit analysis of individual actors; (2) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption, and (3) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks (horizontal or vertical) of corrupt actors.

Also, an interesting anthropological view of "corruption" is advanced by Torsello and Venard (2016), who consider that management studies of corruption have until now neglected to take into account the anthropological view of corruption. Anthropologists consider that corruption should be analyzed in a holistic way, as enmeshed in socio-cultural contexts. For anthropologists, corruption is viewed differently by various cultures, which relate to differing moralities. They also view corruption as a processual phenomenon, linked to the socio-cultural and economic transformations of society. They also criticize the prevalent moralistic view of corruption taken by most management researchers, based on a 'universal' condemnation of corruption, not considering that corruption is viewed in various and different manners, according to cultures and epochs. Anthropologists insist that researchers must first start from the social actors' point of view, according to an emic approach, as people think and perceive the world in which they live.

Torsello and Venard (2016) advance that corruption cannot be defined in a universalistic, ahistorical manner. That can be seen in the sub-Saharan African region, and elsewhere as in India, where considerations of hidden morality of mutual ties, of reciprocity, gift exchanges, interpersonal trust matter. Corruption, according to these researchers, is a dynamic social reality, therefore requiring contextualization. They conclude that the notion of morality has no universal acceptation.

We propose that the research agenda on corruption in IDPs adopts a more open-ended, exploratory approach. Within a PM perspective, pinpointing the "where and how" of corruption in development projects will require addressing how actors build their knowledge management capabilities, and address the social and cultural challenges inherent to international development projects. Several gaps in the literature on corruption need to be addressed. Some aspects in relation to that phenomenon have been under-researched. A more transdisciplinary approach can help to enrich our understanding of the causes and means to mitigate corruption. More knowledge management efforts need to be mobilized. Epistemological reflections need to be addressed, by resorting to more theorization about corruption issues. On one hand, the anthropological approach has been neglected too long by management researchers.

2.6   Chapter Conclusion

We have seen, in part 2.2, the different types of projects and the disciplinary roots of IDPs. Many researchers in the field of international development now want to go farther beyond the usual managerialist, technocratic, instrumental ways of thinking about and managing projects, and deploring the present lack of cross-fertilization between project management studies and research

and international development, to better share the lessons learned in these respective areas of research and open more collaborative ways for analysis and action (Ika et al., 2020b).

IDPs are intended to alleviate poverty, improve governance, build institutional capacity, and promote human rights. Many IDPs are characterized by complexity, and their frequent contacts with the changing conditions in the field are marked by the multiplicity of stakeholders holding divergent perspectives, an asymmetrical distribution of power between aid donor countries and aid recipient countries, cultural differences, and also new challenges to tackle such as climate change, political instability, migrations, etc.

Many researchers suggest to take a larger distanced stance from the usual project management ways influenced by technocratic, managerialist "New Public Management-type" approaches of the 1970s and 1980s, by adopting nimbler approaches, marked by "muddling through", contingency approach, adaptable processes, systems thinking and experimental ways more adapted to the local situations encountered (Picciotto, 2020).

They also invite us to develop more linkages with other social sciences, to better understand and respond adequately to the new contemporary challenges encountered in the field. Such a "New Project Management" approach invites researchers and practitioners to adopt new ways of thinking and acting as for gender equality, cooperating with local populations, using new tools of analysis and project facilitation, for example.

In part 2.3, we have seen that authors have not reached a consensus about the impact of anti-corruption measures. But most concede, in general, that they have had a limited impact until now on the corrupt behaviours found in aid recipient countries. Moreover, recent research has shown that internal political factors play an important role for the tendency to resort to corrupt behaviour by politicians. The concept of Party System Institutionalization (PSI) plays an important role to explain the tendency of African regimes' actors to resort to corrupt behaviour. When elites can count on a longer horizon for keeping power, they tend less to count on fast rent-taking manoeuvres, usually detrimental to their countries' development perspectives.

The World Bank has enacted a determined effort to better regulate procurement practices and curb corrupt practices related to them. But actors in recipient countries will then often resort to a diversity of opportunistic evasive strategies to mitigate the efficiency of anti-corruption measures put in place.

A revealing study undertaken by Andersen et al. (2020) at the World Bank Group reveals that a substantial part of foreign aid is promptly captured by the elite in many aid recipient countries, validating economic theories of rent-seeking related to foreign aid.

Otherwise, a recent report led by the World Bank reminds us that corruption is a multi-dimensional hydra phenomenon, and that concerned governments must fight it on many fronts: on state functions that governments must perform, on various policy tools formally put at their disposal, and by resorting to a set of oversight institutions.

Many authors have done useful studies aimed at identifying the main factors that are conducive to corruption in sub-Saharan Africa: they comprise a various set of economic, political, institutional, cultural factors, that are interesting to take into account to better understand this intriguing and devasting phenomenon (Gani, 2017; Gök, 2020; Musila, 2019).

Finally, we learn that the membership composition of International Donor Organisations (IDOs) plays a "good guy-bad guy" role in sanctioning or not aid recipient countries based on their level of state corruption.

In part 2.4, while there is a general recognition by most researchers that there is a negative relationship between corruption in a country and economic growth, Pavlik (2018) considers that there is a special case to take into account when entrepreneurs do not encounter uncertain results to obtain what they request for their business needs, after paying bribes to avoid cumbersome obstacles by civil servants or politicians. So there seems to be a special case to reflect on as for uncertainty avoidance.

Adam (2020) considers that e-government, as a general matter, promotes access and delivery of government services and operations for the citizens of a country, also making governments more efficient and effective in combating corruption. But the surrounding context has to be taken into consideration for this to happen. In most sub-Saharan African countries, the state of ICT development, literacy among citizens and the poor institutional quality of the public services reduce or annihilate the effectiveness of e-government in the region.

According to Senu (2020), the UN anti-corruption strategies (UNCAC) intended to combat governmental corruption have not been implemented significantly in sub-Saharan Africa, because of the resistances of most governments, that were characterized by dishonesty, maladministration, illicit activities, nepotism and refusal to enact or apply anti-corruption legislation.

Other researchers highlight the importance of targeting projects well with concerned stakeholders, to ensure project accountability and actively fight project capture (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, 2005; Winters, 2014; Winters & Martinez, 2015).

Finally, Moyo (2009) considers the various negative effects that foreign aid has on national governments in sub-Saharan Africa, rendering them lazy and corrupt.

In part 2.5, the integration of these theoretical perspectives offered a new research agenda. Our study will therefore build upon these strands of literature, seeking to meet the remaining challenges at the intersection of IDPs, corruption, and project studies.

Chapter 3

Methodology

3.1 Overview

Our qualitative research is of an exploratory nature. Given the context of our study, a grounded theory methodology was considered a good fit to study the complex phenomenon of corruption. We aim to identify the factors related to corruption that impact on development projects and programs' success, as identified by our respondents.

We then enumerate the basic features of grounded theory. We proceeded with a sampling method by expertise and specify the respondents' profiles. Interviews were semi-structured, with some basic questions asked to initiate discussion.

We have used a grounded theory methodology and proceeded with interviews with thirty development experts. To sort out the data accumulated, we used a qualitative sorting process by using the software NVivo.

Moreover, we will present four theoretical foundations to better interpret the data obtained from the interviewees. This chapter will therefore outline how four key social theories are used to make sense of the elements of empirical corpus we analyzed, which are the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Culturalist Theory (CT) and the Institutional Theory (IT).

In addition to methodological aspects, this chapter outlines one of our contributions in data analysis, which consists in the use of "theoretical coding" of our data that can help to better understand corruption.

3.2   Qualitative Methods

3.2.1   Grounded Theory

This qualitative research is of an exploratory nature and seeks to better understand where and how corruption occurs as a socially embedded administrative phenomenon, and to study how foreign aid agencies, along with their national partners, implement anti-corruption initiatives.

According to Babbie (2013, p. 90): "exploratory studies are done for three purposes: (1) to satisfy the researcher's curiosity and desire for better understanding, (2) to test the feasibility of undertaking a more extensive study, (3) to develop the methods to be employed in subsequent studies". An exploratory approach is best fit to our objectives, seeking to identify the problems occurring during the implementation of international development projects, and thus find the best ways to improve management effectiveness and efficiency at lower operational levels.

Given the context of our study, a grounded theory methodology was considered as a best fit to study the complex phenomenon of corruption (Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Creswell, 2013, pp. 83–90). In this approach (see Table 5 – Features of Grounded Theory), the researcher does not begin the research with a pre-identified list of concepts (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 15). The theory or model emerges as evidence finding and gathering data evolves, allowing to link evidence to

concepts, and reach a saturation level allowing to explain actors, their actions, and networks and processes.

We aim to identify the factors linked to corruption that impact on development aid projects and programs' success, as perceived by the respondents. These factors may be technical, economical, political, social, cultural, and include among others:

- transparency of the project (or program) known by the various actors and stakeholders,

- involvement of the main stakeholders at the various stages of the project (or program),

- level of knowledge and education affecting project efficacy in decision-making,

- capacity by stakeholders to understand the scope and results of the project (or program),

- influence of the cultural and institutional context on the capacity of the stakeholders,

- awareness of accountability and ensuring good practices of good project governance,

- organizational maturity of stakeholder, especially as for project management methods.

While in no way an exhaustive list, and keeping in mind the principles of grounded theory, the scope of concepts and constructs was not bound by any preconceived theory or model. Categories and concepts were left to emerge throughout the project and were analyzed ex-post using the methods prescribed by the methodology.

Table 5: Features of Grounded Theory

Features	Main Benefits	Authors
Evidence-Based	Qualitative data collection avoiding interference from theoretical analysis and concerned with "data thickness", quality, and reliability.	(Glaser & Strauss, 1967)
Inductive Reasoning	"Inductive approach to the study of social life that attempts to generate a theory from the constant comparing of unfolding observations".	(Babbie, 2013, p. 307)
Theoretical Sampling	Rely on opportunistic and theoretical sampling to enhance sources of relevant evidence.	(Babbie, 2013, pp. 190–191; Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 134–152; Creswell, 2013, p. 86)
Data Linking	Systematic and rigorous use of memos and diagrams to enable cross-interview and cross-case evidence finding.	(Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 106–133; Creswell, 2013, pp. 83, 89; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 140–146)
Data Saturation	Sampling of subjects may evolve as the structure of the situation being studied becomes clearer and certain.	(Babbie, 2013, p. 191)
Context Linking	Importance of the respondent's experience and context to enhance evidence finding.	(Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 153–171, 268–282)
Process View	Bringing process into analysis, reflect complexity of actors and interaction networks, and integrating categories.	(Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 283–309)
Theory Building	Using various techniques for achieving theoretical integration.	(Babbie, 2013, pp. 392–393 for integrating theory from data; Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 187–202)
Theory Emergence	Use of open coding to identify concepts, expand definitions, and allow constructs to emerge.	(Babbie, 2013, pp. 389–412; Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 220–238; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 109–140)
Theory Continuity	Establishing standards for validation about grounded theory, ensuring theory building is linked with later stages.	(Creswell, 2013, pp. 260–262; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 501–506)
Analysis Tools	Use of a computer program (e.g., NVivo) for qualitative data analysis.	(Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 203–213)
Writing Style	Keeping a good writing structure for grounded theory, allowing more emergent storytelling as opposed to theory verification case style.	(Creswell, 2013, pp. 229–232)

3.2.2   Respondents

We performed interviews (sufficient as per Creswell, 2013, pp. 148–149) with 30 field international aid experts benefiting from firsthand experience in developing countries (see Table 6 – Respondent Profiles). We sought respondents with either a generalist or specialist insight on various IDPs. We found them both within professional networks as well as through IDP reports and archives, identifying people with potential exposure to the complexity of anti-corruption and PM methods. These included:

- Project managers in the field of international development and aid, preferably persons having worked in sub-Saharan Africa or in Canada with an agency that is active in that region of the world.

- Individuals of African origins who are knowledgeable about projects of international cooperation, and who can judge the efficacity and efficiency of these programs or projects, about the local conditions encountered (e.g., values, economical and political factors, cultures).

- Intellectuals (professors, researchers, authors) who teach or work in the field of international development, who are able to tackle that subject in a more structural way (meaning that they are knowledgeable about recent world developments taking place, such as neoliberalism, aid conditionalities, new principles followed by agencies, bilateral, multilateral, NGOs).

- Specialists active in various fields, concerned by the problems of corruption, such as corruption prevention or repression officers (for example as RCMP officers); audit

specialists (working in government or at Global Affairs of Canada); financial controllers

(working in international development agencies), specialists working in project control.

Table 6: Respondent Profiles

Attributes	Categories	Number of Respondents
Age Group	21-40	4
	41-60	14
	61+	12
Education	Undergraduate	3
	Masters	14
	Doctorate	13
Origins	Canada	18
	Africa	10
	Asia	1
	Middle East	1
Generalists (21 of 30)	Bilateral Aid	11
	Multilateral Aid	2
	Research	8
Specialists (20 of 30; includes specialists who became generalists in later career)	Diplomats	4
	Engineering	4
	Evaluation	3
	Commerce	3
	Public Servant	1
	Police	1
	Consulting	1
	Cooperatives	1
	Post-Conflict Aid	1
	Social Militant	1

3.2.3   Interviews

The interviews, either in French or English, lasted about 90-120 minutes each, and were recorded

and transcribed, later analyzed using the software Nvivo (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 203–213).

The software, instrumental in enabling cross-expert analysis, was performed to help identify

commonalities and differences in corruption issues and how they were handled.

The interviews were semi-structured with basic questions to initiate discussion. They sought to elicit detailed personal experiences, and enrich conceptual understanding of the phenomena of corruption and PM methods implementation:

- To what extent do you consider there was corruption in the projects you worked in, and what could possibly have been done to prevent this?

- What factors explain such a situation: individuals and their personal objectives; interpersonal relationships; the cultural environment (values, social norms, etc.); or a context marked by significant change (political, economic, ideological …)?

- Which factors can mitigate the problems encountered: better monitoring and control, more transparent rules and norms implemented, intervention by authorities, and then by what means could authorities have detected these problems?

Researchers cautiously took in consideration the sensitivity and confidentiality of information shared (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60–84; Miles & Huberman, 2003, pp. 501–507). Given the nature of corruption as a socially embedded phenomenon, attention was given to the working, cultural, professional, and ideological context surrounding the actors interviewed. Ethical considerations were very important in obtaining respondent consent, with proper management of contacting, keeping confidentiality, and processing content to ensure transparency and acceptability for them of the data obtained (Babbie, 2013, pp. 60–84; Creswell, 2013, pp. 152–153). This research, while not funded, was approved by the institutional review board of the university. As well, while unusual in reporting the various respondent statements, it was necessary to identify the origins and professional occupation, as actor culture and roles emerged as key factors in the proposed model.

This practice was nevertheless conforming to the ethics certificate granted to researchers, as it did not in any way allow for identifying respondents nor their milieu.

3.2.4 Analysis

The data obtained was processed according to the state-of-the art methods recommended in the literature, using the NVivo software. Coding of the data obtained led to identify and develop the main concepts identified as meaningful for the respondents (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 220–267), also taking into account the context (ibid., pp. 268-282), while integrating the categories involved (ibid., pp. 295-310). Coding also considered the methods recommended by Miles and Huberman (2003), such as writing codes, memos, noting patterns and themes, counting the frequency of codes, noting the relations among variables.

NVivo is a convenient software for qualitative analysis that allow researchers to simultaneously analyze several interviews from different interviewers and interviewees. (Babbie, 2013, pp. 403–407; Maxwell, 2013, pp. 115–116).

About NVivo, here is a profile of the data we have obtained:

- For the Project Summary, we have stored forty written documents and seventy-six audios
  documents (all available for future researchers).
- In the Coding Summary Report, there are 426 pages containing 1,874 excerpts obtained
  during the interviews.
- The Code Structure presents 315 nodes.
- The Code Summary has 68 pages containing 3,055 paragraphs.

Categorizing analysis starts with the identification of units or segments of data that seem important or meaningful in some way for the researcher (Maxwell, 2013, p. 107). As for the coding process, we have used open, selective, and axial coding processes. During Open coding, data are broken down into discrete parts, closely examined and compared for similarities and differences (Babbie, 2013, p. 397; Corbin & Strauss, 2015; Maxwell, 2013, p. 107). Axial coding aims to identify the core concepts in a study. It involves a regrouping of the data. Selective coding seeks to identify the central code in the study, the one that the other codes are related to (Babbie, 2013, p. 398). ''In the grounded theory method, patterns of relationships can be teased out of an extensive, in-depth examination of a large body of observations'' (ibid., p. 398).

As for the relations between the goals, the conceptual framework, the research question and methods used, we followed a flexible conceptual framework, as recommended by Maxwell (2013, pp. 39–72), meaning that given its qualitative nature, the design is flexible rather than fixed. Nevertheless, sound validity measures have been an ongoing concern (Creswell, 2013, pp. 243–268; Maxwell, 2013, pp. 121–138). Internal validity and external validity of the data obtained and analyzed will be foremost as concerns to be taken care (Gavard-Perret et al., 2008, pp. 182–192).

While our sample is limited, convergence among the various respondent experiences allowed to clearly categorize the type of anti-corruption initiatives that relate closely with project and program failures and success. While it is not possible to propose a set of new methods leading to IDPs "anti-corruption-by-design", the findings are sufficiently innovative to guide PM experts in the field.

These can serve to inspire new rules for stakeholder analysis, project financing agreements, project team building processes, information management, and project control.

3.3 Theoretical Coding

3.3.1 Complexity of Development Aid and Corruption

As we relied on a grounded theory approach, we did not have pre-coded factors but instead relied on respondents, as well as interpreted, what they qualified as corruption issues and anti-corruption initiatives. To facilitate our theory building process, we code several of our respondent statements using acronyms of the four theories previously outlined: OIT for Organizational Interests Theory; PAT for Principal-Agent Theory; CT for Culturalist Theory, and IT for Institutional Theory.

The study of IDPs and corruption requires, at the time of data analysis, a set of theoretical foundations that enable the integration of all the necessary concepts within a coherent model. They must reflect the complexity of development aid and corruption as phenomena still evolving and requiring innovative PM methods to control risk. These theories must consider the various risks, either internal to projects and project management, or due to the external context of the project, that can create more possibilities (and probabilities) that aid projects may and will be subjected to acts of corruption. In these cases, there are more opportunities for "project capture". On the other hand, various safeguarding measures can lead in probability to better results as for the efficiency and efficacity of projects (or programs) involved. To help analyze the evidence collected, and formulate a grounded theory or model, we rely on four theories integrating social and administrative sciences (see Table 7)

Table 7: Four Theories for Results Interpretation

Theories	Organizational Interests Theory (OIT)	Principal-Agent Theory (PAT)	Culturalist Theory (CT)	Institutional Theory (IT)
Authors	Crozier and Friedberg (1977); Morgan (2006); Selznick (1948); Perrow (2014); Somech and Drach-Zahavy (2002)	Berle and Means (1991); Eisenhardt (1988); Jensen and Mecklin (1976); Rouleau (2007); Hendry (2002)	Malinowski (2014); Radcliffe - Brown (1952); Diallo and Thuillier (2004, 2005) ; Muriithi and Crawford (2003); Hofstede (2001); Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (2008); Mutabazi (2008)	Scott (2012); Giezen (2012); Hauser and Hogenacker (2014); Rouleau (2007, pp. 82–89)
Applications	Bilateral and Multilateral agencies; NGO's; donor and recipient countries as for international aid	Governments; bilateral and multilateral agencies; rent-seeking economies	Individual behaviours, needs, values, norms, communities' needs, values, worldviews, solidarity linkages	Project and project management context (country; region)
Concepts	Rational actors; actor's strategy; power relations; situational positions.	Contracts between actors; interests; unequal symmetry of information; agency costs; systems of obligations and controls; financial incentives.	Values; norms; human needs; status. Localized ways to solve problems and interpret situations.	Political, cultural, economical context for project and program management Characteristics of institutions.

3.3.2   Organizational Interests Theory

The Organizational Interests Theory (OIT) (constructed here from elements of the analyses of coalition, contingencies and strategic analysis) focuses on a socio-political reading of the organization and organizational actors (power relations) and their interrelations (Crozier &

Friedberg, 1977; Morgan, 2006; Perrow, 2014; Selznick, 1948; Somech & Drach-Zahavy, 2002).

For this theory, power is a multi-dimensional factor, used by actors in their dealings with each

other (Rouleau, 2007, pp. 115, 118, 125). Actors (who, according to the context, can be individuals,

organizations, even countries) are in a situation of interdependency (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

They regularly enter into fluid coalitions, according to the situations encountered and problems to

be solved (Simon, 1997).

Individuals have divergent interests; they mobilize resources to reach their goal and devise various

strategies to reach their objectives. The organization is seen as a political arena, with dominant

coalitions and other coalitions less powerful (Perrow, 2014; Zaleznik & Kets de Vries, 1985).

Organizational and individual power are the result of various contingencies (Mintzberg, 1983;

Morgan, 2006). The freedom of the actor is limited by organizational rules (Crozier & Friedberg,

1977). The rationality of the actor is limited. Finally, the organization is premised as being a social

construct.

3.3.3 Principal-Agent Theory

For the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) (Berle & Means, 1991; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hendry, 2002;

Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen & Smith, 2003; Rouleau, 2007, pp. 99–102), the organization is

considered as a social set of individuals who have contractual relations between themselves

(Rouleau, 2007, p. 101). The contract is considered as freely passed between equal agents. The

agency relationship is between a principal and an agent. The principal's situation depends upon

the agent's actions. They do not necessarily share the same interests, and between them, there is

an unequal symmetry of information. Agency costs are supported by the two parties, who put in

place systems of obligations and controls. Agency costs comprise expenses made for monitoring, mechanisms of control, and finally residual losses. To limit the costs of agency, the principals have recourse to their authority and various means of control and financial incentives.

An interesting comment by Jancsics (2014, pp. 360–361) is that in cases of corruption, where the state as principal is supposed to represent the interests of the general public, the principal-agent theory becomes irrelevant, since there is no actor able to monitor and punish corrupt behavior (A. Persson et al., 2010; Rothstein, 2011, pp. 99–104). In that case, a few negative group members may 'poison' otherwise 'good apples' and transform the organization into a 'bad barrel', making the group as a whole a bunch of 'bad apples', considered corrupt as a whole (Blickle et al., 2006; Collins & Schmidt, 1993; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 15; Simpson, 2012).

3.3.4 Culturalist Theory

The Culturalist Theory (CT) approach takes a holistic approach, seeing culture as the main background leading actors and communities to base their behaviours, worldview, and actions. The concepts advanced here are values, norms, models, human needs (Delas & Milly, 2015, pp. 253–289). Culture, according to Malinowski (2014) and many anthropologists, serves to fulfill human needs.

Cultural factors also influence the efficacity of international development projects (IDPs). This dimension is discussed by some researchers (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004, 2005; Ika et al., 2010; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003). Diallo and Thuillier (2004) advance that IDPs are characterized by

the geographical and cultural remoteness between the donor countries' supervisors and African managers in the field.

Basing themselves on Hofstede (2001) as for cultural dimensions, Muriithi and Crawford (2003) advance that sub-Saharan Africa has a high level of power distance, a high degree of uncertainty control, an average masculine culture and a strong collectivist culture. As for the socio-economic and socio-cultural environment, SSA project managers must cope with a complex web of obligations to extended families toward which they have a strong moral engagement.

Since corruption is mainly a hidden and mute phenomenon, we will have to resort to macro-sociological indexes such as Transparency International, World Governance Quality indexes, and others, to consider the large perspective (of economical, political, cultural dimensions) prevalent in certain national and regional contexts. These dimensions influence local actors to adapt their behaviours to the norms and models of action in use around them.

3.3.5   Institutional Theory

According to Locatelli et al. (2017), resorting to Institutional Theory (IT) is rendered necessary to consider the "corrupt project context" (including the political, economical, cultural factors). Corruption being a multi-dimensional reality, it involves complex socio-economic systems (e.g., organization, country). This perspective permits to identify shared rules, norms, values, beliefs and negotiated understandings that characterize institutions (ibid., p. 253). The authors advance that, unfortunately, the phenomenon of corruption is not taken enough into consideration for analysis by researchers in the project literature (ibid., p. 265). This topic is more considered in other close

fields of research, such as governance, stakeholders, risk, and value. The institutional theory, as for projects, has been developed, among others, by Scott (2012), Giezen (2012), Hauser and Hogenacker (2014), and Henisz et al. (2012). To better understand that approach, also see Rouleau (2007, pp. 82–89).

Chapter 4

Results

4.1 Overview

We present in this chapter an original theoretical model (see Figure 2 – Anti-Corruption and Project Management Actors and Controls) that illustrates which actors, events and context are related and linked in the dynamic efforts to understand and combat corruption in international development endeavours. The arrows linking these elements are related to either: foreign Aid Cycle, Capture Opportunities, Context Pressures, Personal Damages encountered, and Control Mechanisms exercised. The Model can serve to interpret various interrelated issues brought forward by our respondents, such as Policy issues, Governance concerns, Institutions involved, Aid provided, Corruption acts encountered, Business actors' behaviour, Management issues, Population targeted by international aid, and the surrounding Culture.

To help our analysis, we present ninety-six (96) excerpts from interviews done with the thirty international experts encountered. Then these excerpts are linked to four relevant theories, epistemologically chosen following the analysis of empirical data: the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Culturalist Theory (CT) and the Institutional Theory (IT), as presented in Chapter 3 section 3.3 - Theoretical coding).

We also categorized the excerpts, classifying them using various topics, such as Capture Opportunities, Governance, Institutions, Culture, Business, Control Mechanisms and a 'what,

where and how' section, concerning socio-political ecosystems related to corruption, the influence of neo-liberalism and international aid and project management issues.

4.2 Theoretical Model and Model Components

4.2.1 Theoretical Model

Based on the foregoing data analysis, we propose a theoretical model, as presented in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Anti-Corruption and Project Management Actors and Controls

Model factors are as follows:

- The central box (1 green) are the Events that may lead to the phenomenon of Corruption.

- The corner boxes (4 orange) are the contextual factors influencing the actors and potentially causing the phenomenon of corruption, including Policy, Institutions, Culture, and Project Management practices.

- The intermediate boxes (4 blue), situated between corner boxes, represent the actors involved, including Governance, Business, Beneficiary Population, and Aid Agencies.

Various arrows link the factors and act as cause-effect or closely linked influence between factors:

- Connecting Aid and Business to Corruption (2 red): these arrows represent the many capture opportunities that present themselves.

- Connecting intermediate factors (4 black circular): these arrows represent the international Aid Cycle.

- Connecting corner and intermediate factors (8 blue): these arrows convey the various contextual pressures upon the various actors, such as economic opportunities, power relations.

- Connecting Corruption to Governance and Population (2 broken yellow): these arrows mean the damages inflicted on humans (such as displacement of a population, loss of rights), along with evidence that reach or percolate to governance entities.

- Connecting Management and Culture to Corruption and Governance (4 dotted green): these arrows represent the control mechanisms, that can be of an economic, hierarchical, political, ethnic, or gender type.

4.2.2 Model Components

The model can serve to interpret most of our respondent statements, based on the following definitions of the nine interrelated factors, used in our coding phase within NVivo

The first factor is corruption itself, occurring at the intersection of actors and contextual factors:

- **<u>Corruption or Capture Opportunities:</u>** There are many definitions of corruption. One is "the use of an entrusted power for private gain" (Sohail & Cavill, 2008, p. 730). Corruption comes in many forms: bribery, embezzlement, nepotism, influence peddling, conflicts of interest, accounting fraud, electoral fraud, and so forth (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016, pp. 8–11). Grand corruption involves a small number of powerful players and large sums of money. Petty corruption involves ordinary citizens in their frequent interactions with the police, civil servants, etc. Many social and economic factors facilitate the occurrence of corruption, such as poverty, the lack of civil rights, weak institutions.

The following set of factors is related to the "context" of IDPs:

- **<u>Policy:</u>** it refers to the various political and administrative decisions and ideologies that shape through time the various types of international aid and channels used for aid development (such as the project approach, the program approaches, as sectoral budget support, direct budget support, and technical assistance). Policy also refers to the new paradigmatic aid approach represented by the Paris Declaration (2005), the Millennium Goals (2000-2015), followed by the Durable Development Goals (2015-2030).

- **<u>Institutions:</u>** Large and organized sectors in any society that structurally and ideologically shape people's lives through norms, values, structures, such as the education system, the health sector, the judiciary system, the army, and the police.

- **<u>Culture:</u>** Values, norms, history, socializing institutions (e.g., family, ethnic groups, organizations, etc.) that influence the behaviour and ways of thinking of the people in a society.

- **Management:** it refers to project management professional practices. It concerns the various phases of project development (such as design, planning, implementation, closing, evaluation, post-project), the actors and stakeholders involved, the institutionalized best ways to conduct projects, the values and ideologies implicated, the standards set by institutes and standards of practice, such as PMI in North America and IPMA in Europe.

The last set of factors position "actors" around IDPs and concerned with anti-corruption efforts:

- **Governance:** it concerns the ways people in developed and developing countries are governed by their countries' political leadership. It also relates to the relations between the donor countries and the partner countries (the ones receiving aid), party politics, types of government, the relations between the executive branch, the legislative branch, judicial institutions. Decisional aspects and strategic aspects are also in play.

- **Business:** Actors who are in the private sector, such as entrepreneurs and firms, both in developed countries and developing countries.

- **Population:** They are the beneficiaries of development aid, the targeted groups, such as the inhabitants of a region, a professional group, micro-finance, public servants as for technical assistance. The results pertaining to the viewpoint of the population are reflected along the whole analysis section. In effect, victims of corruption, direct or indirect, are the subject mentioned in analyzing each model component.

- **Aid:** National aid agencies (but also multilateral agencies, NGOs, philanthropic funds), their values, history, channels and sectors of intervention, thematic aid preferences (e.g., gender equality, protection of the environment, agriculture, infrastructure, support for the private sector, etc.), preferred countries and sectors selected for aid.

4.3   Capture Opportunities

Some of the respondents signalled in their interviews that once the aid contract is signed, thus signalling the end of the design and planning processes, and the beginning of the implementation phase, local government officials often try to obtain certain advantages or materials, that were not planned in the formal contract. (PAT and OIT)

Our first effort was to identify "value capture opportunities" from project management stakeholders. Respondents addressed the issue of project capture in various responses. First, at the local government level, local civil servants can try to take advantage of their strategic organizational position in the project processes: (OIT)

We saw earlier that state capture relates to the idea of powerful vested interests that undermine the ability of the state to pursue national development policies in the collective interest, thus undercutting the democratic process (Hira, 2017) (PAT). We have seen that some actors (in aid receiving countries) may try to take advantage of their executive positions in government ministries or local NGOs, that were delegated to them by the principal (being the financing agencies), to obtain material advantages not always specified in the aid contract. Once the funds have been transferred, a margin of executive discretion or opaqueness can permit them to take hold of funds or material, in a manner not specifically planned or specified. This type of practice has been presented by the Principal-Agency researchers.

Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, p. 381) consider the possibility that, when a ruling elite acquires a capability for managing economic rents in a centralized way, with a view to enhancing their own

and others' incomes rather than just maximizing them in the short run, they could then play a useful role by developing a long-horizon developmental patrimo-nialism in Africa. But, unfortunately, in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, they consider the rent-seeking to be widespread, uncontrolled, and associated with both political and administrative corruption. According to Booth (2012), aid can only be profitable in countries with good leadership and governance. Rather, Burgis (2015) recorded many instances of double national accounting methods and shadow dealings involving various sub-Saharan African countries' regimes.

As for project capture, Winters (2014) showed that the well-defined targeting of recipients results in superior accountability. At the other end of the process, aid works better when the recipients of aid can organize for collective action and defend their interests in development projects. (PAT)

Considering the administrative weaknesses often found in many aid recipient countries, as for the management of project and program monitoring and evaluation, it is difficult to evaluate the progress realized. Transaction costs being a complex issue, it is imperative to find ways to build the capacity of public institutions in host countries (CIDA, 2010, p. 7). (PAT)

Moyo (2009), as we have seen, has taken a radical stance by stating that aid has more maleficent than beneficial results and should be cut in its present form, since it fosters corruption (ibid., p. 50). According to her, the bigger the projects are, the more they tend to be captured by elites, and become fungible (ibid., p. 46), enlarging the size of the pie (ibid., p. 60). The money obtained illicitly does not even stay in Africa for productive investments. According to the author, ten billion dollars leave the continent each year, never to come back. Consequently, poor governance goes

on, pitiful infrastructures fall in ruin, and new African generations dream to emigrate for a better future.

The Swedish researchers Reinikka and Svensson (2004) led a study in Uganda to know what happened to a World Bank capitation grant made to the Ugandan government and destined to fund non-wage expenditures for the primary schools of the country. As we saw earlier, the first leg of the study revealed that 87 % of the funds never reached the intended school authorities. It is to be noted that most teachers and parents did not know that they were entitled to capitation grants (ibid., p. 687). In such an instance, when aid does not reach the targeted actors, such as teachers and children, personal damages negatively affect their perspectives of personal development.

Most of the money was diverted by regional and local party officials for other uses. Most of the diverted money was concentrated by a small pool of elites interconnected by common schooling, marriage, friendships, shared ethnicities, or religion. The political patronage system sees to the distribution of the diverted funds for patronage politics and funding of political activities. The rest is consumed as 'private' goods, such as salt, sugar, and beer, or distributed to partisans of the party (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004, p. 688).

Finally, the procurement process was often considered to be subjected to acts of corruption by respondents. Capture opportunities are also committed by civil servants and police officers in their relations with citizens.

1. "Local government officials try to maximize money from development projects. They seem to care little for the needs of the poor." (Retired Canadian aid respondent, micro-finance) (PAT & IT)

2. "Once the contracts are signed, there are obstacles surging: local civil servants demand various advantages for themselves (cars, computers). They have to be reminded of the terms of the contract that don't provide for that." (Retired Canadian project manager, micro-finance) (PAT)

3. "Part of the aid is diverted, through the various layers of state bureaucracy and power, before reaching the aid target groups." (Marketing specialist, respondent of west African origin) (PAT)

4. "Foreign aid must go through three or four stages of the State bureaucracy. This often results in underfunded projects, carried out only on paper. World Bank projects are eaten up and down at various levels." (Retired Canadian expert in project and program evaluation) (PAT)

5. "Before the 1990s, it was taboo for the World Bank to talk about corruption." (Canadian retired multilateral aid agent) (IT)

6. "After a full year as World Bank President, John Wolfensohn told the 1996 Annual Meeting that the Bank "needed to ensure that all resources are used efficiently … If the new compact is to succeed, we must tackle the issue of economic and financial efficiency. But we also need to address transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity. And let's not mince

words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption." (cited by Business consultant, of north African origin) (PAT)

7. "So, corruption happens at the micro level, and among the big guys. So the police and the gendarmerie systematically extort all taxi drivers. All the taxis you see, either metered taxis or non-metered taxis. And for the common taxis, whether in the business district, in Cocody (Abidjan), in the Plateau, or elsewhere, there is a systematic racketeering on taxi drivers, and on the roads." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (PAT & OIT)

8. "People drive outside the norm. It is not clear how the permits are allocated. There is too much corruption. You pay for your license quickly, so you can do your business as a driver. So we do not respect what is fundamental in terms of security. So the police, instead of watching over this, what are they doing? In addition to the civil servant salary he has, he is paid 100 francs each time he calls drivers. So he and his head of department, and the commissioner. And the whole gang takes turns. From 5 a.m. until 10 a.m., there is a group that has racked it up. 100 000 or 200 000 CFA Francs (FCFA 5 000 equals CAD 11)." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (PAT & IT)

9. "(as for public servants) They have a motive for corruption. There is no time limit. They tell the 'requérant': We can do this for you in two days. You answer: Ah, that's too long. If you are in a hurry, you create the opportunity to make added value for him. "I need the file tonight, or tomorrow morning." You are told, 'Give me FCFA 10 000, I'll try to get people to hurry'. We therefore have a collusion of corrupters. So, if you want the document, there is a chain of

people who will share the surplus, and who take advantage of this opportunity. They are in cahoots." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (PAT & IT)

10. "I would say that the problem of corruption is a general problem, for the countries of Africa and in the world, in general. To speak of Togo, I would say that corruption exists at all levels. So. I classify it in three ways: First, it is at the individual level - people, in everyday life, get corrupted. A policeman will take some money from a citizen because he wants to make some money on the streets. Those in public office. It is still at the expense of people who cannot afford it." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT, OIT & CT)

Ethnicity and family relations also play a significant role for obtaining positions and jobs.

11. "Sometimes people have a job that they don't have the skills to do, that they don't deserve. They have it either by ethnicity, or because their cousin is a director. So I got the job, even though I don't have the qualifications. I got it because the one who can award the job is my brother, or my cousin or even my sister's husband. He's from the same ethnicity as me, or stuff like that. Or I went through his superior, whom I know better, and who gave him the order to hire me." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (OIT & CT)

12. "Sometimes that gives a bad job, a performance that gives unresponsible results, and creates frustration. And that creates a lot of other problems as well. It is this form of corruption that plagues our African societies." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (CT)

13. "It's OK if I know someone. If he's from the same ethnicity as me, I'll talk to him, and he'll give me the job. In this culture of solidarity, this is the other setback that does not suit our fight against corruption. So when we talk about corruption in Africa … we find that it is not just a matter of corruption at the state level, at the level of institutions, at the level of services. Culture also indirectly promotes corruption. Because it's OK to help someone somehow. We must do it. It's not a choice. The fight against corruption is difficult. It is a very complicated path in Africa. Culture has something to do with it. This is a point of view that I share." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (PAT & CT)

4.4   Contextual Factors

4.4.1   Development Aid Policy

4.4.1.1   Understanding the Sources of Corruption

The first question asked to respondents was: Where does corruption come from, according to you? How do you explain the phenomenon of corruption? The answers and explanations given were numerous and diverse, and led to several relevant coding integrated within the proposed model. The causes advanced by the respondents were varied: poverty and lack of resources, socio-political and cultural ecosystems, human nature, the predatory state (as studied by the state capture theory), the lack of institutional control mechanisms, human opportunism, neoliberalism, nepotism.

Poverty and lack of resources: Many people are poor or very poor in Africa. The opportunities for a decent and stable level of life are scant. Steady jobs are rare, wages low.

Overall, the 'what, where and how' analysis of corruption can rely on the proposed model to pinpoint and prioritize the factors by which anti-corruption and project management methods could be better aligned.

As for the socio-political ecosystems, rich people constitute an opportunity for other actors to get around them and live off them.

4.4.1.2   Socio-Political Ecosystems

14. "The system is also called 'the manger' ("*la mangeoire*")." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

15. "When you are in the System, you keep silent." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

16. "Those in power are called the System, with regional ramifications. You are either inside or outside the System." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (IT)

17. "The people in power hold on to it. Without it, their children, who study abroad, would no longer be able to afford it." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

18. "Once in power, leaders cling to it." (Engineer, of eastern African origin) (IT)

19. "If the money is for a project in a region, it will go through a governor. He will send to the prefect or his sub-prefect, who is his collaborator. You see that there are at least three or four floors through which the money must pass. You are not unaware that on each floor, there are "punctures", meaning that everyone can help themselves. Let's say that if it's a 100-million-dollar project, or $100,000, if you're more modest, the person who must carry out the project, because of the drains that have occurred along the way, can end up with 50,000 $. He won't complain. Eventually, the project will be underfunded, or it will be a project that will be done only on paper. There are several projects not done." (Marketing expert, of western African origin) (IT, OIT)

20. "In all, you have an ecosystem that depends on corruption, right? Some people don't necessarily understand the impact of it, because in Nigeria, you would see what they call the Big Man, Chief or other things. Thousands of people would be benefiting of that one corrupt individual. And they are smart enough not to keep it all for themselves and share some of their wealth. So, it is not always viewed as legally wrong, as morally wrong." (Senior Canadian civil servant, economics and commercial affairs, and former high-level diplomat in west Africa and south-east Asia) (CT & IT)

21. "In south Africa, there is an ecosystem that depends on a corrupt big man: thousands of people benefit on one corrupt individual." (Canadian high official, aid and commerce) (CT & IT)

22. "Often, when a minister changes, 80% of positions of responsibility also change. Ethnic and family ties matter more than integrity." (Retired Canadian aid project manager) (CT & OIT)

4.4.1.3 Global Political and Economic Context

Corruption is not an isolated phenomenon within aid institutions. It is socially embedded and must be considered within the broader historical context at the global level. Not only government institutions, but all facets of society, are closely integrated with this problem.

23. "Corruption affects all levels of society." (Business consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

As well, the global political and economic context has great influence on how aid is more or less closely managed. For example, Keynesianism has been replaced, since the end of the 1970s and from the 1980s, by neo-liberalism. Looser rules permit actors to manipulate the situation at their advantage. (IT)

24."We are in a neoliberal period: there is a loosening of ethical principles (e.g., the banking rules)." (Canadian intellectual, specialist in international development) (CT)

4.4.2 Institutions

It is useful here to refer to the institutional theory and to the culturalist theory. The institutional theory (IT) (see chapter 3, section 3.3.5) refers to the political, cultural, and economic contexts

that shape how project and program management will be viewed and enacted by the authorities and the stakeholders. This theory helps the observer to consider that any human society shares rules, norms, and beliefs, in a constant and dynamic negotiated process of institutional settings.

Moreover, corruption has flourished in countries plagued by large democratic deficits (Norris, 2011) and weak governance (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). The institutional theory has emphasized that corruption can hardly be put in check if the following institutional safeguards are not present: freedom of the medias, strong political institutions, giving voice and rights to citizens, political stability, quality of regulations, efficacy of public powers and a legally credible State.

The fight against corruption in sub-Saharan Africa must be pursued, as is advanced by the World Bank now, in conjunction with the strengthening of political institutions, giving more voice and rights to the citizens and medias, having better political stability, improving the quality of regulations, the efficacy of public powers and a legally credible state. Educating girls, and young people in general is promising as for better family planning, gender equality, and the fight against diseases and pandemics. (IT)

4.4.2.1 Education

Education is one of the main levers for giving individuals and families ways to cope economically. But in most SSA countries, the structural adjustments promoted by the Washington Consensus in the years 1980s and 1990s provoked a dramatic decline in monetary opportunities for parents to send their children to school.

On the other hand, international cooperation does not always lead to ameliorations in the field. For instance, Canada gave many millions of dollars intended to help fund education in Kenya that corrupt officials inside the Ministry of Education instead siphoned off.

(cited by Ferry et al., 2020, p. 785; O'Neill, 2010).

25. "With the structural adjustments of the 1980s, there was a dismantling of the educational and health systems in the developing countries. It was a brutal period. There was a drop in middle-class income." (Graduate student and political analyst, of west African origin) (IT)

26. "In the field of education, corruption also plays a role. It has always been around for a long time. We have students who do not deserve to pass. The parents are going to see the teacher and give them some money. Or we give a higher mark even if the child does not deserve it. It's not uncommon. Even when I was a child or a student in Togo, we saw cases like that where people did not deserve to pass. They are going to the senior year because the parents went to see the teacher to make arrangements." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT & CT)

27. "With regard to education, the state has said to itself: The more there are new graduates who come out, the more there will be a boom in job seekers. There is no social system that exists on this subject, so this is going to cause social upheaval. So the more we delay things in their academic process, the fewer problems we will have." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (IT)

28. "Several students arrive unprepared for university." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (CT)

29. "Many teachers have not been well trained in the subject they teach." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT & OIT)

30. "There are few opportunities for a good job, even with a diploma." (Reformist militant, Sahelian region) (IT)

31. "A large part of the African population is illiterate, which is not good for democracy." (Business consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

32. (About schools and universities) "So you have buildings that were never really renovated. The library, year after year, had the same books, the same volumes. So when I was in college there were a lot of protests. The students demanded an improvement in our working conditions. The lecture halls were always crowded with many people, but nothing changed to be able to receive new people. The library was in a rundown condition, dare I say it, that it had never been recycled, or improved upon. Scholarship conditions were also a serious problem, because sometimes you went three to four months without receiving any money." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (PAT & CT)

33. "Public education no longer exists. (In the higher education sector), everything is for sale - course notes, course plans. For some girls, there are exchanges of sexual favours. These are

called by some as "sexually transmitted grades." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

34. (When the Franc CFA was devalued in Ivory Coast, and the structural adjustments measures were put in place, around 1992) "The bulk of the state's portfolio was education. So what happened? (That devaluation) saved the state half of teachers' salaries … to have a financial improvement (for the state) ... So all this staff, all these human beings, after the parents could no longer finance the education of their children. A lot of kids must leave school because 'Daddy' doesn't have any money for them to go to school. We are dealing with large families of five, six, seven children. Overnight, you have a salary for all seven children, and that wasn't enough back then. Because there is inflation, life expenses, real estate, transport, everything costs more. There are a lot of young people who are going to drop out of school. They drop out … and it creates social tensions." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (IT)

4.4.2.2   Health

Everywhere in the world, people try very hard to ensure the well-being of their family members. But the health sector in SSA countries, notably in the poorest among them, presents problematic conditions for families and groups not rich enough to help themselves and their relatives.

35. "There is solidarity, people join together to help and pay for a relative who has to go to the hospital." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (CT)

36. "When somebody gets sick, uncles, cousins join to help the family member. It means that everyone has contributed a little. Now there is the nurse asking for more money before treating you, because he is not paid enough. This is where I have a problem, because by doing this, you are hurting someone who needs care. In general, this is the reason we say, that we are poorly paid. But the peasant who came from the bush doesn't even have what you have." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (CT)

37. (In the health services) "What happens is that the money goes to the pharmacist, who runs the cash register. People change prices, they add more. So, nobody knows it, but if the products cost, say 50 pieces, he adds 20 more. The 50 coins will go to the cashier, so to the state, and the rest he keeps to himself, in his pocket. We have also seen in some hospitals where pharmacists, nurses also, sell products. So instead of the patient going to the hospital pharmacy to buy it, the nurse says 'No, listen, I'm going to sell it to you myself'. Where did he get this product? This is another question. Well, you can imagine what happened. He says to you: I will sell you this, I will do this for you at a good price. The money won't go to the state, then. The money goes in his pocket, there is a lot of that in our countries." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (OIT & CT)

38. "I would say that there are similar cases in Togo. When people arrive at the health center, the nurse must always be given something, for people to receive care. If you don't give, you hang out on the ground over there. You can lie there all day. People have to pay for treatment. During treatment, we must also pay for products at prices that are not real." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (OIT & CT)

39. "Health care does not exist. In the medical sector, there is a decline in equipment."

(Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

40. "As for the health system, you pay, or you die. The wealthy sick go abroad for treatment."

(Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT)

4.4.2.3 Social Classes

Many SSA countries have had a good economic upturn situation in the years 2000s, because of the commodities boom and Chinese appetite for imports. But this opportunity is now mainly closed. Moreover, not all African social classes have profited equally of this temporary 'bonanza'. We now have, in many parts of Africa, a widening gap between the per capita situations of the 'haves' and the 'have nots' (Economist (The), 2021b, pp. 14–16).

The number of poor and very poor people has become the main yardstick to establish the contemporary reliability of the concept of development. For example, 80 million out of 200 million people in Nigeria are poor or very poor, based on the USD 1,90 a day yardstick. World Bank's forecasts figure that number will rise to 99 million by 2023 (Economist (The), 2021c, p. 42). More than half of Nigerians are unemployed or underemployed.

41. "In sub-Saharan Africa, there is a high class and a low class. Much depends on castes, family groups. The middle class, usually, comes from their contacts with the upper class."

(Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (CT)

42. "African revenue per capita is 40% more since 2000, but inequalities are rising." "Africans would do anything for improving the lives of their children." (Canadian high official, aid, and commerce) (CT)

43. "Terrorism feeds on the destitute, without hope of living better." (Reformist militant, Sahelian region) (IT)

4.4.2.4 Economy

On a macroeconomic level, African countries, since the independences, have had difficulties to advance relatively to the rest of the world, in matters of industrialization, the fight against poverty, and for building solid institutions (as for justice, good governance, the health sector notably). Too many people are left out of economic opportunities, which leaves many young people desperate, looking for an opportunity to emigrate or, in the worst scenario, falling in the grasp of terrorist networks in exchange of a few dollars or promise for paradise after this hopeless life.

44. "There was a massive dropout, because of the lack of financial means, due to the crisis … As a consequence of the devaluation, Stiglitz (2002), in his book "La grande désillusion", and Ziegler (2015) have shown that the IMF did not accompany the countries at the time of structural adjustments, by palliative measures, to allow the State … to support these people, with what is called, in northern countries, a social safety net, which allows an individual who loses his job, even temporarily, to have some elements of survival, to ensure the minimum for survival, by educating children and feeding them. It's a social balance, it's the right thing to

do. We didn't do that. So, naturally, this person who no longer works, can no longer ensure the framework for monitoring things to do, for example supporting his seven children. There comes a 'slumization' of the masses." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (IT)

45. "The *Franc CFA* was devalued in the 1990s by half. It greatly contributed to the decline in the standard of living of Africans. The middle class was in decline." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT)

46. "The impact of corruption is that poverty does not go down." (Retired Canadian aid project manager)

4.4.2.5 Army

The army has traditionally played an essential role to maintain or install their chosen politicians in power, according to a Neo-Patrimonialist pattern (Beekers & van Gool, 2012) well established now in most SSA countries.

47. "The military, in fact, is a part of society. Houphouët did everything to ensure that the generals had the means ... that they were treated well…At the start, when you are a general, you have your official house. You have various advantages that go with the function. You have a big house, at the expense of the army stewardship. Retired, you keep your advantages. It would be dangerous to take that from you, politically." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (PAT & IT)

48. "The army in Africa is a closed system. Senior officers get richer, do business. No general retires. They are used to a high standard of living." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (OIT and IT)

4.4.2.6 Justice

Many of our respondents said that the African population puts no trust in the judiciary officials.

49. "In most African countries, the institutional frameworks are not solid, not adequate. In addition, the justice is not independent. Justice is instrumentalized." (Canadian business consultant of north Africa origin) (IT)

50. "The government operates by clientelism. Justice is not independent." (Reformist militant, of Sahelian origin) (IT)

4.4.3 Culture

The culturalist theory (CT) helps the observer to be attentive to the deep and shared undercurrents of values and norms that shape the customs and behaviours of large groups of people who live together on a territory and share localized ways to see and solve their problems in society, and by the same way fulfill their human needs, and interpret the situations encountered.

The community (or collectivist) culture prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa leads actors, in job situations or decisions to be taken in state affairs, to favour people of their own larger family, regional and ethnic groups. Here the culturalist theory is useful for analysis. (CT and OIT)

A collectivist culture helps many Africans to find solidarity, support, and help, for finding jobs, paying for studies, helping individuals in moments of distress (CT). On the other hand, economic development, and the building of a state of rights require the reduction of the informal sector, the establishment of more equal civic and political rights, and the encouragement of entrepreneurial skills. That cannot come with the perpetuation of the existing family, cast-like, ethnic favouritism and nepotism, noted by many respondents, as for business matters and affairs of the state.

There has to take place in SSA countries a modernization process, as for obtaining the full status of citizens, gender equality, the ethnic question, and the fight against corruption.

Humans can be considered as being opportunistic creatures. Family and organizational loyalties are in play. In certain organizational settings, actors are given opportunities to grab resources, due to their power situation and to loosely applied rules. Their organizational or institutional power situation allows them opportunities to be seized, without much risk. Many previous citations attested to that dimension. (OIT)

Some respondents also noted that the age and experience of the project managers are positive factors that count (CT), in the perception that the project pursued is considered a success. In sub-Saharan Africa, there is a value given to maturity, experience, and old age. This is considered as

an important value held by Africans, contrary to the Western hemisphere, where youth is better considered than mature age. This factor, related to the values and norms, is part of the perspectives highlighted by the culturalist theory (CT).

According to Muriithi and Crawford (2003) (see also Hofstede, 2001; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2008), sub-Saharan Africa is characterized, in a culturalist perspective, by: (CT)

- A strong distance to power: a tendency to obey power figures, the use of strict supervision of subordinates by superiors, acceptation of unequal conditions at work and in society.

- A medium level of masculine culture: acceptance of the separation between the roles for women from those for men (in families, at work, in politics), and formal power usually detained by male figures over females.

- A strong control of uncertainty: respect for tradition; low risk attitudes at work; a preference for clear rules at work and in family; managers being inclined to micro-management.

- Collectivism: with strong links and loyalty toward extended families, clans, tribes, or ethnic affiliates; the search for approbation by elders and kin before expressing opinions.

- Large and extended families, with a high rate of births per household.

- A strong moral orientation of individuals toward family and ethnic members.

- A young population: people under thirty of age constitute 60 % of the population; with a rate of growth of population at or over 2 % per year.

- Fast growth of urbanization and pauperization in big cities; strong rural exodus.

- There is no safety net in most countries: many young people being unemployed, many want to emigrate to Europe, North America, or rich gulf countries.

- The informal economy provides revenue to most households.

Human nature: Human nature is complex. Because of upbringing, or dispositions from an early age, some people are prone to fall into corruption. As respondents confirmed:

51. "Corruption, everywhere present as it is today, has become a part of society's mores. It has become cultural." (Canadian business consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

52. "This kind of corruption is everywhere. It is at the institutional level, at the top, but I can add personally that it is in the culture itself. I think our culture is a variable that favours this. It turns out that in our African culture, it's OK to do it like that." (Graduate student in management, of west African origin) (IT & CT)

53. "Corruption is not always viewed as legally or morally wrong." (Canadian public official, aid and commerce) (IT & CT)

54. "Corruption is related to human nature. Some are honest, others are venal." (Retired Canadian aid project manager) (CT)

55. "Traditional chiefs are more influential culturally and locally. But for the big politics it is happening in the capital." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (IT & CT)

4.4.4 Project Management

Project management, in the field of international aid, comprises various actors: project managers, stakeholders, project team members (and employees), agency task leaders, national supervisors of

projects and programs, common people targeted as aid beneficiaries. Cultural, sociological, economical political factors also affect actor behaviour.

The theory of principal-agent is also useful here. The national and local agents of the aid process, in receiving countries, are the agents in relation with the donor countries' representatives (who work in national aid agencies, NGOs, etc.), who can be viewed as the principals in such a relationship. The same can be said of the donors' national aid agencies actors who are the agents accountable to the principals represented by the citizens of the donor countries, who are financially and symbolically contributing to the aid effort. In the principal-agent theory, the agent is in a position of caretaker, facing a situation that is subject to the constraining strategic decisions made by the principal. The assets exchanged involve capital, knowledge, and management skills.

At the apex of the state structure in developing countries, as for grand corruption, we have seen that national leaders may be tempted to use international aid to supplement their revenues and keep their power position, as aid flows may be diverted from their main objectives of combating poverty and facilitate economic and social development, by using parts of it in a rent-seeking way.

Since the phenomenon of corruption is prevalent in SSA countries, being the ''Modal Pattern'' according to Booth (2012), how is it possible to think that international aid can avoid its deleterious effects?

As for the African project managers on the field, Diallo and Thuillier (2005) found that they value having good relations and frequent visits with their task manager (located at their desk at the

financing aid agency in a foreign country) (OIT), the relationship with their national coordinator, who is often a public official or politician, who supervises them locally, but also that they feel a moral obligation to their community, in a familial and ethnic sense (CT).

Face to face relations happening during visits contribute to the establishment of a good relationship between the actors involved, and the perceived success of the project (OIT). Here, the organizational interests theory is useful, reminding us that actors tend to pursue their objectives through a perceived rational strategy: establishing professional and friendly relations with powerful actors that will potentially facilitate the pursuance of the project objectives, and also their professional ambitions. This theory emphasizes that power is a multidimensional factor (comprising the exercise of authority, expertise, the advantages brought by personal connections, in situations where actors are found in interdependent and transitional coalitions). Local project managers try to mobilize their resources, seeing organizations as political arenas and potential springboards for their career perspectives.

Diallo and Thuillier (2005) note that the level of satisfaction of the targeted groups by the project was not often mentioned. We have seen that frequent visits and encounters with task managers are valued. The support of their national coordinator was also perceived as an important success factor of the projects and for their own career prospects.

As for the professional practice of project management, Rwelamila and Purushottam (2012) took note of the frequent occurrence of poor management of projects led by African project managers in the region of Austral Africa, due to a lack: of strategic perspectives; of training in project

management; of good business sense; and of Centers of superior education in project management. Moreover, there is a dearth of strategic perspectives related to the micro-management tendencies of African supervisors.

We see that development of project management expertise and skills is needed, through education and further opportunities for practice.

Aid control mechanisms are related to a domain where the principal-agent theory (PAT) is also useful for analysis. In the following section we will see some citations showing how control mechanisms work, or too little, in the field of international aid.

At the aid agency level and project manager level, the federal ministry World Affairs Canada requires from its aid managers to follow strict rules, for the design, selection, monitoring and evaluation of projects expenses. (PAT)

On the other hand, many Canadian respondents, active or retired project managers, that we interviewed, said that Canadian aid is reputed for the strict monitoring and control of the aid transferred, and were proud of it (PAT). It was also often mentioned that Canadian aid agents worked well with their Scandinavian, British and Dutch colleagues, notably about issues related to gender equality and protection of the environment.

At the aid agency level, since the 2005 Paris Declaration, the program approach (either through sectoral or direct budgetary support) has become a favoured channel for the delivery of aid, rather

than the traditional project approach. But it is easier done on paper because accountability and transaction costs can be problematic.

Canadian citizens here take the role of principals about their governmental aid agency whose agents must account for the integrity of the aid expenses, which can put into question the accountability of the aid provided.

According to some of our respondents, the aid situation in many developing countries, is regularly confronted to acts of corruption or mismanagement. Project-related control mechanisms are applied at several levels.

56. "As for sectoral budget support, we cannot measure the effects of budget support, either the effectiveness or the efficiency of aid, as money melts inside the ministries' budget operations." (Retired Canadian expert in project and program evaluation). (PAT)

57. (About direct budgetary funding, Treasury to Treasury). "It's probably the highest risk you can run, having your money squandered because of corruption ... On the other hand, it allows you a privileged platform in development. Because you are working directly with the main ministers, also with the president. You embed consultants and supervisors within government ministries. I have mixed feelings, because I found that useful on some levels - you have a guiding hand in development policies. But I also found it neo-colonial as well. You know we were like the White Europeans, telling them how to run their countries because we were giving them the money. But we had the responsibility to do that, because we had the duty of accountability to see funds correctly managed." (Senior Canadian civil servant, economics and

commercial affairs, and former high-level diplomat in west Africa and south-east Asia) (CT & IT)

58. "In the case of highly corrupt countries, it is better to favour the project approach, for reasons of accountability. You must adjust to the country conditions." (Retired Canadian expert in project and program evaluation) (PAT)

59. "Foreign aid must go through three or four stages. It often results in underfunded projects, carried out only on paper. World Bank projects are eaten up and down at various levels." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (PAT & OIT)

60. "As for the beneficiaries of aid, governance practices are important: we must keep users well informed, involving them, having active committees, holding annual assemblies (IT). We must establish the risk framework (political upheaval? Too much control? Too much bureaucracy?)" (Retired Canadian project manager, micro-finance) (IT)

4.5   Actors

4.5.1   Governance

Some respondents underlined the weak efforts done until now by the African political leadership for a real long-lasting developmental approach. As for project management, a good balancing of aid options has to be found, between the project approach (more appropriate when the political leadership cannot be trusted on issues of integrity), the sectoral program approach (promising as for the collaboration between donors and partner government actors), direct budget support, and

technical assistance, to augment administrative capabilities. These approaches are considered as sets of practices and professional procedures, that help a society to better develop its human and material potentialities and resources, and fight poverty.

The presence of a predator state (Andersen et al., 2020; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Kelsall, 2013) has been studied by the theory of state capture (Hellman et al., 2000; Hellman & Kaufmann, 2001, pp. 31–35): vested interest groups use state resources for their own advantage (we can refer here at the Yeltsin period (1991-1999) when Russian state properties and conglomerates were sold at very low prices to budding oligarchs, or in Romania under Ceaucescu (1965-1989) (Linden, 1986). Often family or ethnic groups profit of the situation.

The acceptation of endogenous responsibility for the future development of the continent, instead of mainly blaming exogenous factors (as for colonial and neo-colonial influences) is also emphasized, as one respondent advanced:

61. "Ultimately, the fight against corruption depends very much on the aid recipient country." (Retired Canadian aid project manager) (OIT)

62. "A country that does not develop is a poorly managed country." (Business Consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

63. "Doctors, lawyers, teachers are very poorly paid. Only politicians are well paid." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

64. "The people in power (in Africa) don't have any social project. There is a lack of will on the part of the decision makers." (Business consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

65. "It's the presidential family who has everything, who benefits from everything." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (IT)

66. "For the DRC (Congo) Everything must be done at Kinshasa. All the ministries are there. It is not like here, in Canada. Here, you have some cities, some provinces who detain some power, some authority. There is some gouvernemental decentralisation. But, in Congo, it happens in Kinshasa! To get a passport to travel, you have got to pass by Kinshasa. For instance, you need to leave Lumumbashi, two thousand kilometers away, to go by plane to Kinshasa, to get your passport from the External affairs ministry, to be able to travel. Everybody needs to go to the capital city. That's the situation.'' (Canadian public servant, of central Africa origin) (IT & OIT)

67. "Sometimes the government will imprison those whose corruption is too embarrassing. They will be released later, without having their assets touched. Some are just imprisoned for the gallery." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (IT)

68. "Corruption is a problem, which is interwoven with other dimensions: voice and citizenship; political stability, efficiency of public authorities, quality of regulations." (Canadian program evaluation specialist) (IT)

69."We need successful projects, justice, open media, mobilizing people." (Business consultant, of north African origin) (IT)

70. "99 % of politicians in Africa are there to get rich. They say to themselves: I am on an ejection seat. I have to take advantage of it for the next four years." (Business consultant, of north African origin) (IT & PAT)

71. "It is shocking. In Africa, as well in the Philippines, it was certainly the case. Their people go into politics, to make money out of it. That thing must change, but most citizens don't see anything wrong with that. And, in fact, they don't always respect honest politicians, because they think that they are fools, and stupid not to get rich themselves. They think that there must be something wrong with them. Yeah, it is perverse. And there are a lot of cultural ideas that are so ingrained in them. It will take a lot of time to change that." (Senior Canadian civil servant, economics and commercial affairs, and former high-level diplomat in west Africa and south-east Asia) (CT & PAT)

72. "I think Africans are tired of the old generation (of politicians), are tired to see their country not progressing, regressing, many times. Now, there is a privileged elite, the ones who have studied abroad, often coming from elite families. But, more and more, they are coming back to try to change things. And I saw that in Nigeria as well. But Nigeria is so complex, compared to Ghana. And I think that Ghana, on the long term, will do better. But there is a lot of

corruption in Ghana, also." (Senior Canadian civil servant, economics and commercial affairs, and former high-level diplomat in west Africa and south-east Asia) (PAT & CT)

73. "The countries of west Africa are still dependent on France. Everywhere, there is the presence of *Françafrique*." (Marketing specialist, of west African origin) (IT)

4.5.2   Business

Business, in many instances, is very mixed with government actors and operations in sub-Saharan Africa. Many politicians do business in the informal sector or use business frontmen for capital accumulation, banking purposes or transfers.

74. "Several entrepreneurs serve as figureheads in their ties to the state. African businesspeople take advantage of several tax benefits, refinancing, and are figureheads. In return, they finance political parties." (Respondent of west African origin) (IT & OIT)

75. "A lot of big buildings are built in Kinshasa, by people who do not seem to have the means for such investments." (Canadian public servant, of central African origin) (IT)

76. "Nigeria is the world's seventh producer of oil, and a member of OPEC. They probably could be one of the top producers of oil if they were less corrupt, or efficient. It provides so much opportunity for corruption, their oil revenues. It is the classic resource curse. It is on the most massive scale in the world, and in the developing world. And for the oil, the massive amount of it is offshore. So, it is easy to control. And they have been exploiting it since the

1960s. It is what the young generation is so unhappy about. Because they know about that immense amount of wealth that has been generated … Though, among the countries, they are among the poorest of the world. Their per capita income is relatively high, but the absolute amount of poor people is also among the highest." (Senior Canadian civil servant, economics and commercial affairs, and former high-level diplomat in west Africa and south-east Asia) (PAT & OIT)

77. "For a boss, it is easier to be surrounded by people chosen by him. There is a lot of patronage in Africa. The culture of good management is not yet well established." (Retired Canadian aid project manager) (OIT)

78. "At the level of public procurement ... what happens is that those who want to obtain contracts have to proceed formally in such and such a way. This market code allows, in principle, to know who can bid, on what, when it starts and when it ends, on how to make a tender … In fact, despite the existence of the public procurement code, contracts are still given to a single company, close to the public authorities." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (OIT)

79. (About a big businessman near the political power) "He monopolizes de facto by taking all the markets. This is a way of feeding the presidential party since politics feeds on means. So if we give all the deals to that businessman, he in turn gives back to the Party's public coffers. However, the party no longer needs to have membership fees, as is done elsewhere, where

members say: we support our party, as is done in Canada, or elsewhere." (Graduate student, and political analyst, of west African origin) (IT & OIT)

The next extracts relate the experience of an engineer who has worked for an oil extraction project in the Persian Gulf. This respondent stresses that when it was a question of providing human resources and materials to the project for critical functions, such as the electric grid or anti-corrosive undersea pipes, the local sponsors did not hesitate to request Western or Japanese firms for trustworthy materials and expertise. But for other non-critical procurement needs, they favoured either workforce or materials coming from Asian sources, cheaper and for patronage reasons. A certain number of SSA countries have and exploit oil reserves also: Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, Gabon, Angola, Mozambique, South Sudan.

80. "The sponsors are a bit like local politics, the families who control the resources, who define the portfolio of projects. So it's this slice of society that has the controlling power over money." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (IT & OIT)

81. "Exactly. They are present on the steering committee during all phases of the (oil extraction) project. So the notion of corruption can be observed in all phases of the project. Personally, I do not have concrete evidence on this, but there is data which tends to prove that at the level of the award of contracts, at the level of the technical and economic evaluation of the tenders, there is always a political influence, for the sake of having control over money. For example, for large contracts, the technical-economic-commercial formula, for awarding

contracts, it always favours commercial evaluation. The responsible authority is always there."

(Electro-mechanical engineer, of north African origin, about working in oil extraction in the

Persian Gulf) (PAT & OIT)

82. "It is not always the offer that is the best technically, in my opinion, from my observations,

that will be retained. We will award contracts to companies that are not technically the most

efficient. We have given contracts to these companies, which are closer to the sponsors, rather

than to other companies. This is kind of how it plays out. It leads us to believe that there is

corruption. It happens at the contract award level." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north

African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (IT & OIT)

83. "While in the Gulf countries, I could observe this also in my experience in Tunisia, before

that, the tendency is very much to favour the commercial side. That is to say, the technical

team will do their job, on the technical counting side, but the final authority is up to who is

going to decide who we want to give the money to." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north

African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (IT & OIT)

84. "It increases the risk that the costs will inflate. Because, in my experience, when you give

purchase orders to suppliers who are not the best technically, that they have not proven that

they are validated, you come to expect delays. nonconformities, problems. There, these

problems are associated with costs. This is what we experienced. One of the problems, if I

remember correctly, the firm contracted was not being able to comply with compliance,

engineering requirements." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (OIT & PAT)

85. "Another example: we ended up with a supplier who was not prepared, who did not have the resources, who did not have the capability, in terms of machines, in terms of his manufacturing process, who was not able to deliver the required quality. So the number of defects, the number of non-conformities, were very high for that supplier." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (IT & OIT)

86. "But when it comes to awarding contracts on less critical aspects, the boss said to me: Do your technical work for the recommendation, but for the final decision, it's up to us. It's not you who's going to decide who we're going to work with. But you have to suffer the consequences, so prepare yourself for the nonconformities that will arise. We have to live with it. Yes, you have to expect problems, have a plan B, in the sense of having to put up with them, even. Then if they are not able to manage the quality, we are going to have to do it." (Electro-mechanical engineer, of north African origin, about working in oil extraction in the Persian Gulf) (OIT & IT)

4.5.3   Aid Agencies

Aid Agencies play a lead role in establishing project management standards. Respondents took notice of the importance of implementing control mechanisms for ensuring a better financial accountability about the aid funds transferred, and for educating the Africans to take better care of the aid business, according to prescribed rules to do so. The institutional theory (IT) is useful here

about the questions of norms, rules, and to refer to prescribed standards to follow, for building a better context for project and program management.

In a society where controls are lacking, the probability of being or becoming corrupt are more numerous, comparatively to other situations where many are taught from an early age the (ideological) virtues of being honest, with opportunities of a good life morally and materially speaking (think about the Scandinavian or New Zealand models). During their lifetime, people are put in specific institutional conditions and must compose with them.

87. "The projects have to be chosen for their relevance, must be well presented, and fit in a strategic framework." (Canadian aid supervisor) (PAT)

88. "You have to closely follow the projects, control the expenses, have transparency in project management." (Canadian business consultant, of north African origin). (PAT)

89. "It is important to measure the performance of aid projects and programs." (Retired Canadian respondent, program evaluation specialist) (PAT)

90. "Reporting is essential, requesting narrative reports every six months, financial reports every three months, field visits, mid-term evaluation, also evaluation by external consultants." (Canadian aid supervisor) (PAT)

91. "You also have to be careful when buying supplies, because there is a lot of money at stake then." (Retired Canadian project manager - micro-finance) (OIT)

92. "There is a need to follow up on budgets concerning the mining and oil contracts of multinationals." (Reformist militant, Sahelian region) (OIT)

93. "As far as budget payments are concerned, we cannot measure the effects of budget support, we cannot measure the effectiveness or the efficiency of aid when it melts inside the ministries." (Retired Canadian expert in project and program evaluation) (IT)

94. "In our relationships with partners, we must apply evaluation criteria: is the budget respected? What is the effectiveness, efficiency of the project? Are there more customers after three years? Are customers more trusting?" (Retired Canadian project manager - micro-finance) (IT)

95. "We train them to receive credit, do business, they are given accounting training, to know how to make a business plan, apply for credit, record their expenses and income." (Retired Canadian aid respondent, micro-finance) (IT)

96. "More conditionalities should be applied by aid donors, as for the aid provided to countries like the mining sector, very marked by corruption". (Reformist militant, Sahelian region) (PAT)

4.5.4 Population

Population is a category construct meaning the intended beneficiaries of international development aid. They represent the targeted groups, such as the inhabitants of a region, professional groups, micro-finance recipients, public servants for technical assistance training, etc. Often, when the amounts provided for international aid are partially or wholly diverted by actors of the recipient state at different levels, the targeted members of the community become victims of corrupt acts. The intended objectives of such projects or programs are not attained.

4.6 Results Synthesis and New Research Sub-Questions

4.6.1 New Research Sub-Questions

As seen in the literature review (chapter 2) and the ninety-six excerpts presented and commented (in chapter 4), we have tried through this thesis to answer the following research sub-questions:

4. ***RQ1:*** *What forms of corruption in IDPs happen, and what are the main forms of capture and their impact at various levels in IDPs?*

5. ***RQ2:*** *Where do contextual factors exert certain pressures on actors in their interaction with the phenomena of corruption in IDPs?*

6. ***RQ3:*** *How do actors interact with, or get affected by, corruption and what are their levers in an IDP PM context?*

The integration of research results, around the model elements from Figure 2, leads to articulate a set of 12 sub-questions linked to the three research questions introduced in Chapter 1, i.e., the ''What, Where, and How'' of Corruption in IDPs. The evidence presented in Chapter 4 does not cover sub-question 12 since it addresses the population perspective and would go beyond the scope

of the present study, which focuses on management practices. This sub-question would also deserve another thesis with a more anthropological and sociological analysis.

Let us now open a new window on the anthropological ways and methods to study corruption in different societies, that corresponds to a different ontological manner to understand corruption.

Torsello and Venard (2016) consider that corruption must be seen and studied in a holistic manner For them, morality in a social construct, based on social processes of interaction. They propose ethnographic methods of investigation. What is called 'corruption' changes according to the times (ibid., p. 7). Research studies must start from an *etic* stance, to understand the realities from the respondent's point of view (ibid., p. 8). Anthropology rejects the moral dualism of corruption as seen by management scholars, therefore adopting a moralistic and ethnocentric view of the phenomenon (ibid., p. 11). In various societies, it engenders links of reciprocity. Morality is therefore considered according to historically situated social mores (ibid., p. 13), seen as socially acceptable by most. So, what is considered as moral can diverge from society to another, and through various epochs.

Definitions of what is considered as corrupt or acceptable practices in human society, in our time, is linked to a succession of various practices of economic, political, and institutional transformation of human societies (ibid., p. 16). In Chinese business networks, *guanxi* (Smart & Hsu, 2008) is considered as an acceptable way to do business (ibid., p. 19). Or the *don (*gift*)*, according to Marcel Mauss (2011), is a civilized way to exchange gifts, women, and is an accepted foundation for reciprocity and gift exchanges in some previous South Seas societies (Malinowski,

2014). Therefore, anthropologists warn us of the risk of considering too fast some practices as unacceptable.

Anthropology thus is in favour of adopting a holistic approach, counting on thick descriptions and the importance of a detailed collection of information. Moral values are dependant on culture (ibid., p. 32). Moreover, as is the case of SSA societies, individuals face conflicting moralities, especially in periods of rapid economical and political transformations (ibid., p. 32).

As elaborated in Table 8, the proposed new sub-questions are structured as follows for each of the three research questions (What, Where, and How). Each is linked to specific attributes of the Figure 2 components (boxes and arrows). The "what" refers to the various types of corruption and capture opportunities in IDP (green box). The "where" refers to the four contextual factors (orange boxes). The "how" refers to the four actors (blue boxes), how their actions throughout the IDP lifecycle are impeded by corruption, and how they can escape it.

- **What:** Sub-questions refer to the main forms of corruption and capture opportunities in IDP (green box identify links to actors, along black lines linked to the IDP lifecycle).
- **Where:** Sub-questions refer to the linkages between factors around the model along the IDP lifecycle (blue lines identify how the context pressures actors, black lines are the IDP lifecycle).
- **How:** Sub-questions cover primarily the linkages between actors and corruption itself (red, yellow, and green lines identify capture opportunities, damages, and control efforts).

Table 8: New Sub-Questions Deduced from Proposed Model

RQ	Model Elements	New Sub-Questions Proposed
1.	What	What forms of corruption in IDPs happen, and what are the main forms of capture and their impact at various levels in IDPs?
1.1.	Aid Capture	How does aid funding get captured by various agents throughout the IDP lifecycle, and to what extent are these events traceable, and how can PM help mitigate it?
1.2.	State Capture	How does the highest levels of leadership in a state or government get captured by powerful elites, and to what extent can IDP governance and PM help prevent it?
1.3.	Project Capture	How does a project, along with its numerous tasks and contractual arrangements, get captured by IDP lifecycle actors, and how can PM help mitigate it?
1.4.	Service Capture	How does the service system supporting IDP execution (e.g. permit admin., public safety, etc.) capture specific components of an IDP, and entrap the populations?
2.	Where	Where do contextual factors exert certain pressures on actors in their interaction with the phenomena of corruption in IDPs?
2.1.	Policy	Where does the international aid policy context influence IDP governance in the aid receiving country, and can be effective to enforce anti-corruption efforts by donor country aid agencies?
2.2.	Institutions	Where does the institutional context of aid receiving country serve as a leverage for governance to reach IDP objectives, and/or serves as levers for business actors in corruption?
2.3.	Culture	Where does the cultural context of the aid receiving country enable the corrupt practices of business actors with their political allies, and how does it influence population reactions?
2.4.	Management	Where does the IDP management context, such as PM standards and practices, ensure that a population receives the aid, and ensure aid agency objectives are reached as planned?
3.	How	How do actors interact with, or get affected by, corruption and what are their levers in an IDP PM context?
3.1.	Aid	How does a donor country aid agency, and its delegated actors along the IDP lifecycle, play a part in preventing corruption, and how can they use the IDP management context as levers?
3.2.	Governance	How does IDP governance in the aid receiving country address corruption and its damages, and serve as a mechanism to prevent capture opportunities, or reduce their impact?
3.3.	Business	How does the business community participate throughout the IDP lifecycle, and how can corruption and capture opportunities be prevented, but also changing corruption culture?
3.4.	Population	How does the aid receiving population get affected by corruption, and is possibly taken hostage of the corruption system, and how does culture help or impede change?

4.6.2   Integration of Four Social Theories

In table 9, the reader can be informed about the links that could be made between the excerpts,

on one hand, and their links with the social theories, the questions asked about corruption (What,

Where and How) according to our model, the different types of capture (aid, state, project and

service), the conditioning factors of corruption (policy, institutions, culture, and project

management), and finally the actors involved in instances of corruption (governance, business,

aid, and population).

Table 9: Number of Excerpts Linked to the Four Social Theories

RQ	Model Elements	Section	CT	IT	OIT	PAT
1.	**What**	**4.3**	9	31	17	21
1.1.	Aid Capture	**4.3**	1	3	1	6
1.2.	State Capture	**4.3**	4	18	12	7
1.3.	Project Capture	**4.3**	1	3	1	6
1.4.	Service Capture	**4.3**	3	7	3	2
2.	**Where**	**4.4 & 4.5**	19	32	7	6
2.1.	Policy	**4.4.1**	4	9	2	0
2.2.	Institutions	**4.4.2**	9	17	4	3
2.3.	Culture	**4.4.3**	4	5	0	0
2.4.	Project Management	**4.5.1**	2	1	1	3
3.	**How**	**4.6**	2	22	18	21
3.1.	Governance	**4.6.1**	2	10	2	3
3.2.	Business	**4.6.2**	0	7	12	3
3.3.	Aid	**4.6.3**	0	2	2	5
3.4.	Population	**4.6.4**	0	3	2	10

For a quick reference, to help readers browse through the 96 excerpts, we recommend reading the

following excerpt numbers to better appreciate the various forms of "What" kinds of corruptions:

- Excerpts related to Aid Capture: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 19, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96;

- Excerpts related to State Capture: 3, 4, 6, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 47, 48, 57, 61, 65, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83;

- Excerpts related to Project Capture: 12, 56, 58, 59, 87, 88, 89, 94;

- Excerpts related to Service Capture: 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 26, 27, 33, 37, 40, 49, 50, 66;

- Excerpts related to Population: 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 19, 46, 56, 59, 60, 88, 89, 90;

- No theory linked to excerpts 5 and 46.

4.6.2.1 General comments

In relation to the four social theories advanced in this thesis, nine (9) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT), as for the question What (concerning the types of capture). Nineteen (19) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT) as for the question Where (about the conditioning factors of corruption) and two (2) excerpts could be linked to the Culturalist theory (CT) as for the question How (the actors involved in corrupt instances).

Thirty-one (31) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT), for the question "What", thirty-two (32) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT) as for the question "Where", and twenty-two (22) excerpts could be linked to the Institutional theory (IT) as for the question "How".

Seventeen (17) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT), for the question "What", seven (7) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT) as for the question "Where", and eighteen (18) excerpts could be linked to the Organizational Interests theory (OIT) as for the question "How".

Twenty-one (21) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent theory (PAT), for the question "What", six (6) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent theory (PAT) as for the question "Where", and twenty-one (21) excerpts could be linked to the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) as for the question "How".

Below Table 9, the reader can also be informed about which excerpts are related to the each of the different types of capture, and also the excerpts related to the Population category.

We will now analyze the implications from these excerpts linked to the four social theories.

4.6.2.2   Excerpts related to the Culturalist Theory (CT)

The Culturalist Theory (CT) takes a holistic approach, by seeing culture as the main background leading actors and communities to base their behaviours, worldviews, and actions. The relevant concepts related to culture here, are social norms, values, socialization, social control. Culture, according to Malinowski (2014) and many anthropologists, serves to fulfill human needs.

Social norms

Social norms are shared standards of acceptable behaviour by groups. They can both be informal understandings that govern the behaviour of members of a society, as well as being codified into rules and laws (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Young, 2015). They are deemed to be powerful drivers of human behaviours. According to Brennan et al. (2013), they function to hold us accountable to each other for adherence to the principles that they cover. Norms, finally, are contingent on context, social group, and historical circumstances.

Some of our respondents spoke about corruption in sub-Saharan Africa as being a general, cultural problem, because it was prevalent in many domains of life in the countries they referred to (excerpts 10, 12. 13, 52, 53, 71). Some of their answers are: ''It's a general problem'', ''The culture promotes corruption'', ''It plagues our African societies'', ''In our culture, it is OK to do that'', ''It is not viewed as wrong'', ''They do not see anything wrong with that''.

Social values

Values and norms shape the customs and behaviours of large groups of people. For Max Weber (2005), there is a *corpus* of values that distinguish Protestantism from other creeds. Social values distinguish people living together on a territory and who share typical manners to see and solve the problems they encounter. Values refer to broad preferences of people about the appropriate course of actions to be taken. They reflect a person's sense of right or wrong in face of a problem or a situation. They constitute tools to interpret the situations encountered.

For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa, it is generally considered as culturally ethical to take care of sick relatives (see excerpt 35), to help financially young members of their extended family for continuing their studies.

The general historical system can play a role on the changing behaviours:

''Neo-liberalism brings a loosening of ethical principles'' (exc. 24).

''A dangerous environment leads to a hierarchical, authoritarian, and warlike culture, while a safe and peaceful environment fosters an egalitarian and tolerant culture.'' (Fog, 2017)

Socialization

In sociology, socialization is the process of internalizing the norms and ideologies of society. Socialization encompasses both learning and teaching and is thus "the means by which social and cultural continuity are attained" (Clausen, 1968; Kardiner, 1969; Maccoby & Martin, 1983; Mead, 1930).

Cultural dimensions in Sub-Saharan Africa

Basing themselves on Hofstede (2001) as for cultural dimensions, Muriithi and Crawford (2003) advance that sub-Saharan Africa has a high level of power distance, a high degree of uncertainty control, an average masculine culture and a strong collectivist culture. As for the socio-economic and socio-cultural environment, SSA project managers must cope with a complex web of obligations to extended families toward which they have a strong moral engagement.

Collectivism

In many cases, respondents talked about phenomena related to hiring relatives, even when they did not have enough competences to get the job done (exc. 11). Also, many people profit from knowing individuals for getting jobs or privileges (exc. 20) or benefiting for being part of an ecosystem led by a 'Big Man', according to a neo-patrimonial pattern (exc. 21).

For many Africans, much depends on having or not good support from castes, family, ethnic affiliations, or contacts with privileged members of the higher class (Kelsall, 2008). On the good side of things, many family members will help bringing old or very sick people to a health clinic (exc. 35).

''At the workplace, bosses will often hire or promote members on the bases of ethnic appurtenance'' (exc. 11).

The community (or collectivist) culture prevailing in sub-Saharan Africa leads actors, in job situations or decisions to be taken in state affairs, to favour people of their own larger family, regional and ethnic groups.

A collectivist culture helps many Africans to find solidarity, support, and help, for finding jobs, paying for studies, helping individuals in moments of distress (CT). On the other hand, economic development, and the building of a state of rights require the reduction of the informal sector, the establishment of more equal civic and political rights, and the encouragement of entrepreneurial skills.

''Some institutions may suffer from corrupt acts by institutional caretakers, as when buildings are left unrepaired at the university'' (exc. 32), or ''when poor sick patients are left without care by nurses'' (exc. 37 and 38).

"Corruption, everywhere present as it is today, has become a part of society's mores. It has become cultural" (exc. 51).

Social Control

Social control is a [concept](#) within the [disciplines](#) of the [social sciences](#), that describes a certain set of rules and standards in society that keep individuals bound to conventional standards as well as to the use of formalized mechanisms (Deflem, 2019; M. Innes, 2003; Little, 2014). Many people in SSA countries feel constrained to follow certain rules of action, deemed necessary to survive in

this territory, deprived of many other alternatives, to be able to survive and feed their family. To do otherwise would jeopardize their perspectives of survival and integration in the society.

Cultural factors also influence the efficacity of international development projects (IDPs) according to some researchers (Diallo & Thuillier, 2004, 2005; Ika et al., 2010; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003). Diallo and Thuillier (2004) advance that IDPs are characterized by the geographical and cultural remoteness between the donor countries' supervisors and African managers in the field.

Fighting Corruption in Organizations

Ashforth and Anand (2003) demonstrate convincingly how corruption takes place in organizations, by various means, such as the introduction of newcomers to corrupt veteran leaders of the group, their gradual insertion in illegal practices not condemned by the management of the organizations, psychological rationalisations to make them accustomed to corrupt organizational practices, the absence of anti-corruption professionals and measures in the organization, and finally, in most cases, the acceptance by them of new corrupt ways to work (ibid., pp. 4-15).

The processes of rationalizing the acceptance of corruption by many members of the organization are well explained by referring to many instances of corruption in various workplaces (police agents, nurses, financial brokers, etc.) and a recall of many scandals that took place in the U.S. (e.g. Enron, the deadly Ford Pinto car model, the Catholic Church, etc.) (ibid., pp.15-25). The various processes of socializing humans into corruption take place through social group influence, cooptation with colleagues, and various 'groupthink-type' of self-justifications (Ashforth & Anand, 2003, pp. 25–36; Janis, 1982). Finally, there is a discussion about the best ways to reverse corruption normalization (such as whistleblowing, legal actions, etc.) (Ashforth & Anand, 2003,

pp. 25–42). The authors conclude that the best ways to combat corruption are through prevention and ethical training. Such a study is relevant for the situations found nowadays in many workplaces in SSA countries.

4.6.2.3 Excerpts related to the Institutional Theory (IT)

According to Locatelli et al. (2017), resorting to Institutional Theory (IT) is rendered necessary to consider the "corrupt project context" (including the political, economical, cultural factors). Corruption being a multi-dimensional reality, it involves complex socio-economic systems (e.g., organization, country). This perspective permits to identify shared rules, norms, values, beliefs and negotiated understandings that characterize institutions (ibid., p. 253).

The institutional theory (IT) (see chapter 3, section 3.3.5) refers to the political, cultural, and economic contexts that shape how project and program management are viewed and enacted by the authorities and the stakeholders. This theory helps the observer to consider that any human society shares rules, norms, and beliefs, in a constant and dynamic negotiated process of institutional settings.

The authors advance that, unfortunately, the phenomenon of corruption is not taken enough into consideration for analysis by researchers in the project literature (ibid., p. 265). This topic is more considered in other close fields of research, such as governance, stakeholders, risk, and value.

The institutional theory, as for projects, has been developed, among others, by Scott (2012, 2014), Giezen (2012), Hauser and Hogenacker (2014), and Henisz et al. (2012). To better understand that approach, also see Rouleau (2007, pp. 82–89).

At the aid agency level and project manager level, the federal ministry World Affairs Canada requires from its aid managers to follow strict rules, for the design, selection, monitoring, and evaluation of projects expenses.

Corruption, a pervasive situation

''I would say that corruption exists at all levels'' (exc. 10).

''Corruption affects all levels of society'' (exc.23).

''(About delivering a permit, a license, a passport) Frequently public servants will offer to deliver faster the document needed if the 'requérant' pays more for this service, in cahoots with colleagues'' (exc. 9).

On the National Elites

''World Bank President John Wolfensohn told the WB Annual Meeting: We need to ensure that all resources are used efficiently… We also need to address transparency, accountability, and institutional capacity… We need to deal with the cancer of corruption'' (exc. 6)

''The System is called 'the Manger' (*la 'Mangeoire'*)'' (exc.14).

''When you are in the System, you keep silent.'' (exc.15).

''Once in power, leaders cling to it'' (exc.18).

''Without it, their children, who study abroad, would no longer be able to afford it'' (exc. 17).

''You are either inside or outside the System'' (exc. 16).

Neo-Patrimonialism

Moreover, corruption has flourished in countries plagued by large democratic deficits (Norris, 2011) and weak governance (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016).

"Often, when a minister changes, 80% of positions of responsibility also change. Ethnic and family ties matter more than integrity" (exc. 22).

"The army in Africa is a closed system. Senior officers get richer, do business. No general retires. They are used to a high standard of living" (exc. 48).

"In most African countries, the institutional frameworks are not solid, not adequate. In

addition, the justice is not independent. Justice is instrumentalized" (exc. 49).

"The government operates by clientelism. Justice is not independent" (exc. 50).

"99 % of politicians in Africa are there to get rich. They say to themselves: I am on an ejection seat. I have to take advantage of it for the next four years" (exc. 70).

"Corruption is a problem, which is interwoven with other dimensions: voice and citizenship; political stability, efficiency of public authorities, quality of regulations" (exc. 68).

Weak Institutions

''With the structural adjustments, of the 80's, there was a dismantling of the educational and health systems in the developing countries'' (exc. 25).

''(in some regions) Health does not exist. In the medical sector, there is a decline in equipment'' (exc. 39).

"As for the health system, you pay, or you die. The wealthy sick go abroad for treatment" (exc. 40).

Few available jobs and opportunities for people

During their lifetime, in many developing countries, people are put in specific institutional conditions and must compose with them.

''There are few opportunities for a good job, even with a diploma'' (exc. 30).

Impact of Corruption

''The impact of corruption is that poverty does not go down'' (exc. 46).

Normalization

In a society where controls are lacking, the probability of being or becoming corrupt are more numerous, comparatively to other situations where many are taught from an early age the (ideological) virtues of being honest, with opportunities of a good life morally and materially speaking.

''This kind of corruption is everywhere. It is at the institutional level, at the top, but I can add personally that it is in the culture itself. I think our culture is a variable that favours this. It turns out that in our African culture, it's OK to do it like that" (exc. 52).

4.6.2.4   Excerpts related to the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT)

The Organizational Interests Theory (OIT**),** constructed here from elements of the analyses of coalition, contingencies, and strategic analysis, focuses on a socio-political reading of the organization and organizational actors (power relations) and their interrelations (which can be at various levels: bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs, donor and recipient countries as for international aid).

Actors who, according to the context, can be individuals, organizations, even countries, are in a situation of interdependency with each other (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977). The state of organizational and individual power are the result of various contingencies.

Mid-20th century organization theorists (Crozier, 1964; Cyert & March, 1963; Dalton, 1959; Gouldner, 1954; March, 1962; Selznick, 1948) ''were concerned with understanding how power structures and political processes in organizations lead to various outcomes'' (K. Weber & Waeger, 2017, p. 886). This open polity model shows that ''internal political processes are intertwined with external conditions, so that organizational responses to their environment are mediated and shaped by boundary processes and organizational coalition dynamics'' (ibid., pp. 887-888).

Actors take advantage of their position

Humans can be considered as being opportunistic creatures. Family and organizational loyalties are in play. In certain organizational settings, actors are given opportunities to grab resources, due to their power situation and to loosely applied rules. Their organizational or institutional power situation allows them opportunities to be seized, without much risk in some instances.

Local government officials often try to obtain certain advantages or materials, that were not planned in their formal contract. At the local government level, local civil servants can try to take advantage of their strategic organizational position in the project processes. Our first effort was to identify "value capture opportunities" from project management stakeholders. Respondents addressed the issue of project capture in various responses.

''To speak of Togo, I would say that corruption exists at all levels. So. I classify it in three ways: First, it is at the individual level - people, in everyday life, get corrupted. A policeman will take some money from a citizen because he wants to make some money on the streets. Those in public office. It is still at the expense of people who cannot afford it" (excerpt 10).

"I would say that there are similar cases in Togo. When people arrive at the health center, the nurse must always be given something, for people to receive care. If you don't give, you hang out on the ground over there. You can lie there all day'' (exc. 38).

Corruption: a frequent occurrence

(In the health services) "What happens is that the money goes to the pharmacist, who runs the cash register. People change prices, they add more. So, nobody knows it, but if the products costs, say 50 pieces, he adds 20 more. The 50 coins will go to the cashier, so to the state, and the rest he

keeps to himself, in his pocket… We have also seen in some hospitals where pharmacists, nurses also, sell products… The money won't go to the state, then. The money goes in his pocket. There is a lot of that in our countries'' (exc. 37).

Neo-Patrimonialism

"A country that does not develop is a poorly managed country" (exc. 62).

"Doctors, lawyers, teachers are very poorly paid. Only politicians are well paid" (exc. 63).

"For the DRC (Congo), everything must be done at Kinshasa. All the ministries are there. It is not like here, in Canada. Here, you have some cities, some provinces who detain some power, some authority. There is some governmental decentralisation. But, in Congo, it happens in Kinshasa!'' (exc. 66).

"(About a big businessman near the political power) "He monopolizes de facto by taking all the markets. This is a way of feeding the presidential party since politics feeds on means. So if we give all the deals to that businessman, he in turn gives back to the Party's public coffers'' (exc. 79).

"(In the Persian Gulf) The sponsors are a bit like local politics, the families who control the resources, who define the portfolio of projects. So it's this slice of society that has the controlling power over money" (exc. 80).

A need for more control

"(in the Sahel region) There is a need to follow up on budgets concerning the mining and oil contracts of multinationals" (exc. 92).

Socio-political games

The actor's freedom is limited by organizational and institutional rules. This makes the rationality of the actor limited. Actors regularly enter into fluid coalitions, according to the situations encountered and the problems to be solved (Simon, 1997). Finally, the organization is premised as being a social construct.

Individuals have divergent interests; they mobilize resources to reach their goal and devise various strategies to reach their objectives. The organization is seen as a political arena, with dominant coalitions and other coalitions less powerful.

Actors tend to pursue their objectives through a perceived rational strategy, establishing professional and friendly relations with powerful actors that will potentially facilitate the pursuance of the project objectives, and their professional ambitions.

Power is a multidimensional factor (comprising the exercise of authority, expertise, the advantages brought by personal connections, in situations where actors are found in interdependent and transitional coalitions). Local project managers try to mobilize their resources, seeing organizations as political arenas and potential springboards for their career perspectives.

4.6.2.5 Excerpts related to the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT)

For the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) the organization is considered as a social set of individuals who have contractual relations between themselves. The contract is considered as freely passed between equal parties. This agency relationship takes place between a principal and an agent. The

principal's situation depends upon the agent's actions. They do not necessarily share the same interests, and between them, there is an unequal symmetry of information.

The principal-agent theory, according to Braun and Guston (2003, p. 303), has been developed on the context of rational choice and transaction cost theory (Coleman, 1990; Williamson, 1985). In their study of the American political system of governance, Waterman and Meier (1998, p. 176) consider that bureaucrats are assumed to have distinct informational and expertise advantages over politicians. The hyper-politicisation of sub-Saharan African (SSA) regimes presents a different *tableau* of the situation there.

Contractual Relations

Once the funds have been transferred by the principal, a margin of executive discretion or opaqueness can allow the agent to take hold of funds or material, in a manner not specifically planned or specified, as is the case found in this study on corruption.

Here are some excerpts corresponding to this statement. Transaction costs being a complex issue, it is imperative to find ways to build the capacity of public institutions in host countries. "Once the contracts are signed, there are obstacles surging: local civil servants demand various advantages for themselves (cars, computers). They have to be reminded of the terms of the contract that don't provide for that" (excerpt 2).

A System of obligations

Between the principal and the agent, a functional relationship is supposed to take place between them. In this case, this relationship concerns the foreign aid agency and the aid recipient country'

agent. It also concerns the obligations between the citizens of the recipient country and the authority taking care of the assets supposed to benefit their 'clients' as presented in excerpt 32.

"Local government officials try to maximize money from development projects. They seem to care little for the needs of the poor" (exc. 1).

''So you have buildings that were never really renovated. The library, year after year, had the same books, the same volumes. So when I was in college there were a lot of protests'' (exc. 32).

Opportunities taken

Some of the respondents signalled in their interviews that once the international aid contract is signed, thus signalling the end of the design and planning processes, and the beginning of the implementation phase, local government officials often try to obtain certain advantages or materials**,** that were not planned in the formal contract.

We have seen that some actors (in aid receiving countries) may try to take advantage of their executive positions in government ministries or local NGOs, that were delegated to them by the principal (being the financing agencies), to obtain material advantages not always specified in the aid contract.

"Part of the aid is diverted, through the various layers of state bureaucracy and power, before reaching the aid target groups" (exc. 3).

"Foreign aid must go through three or four stages. It often results in underfunded projects, carried out only on paper. World Bank projects are eaten up and down at various levels'' (exc. 59).

Opacity of the system

We have seen that transaction costs being a complex issue, it is imperative to find ways to build the capacity of public institutions in host countries (CIDA, 2010, p. 7). Considering the administrative weaknesses often found in many aid recipient countries, as for the management of project and program monitoring and evaluation, it is often difficult to evaluate the progress realized.

"As for sectoral budget support, we cannot measure the effects of budget support, either the effectiveness or the efficiency of aid, as money melts inside the ministries' budget operations" (exc. 56).

Neo-patrimonialism

The neo-patrimonialist system of governance often found in SSA countries, based on the power detained by certain groups that profit of the system to accumulate material benefits for themselves and their cronies, provides an interesting source of explanations as for the principal-agent relations in SSA countries. In such a governance system the principals have enormous power to dictate the agents the corrupt ways to function,

"It's OK if I know someone. If he's from the same ethnicity as me, I'll talk to him, and he'll give me the job. In this culture of solidarity, this is the other setback that does not suit our fight against corruption. So when we talk about corruption in Africa … we find that it is not just a matter of corruption at the state level, at the level of institutions, at the level of services. Culture also indirectly promotes corruption. Because it's OK to help someone somehow. We must do it. It's not a choice'' (exc. 13).

Need for control

Many Canadian respondents, active or retired project managers, that we interviewed, said that Canadian aid is reputed for the strict monitoring and control of the aid transferred, and were proud of it.

"In the case of highly corrupt countries, it is better to favour the project approach, for reasons of accountability. You must adjust to the country conditions" (exc. 58).

"It is important to measure the performance of aid projects and programs" (exc. 89).

"Reporting is essential, requesting narrative reports every six months, financial reports every three months, field visits, mid-term evaluation, also evaluation by external consultants" (exc. 90).

"More conditionalities should be applied by aid donors, as for the aid provided to countries like the mining sector, very marked by corruption" (exc. 96).

Generational change

Some of our respondents expect many difficulties to change the existing neo-patrimonialist ways that actively preside over the principal-agent ways of functioning in SSA countries.

"I think Africans are tired of the old generation (of politicians), are tired to see their country not progressing, regressing, many times. Now, there is a privileged elite, the ones who have studied abroad, often coming from elite families. But, more and more, they are coming back to try to change things'' (exc. 72).

"It is what the young generation is so unhappy about. Because they know about that immense amount of wealth that has been generated … Though, among the countries, they are among the

poorest of the world. Their per capita income is relatively high, but the absolute amount of poor people is also among the highest'' (exc. 76).

'Bad apples'

Agency costs are supported by the two parties, who put in place systems of obligations and controls. Agency costs comprise expenses made for monitoring, mechanisms of control, and finally residual losses. To limit the costs of agency, the principals have recourse to their authority and various means of control and financial incentives.

An interesting comment by Jancsics (2014, pp. 360–361) is that in cases of prevalent corruption, where the state as principal is supposed to represent the interests of the general public, the principal-agent theory becomes irrelevant, since there is no actor able to monitor and punish corrupt behaviour. In that case, a few negative group members may 'poison' otherwise 'good apples' and transform the organization into a 'bad barrel', making the group a bunch of 'bad apples', considered corrupt.

Chapter 5

Discussion

5.1 Overview

We discuss in this chapter the relative value of our findings presented in chapter 4, which were integrated within a proposed model grounded in our data analysis. We attempt to justify them by pinpointing how they can extend upon and help better articulate the context of International Development Projects (IDPs).

Our guiding principles are within the epistemology of Paul Feyerabend, especially as synthesized in his book "Against Method" (Feyerabend, 1975). Since this perspective has yet to be fully addressed in the PM literature, we adopted its interpretations from a discipline close to PM studies, i.e., Information Systems (IS). Authors in IS journals have so far used this perspective to encourage less constraints from research methodology, and greater focus on empirical data quality and imagination to spur innovative knowledge (Treiblmaier, 2018). But a more striking debate has emerged, arguing that this epistemology touches beyond methodology, as it would be also relevant to assess the relative value of contributions to the advancement of knowledge (Hirschheim, 2019; Hovorka et al., 2019).

The purpose of this chapter is not to bypass the task of theory building, but primarily to continue the logic of grounded theory, where theory emerges from findings, leading to grafting points with relevant theoretical frameworks. Hence, instead of "Theory as King", the foregoing discussion

adopts a viewpoint of "Theory as Instrument" for analysis and advancement in knowledge (Avison & Malaurent, 2014).

We review in section 2 some relevant theoretical implications, linked broadly to the initial literature review in chapter 2. While it is still difficult to articulate a complete model, we point to literature that seems to confirm our findings and would be a valuable starting point for future research.

Section 3 makes a pause between sections 2 and 4, allowing us to reflect on the relative value of an emerging body of research on Neo-Patrimonialism. While not entirely capable to account for all facets of corruption in IDPs, this literature opens doors to articulate an interesting analysis of regimes plagued by a high level of corruption and dysfunctional governance.

In section 4, we focus on a set of theoretical models that may be integrated with our proposed model and allow for more effective Anti-Corruption initiatives within PM methods in IDPs. These theories, while not directly related to PM methods, nevertheless impact PM practices as they affect indirectly IDP outcomes. This section will situate this literature more specifically within the post-colonial and critical paradigms (Ahen, 2021).

5.2   Relevant Theoretical Implications

5.2.1   Managing International Development Projects

The improvement of IDPs is a common concern for organizing work and delivering change (Ika et al., 2020a). But many of our respondents have talked about specific problems that impede or

handicap the attainment of satisfying results for IDPs, such as the foreign aid funds retained at various layers of recipient countries' bureaucracies, instead of them going directly for the implementation of the goals pursued by IDPs. According to us, this aspect is not sufficiently recognized in the literature on IDPs. About this specific negative factor, we believe that it is not sufficient to talk about 'occasional' "dirty politics", but we rather advance that this question should be treated in a more structural way with the analytical acceptance of the pregnancy of the concept of Neo-Patrimonialism (NP), which constitutes a political system that vies for the enrichment of the members constituting the elite of a regime, their cronies and business partners, and seriously impedes the fight to reduce poverty in the region.

Diallo and Thuillier (2004, 2005) in their study of the behaviour of African project coordinators and managers, have remarked that these actors did not give much (or sufficient) attention to the needs of the targeted community in their evaluation of the results pursued by IDPs. We have found from some of our African respondents the same opinion about the relative lack of attention given to the needs of the poor who are rightly an important part of the stakeholders as for IDPs.

We have seen that IDPs are complex endeavours for change in an environment marked by an increasingly unstable and turbulent environment (Ika et al., 2020a; Picciotto, 2020). This reading of the situation is more considered by the respondents who are engaged in militant work. On the other hand, our respondents working for the Canadian aid sector tend to adopt, in general, a more managerialist and technocratic approach to their mission and work (as noted by Dar & Cooke, 2008; Ika & Hodgson, 2014). An exception to this statement must be made for the few respondents

we met who held high responsibilities as ambassadors or high commissioners, who were indeed more sensitive to the political aspects of the situations in which they were involved.

As for the work of Brière and Auclair (2020) about the importance of attaining gender equality in aid agencies and aid recipient countries, the international cooperation workers we interviewed were of the advice that this type of message was well shared and understood in their collaboration with their Scandinavian, British and Dutch colleagues, but that they had more difficulties to pass that kind of message to many of their African peers, which reflects the medium masculine culture found in most SSA countries, according to (Hofstede, 1991; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 2008).

As for the Weberian ideal-type of rational-legal bureaucracy, such a reading is analytically useful to better understand some situations encountered by respondents who deplored the lack of administrative integrity or job permanence they encountered when the hierarchical bosses (in the recipient country) moved away and the new bosses hired a totally new workforce, usually at the expense of administrative skills required (Ika et al., 2012).

5.2.2   Corruption and International Development Projects

About the efficacy of foreign aid, our respondents in some way reflect the ambivalence about it shown by the authors we refer to in part 2.3. Some of our respondents, of African origin mainly, say that aid should have more conditionalities attached to it, as is the case of the Sahelian region where Canadian mining interests have a stake in the economic development. Otherwise, Canada is not perceived for having the same leverage as more powerful countries. Nevertheless, as a

middle power, Canada can partner with other countries of the same weight, such as the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands, to advance issues they have at heart, either through bilateral or multilateral aid, such as for gender equality, environmental concerns, human rights.

As for the application of the 2005 Paris Declaration principles, the Canadian development agency had at first hesitations to resort to sectoral support or budgetary support, particularly in the case of recipient countries where regimes could not be fully trusted historically as for their development and integrity credentials. Since the melding of the aid agency with Canada World Affairs, aid agents are much more influenced now by other considerations such as commerce, diplomatic concerns, economic development, than only purely development considerations, as was the case at CIDA in the 1970's period. This was illustrated by many Canadian professional experts who have lived through that institutional transition.

As for procurement issues, most of our respondents did not work at a national level as is the concern of the World Bank in its effort to open access and increase oversight for procurement issues. But at a more micro level of operations, many respondents stressed the importance of being very vigilant when dealing with public or private actors, such as civil servants, or businesspeople, who often try to get a share of that 'aid harvest', for themselves or for their services, of the money or items transferred, such as for vehicles, computers, etc. Canadian aid agents have the reputation, it seems, to be very vigilant, some would say stingy, about the management of monetary matters. Many respondents indeed stated that foreign aid is frequently a magnet for rent-seeking intentions by actors, at various levels (politicians, civil servants, drivers, servants, etc.). This was often voiced

by various respondents. Local merchants in very corrupt countries can be very canny in their ways to deal with goods provided by foreign aid.

Elite capture, as analyzed by Andersen et al.(2020), was not talked about much since it pertains to high state levels. Not many of our respondents, except for a few, dealt with people at such levels. On the other hand, some deplored that, when high or middle level civil servants move into a position of importance, they often rush to replace the people in place by their cronies or "people of their village", getting rid of experienced people, and not replacing them with competent enough replacement people. This is also related with Neo-Patrimonialism and ethnic solidarity.

The World Bank Report (2020) recalls the necessity of a multi-front effort to fight corruption, which illustrates very well the complex and protracted effort this represents. Many of our respondents provided various examples of corruption by different actors: policemen, civil servants, judges, businesspeople, money laundered through various schemes such as investing in real estate abroad. As for the literature consulted, according to many authors interested in the issue of corruption, they say that this phenomenon becomes more acute by the year and is not at all in regression.

As for the theory about Party System Institutionalization (PSI) advanced by Dávid-Barrett and Fazekas (2020), this theory is very interesting, showing that project management studies and international development studies should take more into account the socio-political context in which projects take place in SSA countries. This invites us to establish bridges with other social

sciences, as is recommended by Ika et al. (2020a) and Picciotto (2020). More studies should be done in that perspective.

As for the various factors - economic, political, cultural, etc. that are conducive to corruption, they are instructive to study (Gani, 2017; Gök, 2020; Musila, 2019). It is true that the structural adjustment measures of the 1980s and 1990s, advanced by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, led SSA countries to be more linked to the international economic system in its neo-liberal version and contributed to significantly lower the number of civil servants and their wages in this region, and to degrade the education and health systems. The devaluation of the value of the Franc CFA also contributed to plunge millions of families into poverty.

The degraded low wages of civil servants made them much more vulnerable to the temptations of adopting corrupt ways to survive or thrive. So, we come to that bleak realization: if these SSA countries cannot count or build by themselves a better deal for their economic situation, it will be hard to successfully combat corruption. And how to succeed in that endeavour if the neo-patrimonial way of doing politics perpetuates the present situation? Economic, political, and cultural mores are intertwined.

As Aidt (2003) and Jain (2001) advance, three conditions are necessary for corruption to arise and persist: discretionary power, economic costs, and weak institutions. Discretionary power needs to be contained better by stronger institutions, and the overall economic situation needs to favour people's life conditions. A democratic context helps, but as was said by some respondents, as long as peoples' revenues don't attain a certain level (USD 3000 / 4000 per capita?), western-type

democracy is at best mimicked by African regimes, to allow them to be recognized internationally and receive foreign aid.

So, as was advanced by Aborisade and Aliyyu (2018), since the colonial era, Africans have learned not to trust the representatives of the state, who were seen as exploiters. They do not find more solace in trusting the contemporary regimes' agents in power in post-colonial times, since they are mired in such a high level of corruption.

It is also interesting to take into account the research by Ferry et al. (2020) who found that many donor countries (e.g. China, Saudi Arabia, et al.) do not condemn or discourage a high level of corruption in some aid recipient countries they favour, because they have a similar type of non-democratic governance, even if they pay lip service to the reduction of corruption, without truly believing it.

5.2.3   Anti-Corruption in Projects

An enormous amount of money is lost to corruption each year, notably in SSA countries (Ahen, 2021; Kaufmann, 2005). It is so much money lost to necessary efforts to put for better educating young Africans, curing ailments, such as malaria, malnutrition, etc. There was a large consensus among the respondents interviewed that corruption exists on a large scale and is a plague handicapping economic and human development in this region of the world. Particularly in countries ranking high as for their corruption rate, some respondents reported that many individuals in these countries expect to receive extra money or specific privileges for their services (e.g., specialized training, trips abroad, etc.), beyond their salaries or contracts signed.

However, we could not contest Pavlik (2018)'s assertion that, in specific cases, the usually negative correlation between corruption and economic growth does not stand, when bribes are given by businesspeople to state agents (politicians, civil servants) allowing them with relative certainty to obtain a favourable and fast outcome for their business needs, since our interviews were more centered on project topics rather than economic matters. But this study is interesting, to have a better all-around view of the effects of corruption, particularly in business matters. This also highlights the interest of studying the various types of corrupt countries in relation to their specific PSI (Party System Institutionalization) regimes, as demonstrated by the comparison between Soviet Union and post-communist Russia by Shleifer and Vishny (1993).

The study of Adam (2020) is also interesting, to better put in perspective the role of e-government for the modernization of the relations between states and citizens. In the Western world, we tend to consider that new technologies will have positive effects for the economic development of societies, and to fight corruption by making the relations between the state and the citizens more transparent. But this author shows well that this supposed effect of e-gov stands only when there is a favourable context around, which is not yet prevalent in many SSA countries (e.g., the rate of ICT development, computer communication literacy, the efficiency and integrity of the public administrations).

There is a formal effort put by the United Nations organization in its anti-corruption effort called UNCAC (Senu, 2020). Unfortunately, this effort until now has been rendered harmless by many regimes in SSA countries, that do not consider in their interest to fight corruption. According to

us, this confirms once more the resolute will of the neo-patrimonialist regimes in power in SSA countries to not surrender power and their capacity to accumulate rent-seeking opportunities. They consider that any enacted anti-corruption effort would jeopardize their hold on power. Here again, the 'Realpolitik' socio-political factors at play seem to us to determine the lack of overture to new ways to govern. Many of our African respondents seemed indeed to have no illusion as for the African regimes' desire to govern differently for moral reasons.

To better control the funds transferred by foreign aid, our respondents involved in international cooperation, have stressed the importance of strictly following the flows of money, as is advanced by Winters (2014) to avoid the capture of projects. This can be done, according to this author, by targeting well the intended stakeholders of projects, encouraging them to organize (through social capital mobilization efforts) and clarifying accountability. These cautionary measures were stressed particularly by some of our respondents, either Africans (notably fighting courageously the rent-grabbing behaviours of some Sahelian regimes) or Canadians working for World Affairs in West Africa. Project capture is a frequent reality to be aware of, as is shown by authors such as Reinikka and Svensson (2004) and Svensson (2005) concerning World Bank grant-based aid offered to Ugandan primary schools.

Also, in general, we have seen that the literature generally considers that poorer countries are often more corrupt and more poorly governed (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Andersen et al., 2020; Svensson, 2005; Treisman, 2000, 2007).

As for project management, which is an important instrument to change SSA countries for the better as for their development perspectives, Rwelamila and Purushottam (2012) who concentrated their study of projects in Austral Africa, consider that projects led by African managers often need to be better managed, due to multiple factors, such as a lack of strategic perspectives, lack of training in project management, lack of a better sense of business, the micro-management tendencies of African supervisors, and the lack of superior education in project management.

Winters and Martinez (2015) have stressed the importance for Western aid donors to better discriminate to which governments aid should be accorded, and also to calibrate carefully the types of aid, according to the will of SSA regimes to really care for the development of their country, the advancement of democracy and work for the fate of the poor. Otherwise, aid funds will be spent without results for the accomplishment of these objectives, as it is stressed by many researchers (Booth, 2012; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Easterly, 2013; Moyo, 2009).

We have shown that there is an aid industry, where thousand of people toil and to which they are dedicated. Specifically, on a more cautious note, some authors such as Monkam (2012) have shown that there is a 'syndrome of moving the money' in development agencies, that can potentially hinder analytic acuity in their evaluation of some projects that should be more examined prior to financing them.

Also, Clements (2020), an American expert in designing evaluation frameworks, notes that in more than some cases he examined, the definitions of 'efficiency', 'impact' and 'sustainability', standards recommended by the OECD's DAC (Development Assistance Committee), are

problematic and can differ from project to project. Moreover, too often, he adds that many reports about structural weaknesses in targeting aid's intended beneficiaries and problems of accountability were usually erased in (half of) the executive summaries, ultimately intended for the funding principals and the public at large. Moreover, instances of widespread corruption and severe mismanagement of projects are too often white-washed in evaluation and top-level reports (Clements, 1999). Most of our respondents, exception made for two of them, were not evaluation design experts, and did not dwell upon reporting on such deficiencies.

It is interesting to note that some of our respondents who have been working in international aid for many years (being now retired or near retirement) often have a more critical and politicized stance toward international aid, while younger civil servants now working in that field of activity seem to adopt a more business and technocratic view of their work and the situation in which they are involved.

5.3 Core Theoretical Constructs

5.3.1 Neo-Patrimonialism

We think that Neo-Patrimonialism is an important cause for the high amount of corruption found in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries. This political system makes it highly difficult to renew the set of people in power (politicians) and in the bureaucracy (civil servants), otherwise than within the bounds of cronyism. Consequently, the state does not look after the interests of all citizens, and rather favours in large measure a gang of cronies, bureaucrats and businesspeople, loyal and ready to collaborate with the power in place. Incumbents take all kinds of measures to keep their place and privileges, blocking the access to power of opponents and militants who want to change the present unequal system in place (Beekers & van Gool, 2012).

Democratic rules are not respected, politicians in the opposition and voters who want change are intimidated or put aside. Almost everywhere, the mechanisms of parliamentary functioning only serve to give a false appearance of democracy. Most contemporary African states, with rare exceptions, do not play according to the rules of democratic alternance.

We do not see political leaders admitting defeat in regular elections, because too many people allied with the regime in power would then lose their protection and jobs. That is what we routinely see in Africa, as the power incumbents will do everything to retain power, as was the case some months ago in Ivory Coast with Ouattara and in Uganda with Museveni (Economist (The), 2021a). In both countries, opposition leaders were either arrested or barred from being electorally eligible, crowds were dispersed with tear-gas or bullets.

Under these conditions, corruption in most SSA countries has become an institution with its own rules, norms, habitus(es) (Bourdieu, 1979) to follow, to make sure nothing changes and that the system in place rewards the people who collaborate to keep their privileges, in a system creating profound inequalities, and that drastically reduces the chances of real development for the rest of the citizens not included in the "System" (also called the "Manger" in some countries).

In a neo-patrimonial type of regime, the ruling elites use the state for their personal enrichment, with the support of a public administration characterized by being "patently unstable, inefficient, non-transparent, and that fails to distribute public resources to large segments of the population" (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 1). The people left outside of this system do not (or almost do not) enjoy the services expected by citizens living in modern and functional states.

The concept of neo-patrimonialism was introduced in the late 1970s by Médard (1979, 1991), to analyze the Cameroonian regime's lack of institutionalization and state of 'underdevelopment' as for its 'impotent state'.

In such regimes, the "national institutions are weak", democracy is "deficient", and governance is "not fully accountable" to all citizens (UNDP, 2002). In many SSA countries, "governing is characterized by the appropriation of power as a personal asset and through the clientelist redistribution of wealth and official positions" (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

5.3.2   Patrimonialism and the 'Big Man'

Historically, neo-patrimonialism typically evolved from the prior cultural-political system of patrimonialism in place, characterized by 'Big Man' politics at a local level, that went upscale, to the national level of governance, after the success of independence movements.

"In pre-colonialist and colonialist times, the notion of the African Big Man signifies that a man who is able to use his power not only to accumulate wealth, but to redistribute to his clients, becomes a man of honor, while economic affluence represents a crucial virtue… A chief who does not successfully use his resources, authority, and connections, to promote the prosperity of his village and/or his tribe loses his honor" (Bayart, 1993, p. 242).

We see that "the present-day 'personalized' rule can be traced to a more traditional moral economy of patron-client. In such exchange systems, dominant individuals provide livelihoods and/or

political protection to the less resourceful in exchange for loyalty and/or labour" (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

"While petty corruption is mostly despised by all, because it is self-serving and usually arbitrary, there is often a recognition that the elite's much more significant abuse of power serves larger and more legitimate moral purposes" (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 159, cited by Ganahl, 2013, p. 140).

In the present situation, if a representative's ability to garner wealth for himself is realized, then for many, in a clientelist state of affairs, it is only proof, for his and her constituents, of his (or her) success in getting a share of the 'national cake' (Ganahl, 2013, p. 140). There is reason to believe that public development aid, if not closely monitored by donors, can and will be used in such manners liberally.

Neopatrimonialism is a distinct modern phenomenon, in post-colonial societies that have experienced the rise of the modern state organizations, incorporated in the modern international system (Médard, 1982, p. 179).

It is to be noted that the concept of neopatrimonialism has been criticized by Thandika Mkandawire (2015), who deplores that this paradigm has been too rapidly adopted by a large array of Western and African academics and international development actors. According to this eminent scholar, neopatrimonialism falls short theoretically on many dimensions: it is too much based on cultural generalizations and stereotypes about Africans, is based on a paucity of valid empirical data and

case studies, and does not give enough importance to the importance of ideas and agency relatively to the history of post-colonial African regimes (ibid., pp. 36-40; Friedman, 2018, pp. 450–451).

Other dimensions to be considered relatively to the corrupt governance of many African regimes is to look beyond and consider the various ways taken by what Ahen (2021) calls the International Mega-Corruption Inc. (ImC) phenomenon, comprised of the many ways multinational corporations take hold of the resources of the African continent, with the complicity of politicians (local, and foreign), by using multiple fiscal ways to avoid taxation, the support of various wealth management consultancies. For this academic, ImC constitutes a real weapon of structural violence against the attainment of the SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals). Tax evasion, impunity, legal loopholes, corporate political power, complex elite networks, complicity of the international regulation agencies, make possible the over exploitation of the resources of the African continent, and the quasi-impossibility of tangibly reduce poverty in that part of the world (ibid., p. 15).

5.3.3   Post-Colonial Hybrid States in Sub-Saharan Africa

5.3.3.1   Governance Regimes

According to Fjelde and Hegre (2014, p. 271), hybrid regimes are regimes that are somewhere between the conventional, closed authoritarian regime and a fully developed democracy or polyarchy (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Schedler, 2006). Paradoxically, most hybrid regimes in sub-Saharan Africa display a mix of democratic and autocratic traits, such as combining apparent democratic institutions and severe restrictions of suffrage.

The notion of quasi-state has been introduced by Jackson (1990) to characterize states endowed with a limited capacity to assert their sovereignty (Bach, 2011, pp. 280–281). This type of regime is even qualified of being 'anti-developmental' in its worst forms (Sandbrook, 2000, p. 59), or as an 'institutional curse' (Hyden, 2000, p. 19), and 'klepto-patrimonial' (McIntyre in Searle, 1999, p. 8).

There is a wide chasm between the Weberian-type model of the modern Western state and the reality of many African states, whose hybrid nature is best captured by the terms of neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, and a 'Big Man' type of governance (Ganahl, 2013, p. 131).

Starting with the work of Max Weber (2013), the famous German sociologist, the state is a social system of political domination that lays down the laws that citizens have to obey. Otherwise, the state may legally punish delinquent citizens by using the force at its disposal. By creating, enforcing and continuously amending laws, the state succeeds to manage such a particular state of social order (Ganahl, 2013, p. 132).

According to Weber (2013), six features distinguish the modern rational-legal state. We elaborate on each of these dimensions and attempt to integrate them within a coherent analysis of governance regimes.

5.3.3.2 Monopoly on Force

The state possesses a monopoly on physical force, without the presence of relevant rivals to the state's claim to authority. Indeed, only the state possesses the wherewithal to legislate and enforce the law.

Many African states do not exercise even the most exiguous control over the entire expanse of their territories. In some cases, the states' ambit does not extend beyond the capital, making the control of the state a question of who controls the capital.

The reader can refer to such examples as DRC Congo (where there are almost no routes linking the vast and various parts of the country, and the fact that citizens must reach the capital to fill any important administrative documents), and also Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, Mauritania, for extended parts of the recent past (Ganahl, 2013, p. 134). This situation incites the African national leaders to privilege the spending of moneys on their clientelist groups and regions, instead of building solid infrastructures that would effectively link the various parts of the country.

5.3.3.3 Acceptance by Citizens

The state must enjoy widespread acceptance among the citizens, who must acknowledge the state's sovereign authority, and consent, at least in principle, to the body and laws it tries enforcing (ibid., pp. 132-133). For example, a state engaged in civil war cannot be considered to be a state (B. Anderson, 1983), since the aims and principles of social order, as well as the governing apparatus, cannot be the object of a violent dispute between various fractions of the society (Ganahl, 2013, p. 132).

5.3.3.4 Citizens as Members of a Nation

Citizens must regard themselves as the members of a nation - as being a body of people who identify with the political community represented by the state. That entails a feeling of loyalty and subjective belonging. Of course, that national identity is a social construction, which includes patriotic and nationalistic convictions (B. Anderson, 1983).

Despite the recent tendencies of citizens in most African states to regard themselves as Nigerians, Chadians, Mauritanians, etc., in many cases they still identify themselves even more to regional, tribal or clan identities, taking precedence over national identity in practice, as can be observed in various exercises of national elections (as for Nigeria, the 2007 national Kenyan elections, south Africa). Nigeria represents a particular complex mixture of ethnic, tribal, and religious conflict of allegiances (Ganahl, 2013, p. 135).

5.3.3.5 Monopoly Over a Territory

The state exercises its monopoly on force over a given territory, meaning that the state has a claim on a piece of land over which it can exert its power. It also means that the state has the capacity to broadcast and impose its laws over the entirety of its domain. With most of the sub-Saharan African countries, it is far from a given state of affairs (Ganahl, 2013, p. 133).

A strong evidence is the case of Nigeria, among other examples, whose army is incapable to fight in a competent manner the incursions of the terrorist group Boko Haram in the central and north-west part of the country, which spreads terror by killing hundreds of peasants, and kidnapping

young students at will, mainly female, for extorting ransoms from relatives or make expeditive marriages with their rebel soldiers (Economist (The), 2020a, p. 50).

Such an ethno-regional fractionalization and conflict mainly finds its origin in the artificial constitution of African states at the 1884 Berlin Conference, that makes many countries constantly finding themselves in low and recurring levels of civil war, as in the cases of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast, the Central Republic of Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mauritania (Ganahl, 2013, p. 135).

5.3.3.6 Material Support to Sovereignty

A sovereign and autonomous state must be able to extract sufficient material resources to maintain its survival and sovereignty. Financing of the state makes it a necessity to be able to tax the economic activities of its citizens. In fact, most African states draw the lion's share of their resources from external sources, such as international aid, emigrants' remittances, direct foreign investments, etc. (ibid., p. 133).

As is also the case for Bayart (1993), Reno (1999) considers that the survival and/or enrichment strategies employed by both rulers and subjects, result in the tendency not to trust the state for using well the taxes obtained, and certainly not for the profit of their own in-group for most of the persons concerned. In that sense, the informal market that proliferates in sub-Saharan Africa can be considered as a kind of revenge of the civil society against the formal state, since people thus succeed to operate outside the ambit of their reviled state's supervision and control (Ganahl, 2013, p. 142).

Many African states find themselves regularly unable of generating the material resources needed to finance their existence. Many are part of the HIPCs list (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries), making them dependent on development assistance from developed countries. Otherwise, many would be unable to fulfill the most basic economic and institutional prerequisites of political existence (ibid., p. 135).

5.3.3.7   International Recognition

A state must be recognized as such by other established states. Though African states are formerly identical to all the other states of the international community, being formally recognized by the United Nations as sovereign states, entitled to represent the inhabitants of their respective territory. Indeed, states need to be recognized by other sovereign entities to engage into international, political, and economical dealings.

5.3.4   Modern Realities of Governance Regimes

The Weberian conception of governance regimes must be confronted to modern realities. While not invalidating the features described so far, several authors contend that more complex micro-factors are at play, requiring an effort of harmonizing the macro-view of Weber.

Jackson (1990) presents different conceptual depictions of the discrepancy between the state in theory and the African state in reality. He differentiates between the empirical statehood (when states have managed to attain real physical control over their territories, have subdued internal rivals, and defend their position against other nations) and juridical statehood (when they are simply recognized by other states).

Bayart (1993) employs two useful concepts: *la politique du ventre* (the politics of the belly), as in Cameroun, to signify that the group in power will take good care of the members of their extended family and political allies, ensuring they will get hold of material benefits by the sole virtue of the power detained instead of taking care of the needs of the larger population of the country.

The exercise of power is not intended by most rulers to serve the public interest, since in most of sub-Saharan African states, there is no clean distinction between the exercise of political power and the pursuit of private aims.

Bayart (1993) also considers that it is not possible in most African states to make the dichotomy between political and private affairs, and between the state and civil society, since most economic activities largely take place with the use of and control over state resources. According to him, the Weberian separation of legal-rational politics as opposed to personalized politics, is constantly contradicted by the facts.

According to Ganahl (2013, p. 144), contrary to the Western-Weberian model, politics in Africa is personalized, informal, irreducibly plural, and patrimonial.

In the world of development, the Weberian separation between modern systems of rule based on legal-rational norms are expected to be found (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 3). Unfortunately, instances of corruption abound, and the spoiling of public resources and unresponsiveness of public elites rather seem to be the norm (Cammack, 2007, pp. 599–600).

The term good governance appears to be an ideological concept, based on Western historical experience. This view fails to take into account that the political and public administration in SSA countries continue to be marked by authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption (Beekers & van Gool, 2012, p. 4).

According to Fjelde and Hegre (2014, p. 267), many scholars who have studied African regimes describe a system of governance where formal and informal institutions interpenetrate each other. The leaders' ability to retain power, maintain elite cohesion and placate oppositional groups, rests mainly on the disbursement of regime patronage through clientelist arrangements (Bach & Gazibo, 2011; Bratton & van de Walle, 1994; Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Englebert, 2000; Hyden, 2005; Lemarchand, 1972; Médard, 1991, 2000).

Democratic rules are not respected, politicians in the opposition and voters who want change are intimidated or put aside. Almost everywhere, the mechanisms of parliamentary functioning only serve to give a false appearance of democracy. Most sub-Saharan African states, with rare exceptions, do not play the rules of alternance.

5.4   Theoretical Models Explaining Anti-Corruption Effectiveness

5.4.1   Relevance of Models

Under these conditions, corruption in most SSA countries has become an institution with its own rules to follow, norms, habitus(es) to adhere to, as Bourdieu (1979) would have said, to make sure nothing changes and that the system in place rewards the people who collaborate to keep their

privileges, in a system creating profound inequalities, and reducing the chances of real development for the rest of the citizens not included in the ''System''.

Let us now examine three models that could increase the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives, including in PM methods applied within IDPs at various stages of their lifecycle. These models are: (1) the good governance model; (2) the model of long-horizon rent-taking; and (3) the developmental state governance model. Each one will be presented, with its main characteristics, but also the limits of their applicability, due to the contexts encountered.

Each of these constructions can be used either to estimate the level of sound governance in a society and as a pragmatic way to counteract the phenomenon of corruption.

5.4.2   The Good Governance Model

The World Bank and the United Nations Organization and its anti-corruption effort called UNCAC (United Nations Convention against Corruption) both largely refer to the Good Governance Theory, as advanced by the World Bank Group.

We have seen that the World Bank is making efforts to advance the importance of good governance in its official development assistance policy. The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators put forward six key dimensions of governance, that measure the quality of governance in over 200 countries.

The 'global indicators of good governance' (Kaufmann et al., 2020) are: (1) Citizen voice and responsibility; (2) Political stability and absence of violence; (3) Efficiency of public authorities; (4) Quality of regulation; (5) The rule of law, and (6) Control of corruption. On the other hand, the World Bank (2020) report titled *Enhancing Government Effectiveness and Transparency – The Fight Against Corruption*, has proceeded to report five key thematic areas in part 1 (titled Selected key sectors and functions of Government): (1) Public Procurement; (2) Public Infrastructure, (3) State-owned Enterprises (SOEs), (4) Custom Administration, and (5) Delivery of Services in selected sectors.

In Part II (*Policy tools and interventions used to control corruption*), the World Bank (2020) report examines some of the policy responses that government and civil society may employ for corruption prevention and detection. These selected policy tools are: (1) Open Government Initiatives, (2) Gov Tech, (3) Asset and Interest Disclosure, (4) Beneficial Ownership Transparency, and (5) Exchange of Tax Information and Identification of Tax Crimes.

Finally, in Part III (*Institutions used by government for oversight and accountability*), the report covers three oversight institutions that can contribute to the fight against corruption: (1) Anticorruption Agencies, (2) Supreme Audit Institutions, and (3) the Justice System.

We recall some of the key messages conveyed by the World Bank (2020) report:

- Anti-corruption progress is not linear, and reforms regularly suffer due to political setbacks and/poor institutional weaknesses.

- The 'how' of reform can be as important as the 'what' of reform, as it requires an understanding of how key obstacles could be overcome in some contexts.

- There is no single success factor; impactful reform usually requires a combination of several interventions.

- Open government reforms can lead to a stronger relationship between government and citizens, increasing levels of trust and social capital.

- Sector and function-specific interventions can be effective and complementary to broader government-wide efforts to bring transparency, integrity, and good governance.

- It is critical to look beyond the *de jure* aspect of anti-corruption institutions and tools, to the *de facto* impact and make course corrections, so that national anti-corruption strategies and institutions are made well tailored to the needs and contexts of countries.

- Collaboration and information sharing across traditional agency boundaries, and across international boundaries are important to address corruption.

- It is important to factor the historical, social, economic and political realities of a country into anti-corruption reform efforts (World Bank, 2020, pp. xv, xvi).

This World Bank (2020) report reminds us that it is frequent to find strong inter-linkages between power, politics and money. Political parties and campaigns are often financed by close links with business, which can be corrupt. More often than not, entrenched political elites are eager to maintain their grip on power and money (ibid., p. xv). High-profile anti-corruption strategies have often been proven to be ineffective, only giving a temporary veneer of government action (ibid., p. xv).

Most developed countries' governments and public opinion support the good governance model to be applied by developing countries' governments. On the other hand, several other opinions must be taken in consideration:

- The Transparency International Report (2021) reveals that ''While most countries have made little to no progress in tackling corruption in almost a decade, more than two-thirds of countries score below 50 (the average country score being 43) ... Reports show that corruption is prevalent across the Covid-19 response from bribery for Covid-19 tests, treatment and other health services, to public procurement of medical supplies and overall emergency preparedness … Our analysis reveals that countries that perform well on the index invest more in health care, are better able to provide universal coverage and are less likely to violate democratic norms or the rule of law when responding to a crisis''. We see that corruption has deleterious effects on various domains of society and humans' quality of life.

- The Freedom House Report, titled *Freedom in the World 2021* (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021, p. 1), advances that ''As a lethal pandemic, economic and physical insecurity, and violent conflict ravaged the world, democracy's defenders sustained heavy new losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favour of tyranny ... Incumbent leaders increasingly used force to crush opponents and settle scores, sometimes in the name of public health, while beleaguered activists, lacking effective international support, faced heavy jail sentences, torture, or murder in many settings ... These withering blows marked the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. The

countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with improvements by the largest margins recorded since''. Corruption, we can see, not only is a result of the degradation of governance in many countries, but also directly contributes to the fall of freedom and prospects of emancipation of citizens in various countries affected by it.

- We have seen that the community of aid donors is formally in favour of good governance and fighting corruption. But, in reality, as found by Ferry et al. (2020), autocratic and corrupt donor countries will, in fact, readily give aid to corrupt developing countries sharing their same corrupt mode of governance.

- Good governance should, in the best circumstances, lead to more democratic forms of governing people. Pippa Norris (2011) has studied various forms of governance in the world, distinguishing four forms of governance: older liberal democracies, younger liberal democracies, electoral democracies (which is the form most encountered in SAA countries since the 1990s), and autocracies (ibid., p. 98). In her study, she notes that many citizens in older democracies have a wider conception of what democracy entails (ibid., p. 52), which includes freedom of the press, human rights for all (e.g. as for the LBGTQ people), women's empowerment, the changing of the political guard after elections, civic engagement, etc.

- She also considers that parties are one of the important conduits of political participation. She found in her study about democratic deficit, that many people in the developing world

have a more limited view of what democracy entails as a political system, since they often have a shorter (or none) experience with that system. For instance, sometimes, respondents to surveys will consider that strong men or the military can lead the way to democracy (in reality, it is rarely the case). Also, their main attraction for eventually living in a democracy is that democratic countries are rich. Overall, she found that historical experience of democracy, cosmopolitan communications, and economic development all provide stronger predictors of democratic knowledge (ibid., p. 166). This researcher demonstrates that the concept of democracy is attractive, but not always understood in the same manner by people across the world.

- We have seen that many SSA countries are hybrid states mixing democratic appearances of functioning (e.g. parliamentary settings, intermittent elections) with autocratic manners of governing. Being neo-patrimonialist regimes, they tend to give the impression of following reasonable rules of democratic functioning, while ensuring that the incumbent politicians will stay in power and keep their opponents away from it. These false appearances also stand in other domains, such as in business, constituting so many 'Potemkin castles' to play to the gallery. Two illustrative examples are the existence of thorough laws and rules against corruption in Nigeria that are not at all applied (Iyoha & Oyerinde, 2010), and modern corporate governance and accountability practices, apparently perfect by-the-book, but are not used factually by Kenyan corporations' boards of directors (Kimani et al., 2020).

We see that these various efforts, such as the ones pursued by the World Bank and the United Nations Organization, related to the good governance model, will continue, despite the resistances encountered that we have seen. The experience accumulated is worthwhile for the organizations, experts and militants concerned. However, other fronts need to be opened, such as more focused dialogues between governments, to put pressure on developing countries' elites, either by imposing conditionalities on aid, better controls by donors, or otherwise.

5.4.3   The Model of Long-Horizon Rent-Taking

Another way to favour development, for a developing country, according to Kelsall (2013) is to shirk away from neo-patrimonial ways, whose legitimacy is ''tied to the distribution of economic favours to clients and cronies, meaning that industrial policies will inevitably fall prey to unproductive 'rent-seeking' (ibid., p. 1). This author proceeds with the analysis of case studies of four contemporary African states (Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Kenya), also in comparison with some Asian countries, as Japan, South Korea and others, who were part of famous economic take-offs, after World War II.

Since their independence, many African countries have developed their service sector, and have profited in the first decade of the 2000s from exporting oil, minerals and agricultural products, notably to China, but have not improved their economic performance that would have seen the reduction of unemployment and poverty. ''Governments must work more proactively with the private sector to remove market failures and structural distortions, boost productivity growth, diversify production and exports, upgrade technology in all sectors, and increase their global shares of high technology exports'' (Amoako, 2011, p. 27 as reported by Kelsall, 2013, p. 5).

Heterodox development thinkers, according to Kelsall (2013, p. 6), believe that Africa, to sustain high growth and poverty reduction, must ''adopt an ambitious form of industrial policy, referred as a 'learning, industrial and technology' (LIT) policy'' (ibid., p. 6).

Kelsall (2013) then proceeds to examine African examples of patrimonial-based development countries that were successful, for instances, Kenya under Kenyatta and Ivory Coast under Houphouet-Boigny (M. Meredith, 2005, pp. 65–66, 2014, pp. 595–596). An ideal model, familiar to the existing conditions in SSA countries, according to Kelsall (2013, p. 18), is the presence at the head of a country of an individual or group at the apex of the state, able to control the major rents created and to distribute them in a productive way, thus being able to establish a network of top-down patron-client relationships.

By contrast, elsewhere, rent-management was not centralized, and the leadership was unable to control rent-seeking, leading to unrestrained corruption, economic crisis, even the collapse of authority (ibid., p.19). In such cases, if there are numerous low-level actors all seeking rents for themselves, it becomes difficult to coordinate their actions and not fall into unmanageable corruption (ibid., p.20).

Ideally, rent management must be oriented for the long term. Long-horizon rent management means directing a substantial portion of rent-earning opportunities to activities that increase the value-added industrial activities, making it possible to transform the productive forces in the long run (MacIntyre, 2000, pp. 265, 270).

Kelsall (2013) presents a four-part typology model of rent management:

    I.   Competitive clientelism (low centralization of state power and short time horizon) (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 23–24, 29, 44–46)

    II.   Non-developmental kleptocracy (high centralization of state power and short time horizon) (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 25, 29, 43)

    III.   Ineffective developmental state (low centralization of state power and long-time horizon) (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 24–25, 29, 43)

    IV.   Developmental patrimonialism (high centralization of state power and long-time horizon) (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 25–27, 29–39)

Here are the characteristics of each of the models presented by Kelsall (2013, p. 29):

Model I (decentralized, short-horizon) can apply to Côte-d'Ivoire (1993-2010) with a weak economic performance; to Kenya (1994-2004) with a weak economic performance, and Malawi (1994-2004) with a mixed economic performance. Model I is characterized by 'winner takes all' (politicians and cronies extract maximum rents, for fear that there will be nothing left for them tomorrow), corruption/looting of economy, lack of political mediation, repression and violence, communalism and erosion of authority (Allen, 1995, p. 308). Other examples in Asia and Africa are Sukarno's Indonesia, the Nigerian First Republic, Sierra Leone before the 1992 military coup.

Model II (centralized, short-horizon) applies to Côte-d'Ivoire (1981-1993) with a quite weak economic performance; to Kenya (1982-2002) with a weak economic performance, and to Malawi

(1980-1994) also with a weak economic performance. In this situation, the leadership has considerable success in centralizing the rent process but does not take the long view. The regime takes on a kleptocratic aspect, cronies being allowed to enrich themselves without limits. Zaïre-Congo under Mobutu (1965-1997) (K. Johnson, 2017) fits the bill, also Siaka Stevens (Prime Minister of Sierra Leone from 1967 to 1971 and President from 1971 to 1985) who became filthy rich dealing with 'dirty diamonds' in 1970s Sierra Leone (Reno, 1995; Schatzberg, 1988), and South Africa under Jacob Zuma (2009-2018). The most extreme and dysfunctional cases can be found in the predatory regimes of Idi Amin Dada in Uganda (1971-1979), Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (1968-1979) and Jean Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa (1966-1979) (Bach, 2011, p. 279; Chehabi & Linz, 1998).

Model III (decentralized, long-horizon) applies to Côte-d'Ivoire (1975-1980) with a weak economic performance. Here the leadership desires to take the long view, to serve the interests of society at large, but lacks the state machinery to centralize rents. Another example is Cambodia (1979-1991), and Nigeria under General Gowon (1966-1975) (Forrest, 2019, pp. 47–57).

Model IV (centralized, long-horizon) applies to Côte-d'Ivoire for the period of 1960-1975, with a strong economic performance under Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The same comment applies to Kenya under Jomo Kenyatta (1965-1975) (M. Meredith, 2014, pp. 558–563). Malawi (1965-1978 and 2004-2009) also fits the bill, with a quite strong economic performance in that period. Here, the leadership has succeeded in centralizing control over rents, taking a long-term approach to maximize rents, with a more or less blurring of the boundaries between public and private property of the ruler(s) (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 25–26). Bach (2011) considers the regimes of Houphouët-Boigny

and Kenyatta, during these 'blessed' periods, resulting from an enlightened type of 'regulated neopatrimonialism' that combined a benevolent personal rule with the use of a balanced regional, ethnic, generational and even of personal rivalries put at the service of the national party in power (see also Crook, 1989, pp. 227–228).

In Model IV, ''leaders have a vision that inspires them to create rents and discipline rent-seeking with a view to expanding income through investment over the long term'' (Kelsall, 2013, p. 24). In the patrimonial culture of SSA, this model seems to be the best option to reduce state corruption.

As well, rents serve to finance party activities, and to finance domestic investment, including public works and original policy initiatives. In that model, corruption looks more predictable and more moderated (Pavlik, 2018). The rent process does not hurt the climate for investment, domestic and foreign. Other examples are: South Korea (1961-1987), Malaysia (1957-1997), Indonesia (1967-1997), Botswana (1966-1998) (Poteete, 2009). In these instances, the reader will have recognized the presence of a strong PSI (Political System Institutionalization) (Dávid-Barrett & Fazekas, 2020). Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) also consider the case of Rwanda under Paul Kagame as a fitting example of developmental patrimonialism (Kelsall, 2013, pp. 102–144; Purdeková, 2011; Purdeková et al., 2018).

Model IV is interesting for aid donors and allies to support. However, regime changes always happen sooner or later, and may put a stop to such governance choices. Also, an interesting option for donors is to identify change leaders when they happen to have a stake in the governance of

their country, when in charge of a ministry or department, and engage a fruitful dialogue with them to encourage them and learn from their experience.

5.4.4   The Developmental State Governance Model

Another way proposed for transforming a developing country for the better is the Developmental State Governance (DSG) model. In that model, the state takes control over entire sectors of the economy, especially strategic industries.

"The state, in this model, wants to be an actor in the structural transformation of the economy. Initially, the goal is to catch up, then later to compete with developed countries" (Beaudet & Benhmade, 2019, p. 200; C. Johnson, 1982, 1999; Leftwich, 2011; Wade, 1990).

The main historical examples of DSG model are found in East Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

"The DSG model is structured around a set of institutions, whose mission is to choose the economic sectors to develop through a series of interventionist measures. DSG leaders intervene in the market to govern and discipline the private sector through various incentives or coercion, for example by regulating access to credit" (Gaudreault, 2019, p. 200).

The collaborative link between the political and business elites provides institutional channels for the permanent renegotiation of development objectives and strategies to be deployed (ibid., p. 200).

In many Asian countries, at first, DSG was primarily a nationalist project, adhered to by the ruling elite. There is the presence of an effective institutional fabric combined with political stability and the success of economic reforms.

Developmental states choose champion industrial sectors, as strategic vectors of economic development. Close links are established between the government, a technocratic elite and favoured entrepreneurs. Strategic choices are made and changed when needed.

At first, from a social point of view, DSG tends to exercise strict control and repression of civil rights, but finds its legitimacy in its economic and social achievements (Gaudreault, 2019, pp. 49–51). Its only justification with the citizenry is proven economic development.

Education becomes a priority, in order to train students who will excel in the key sectors to be developed.

Examples of economic strategic choices vary:

- In South Korea, the focus, depending on the periods, was on shipyards, the automotive industry (Amsden, 1992; G. White, 1988)
- In Taiwan: making microchips for computers, assembling them for computers and cars, among other uses
- In Singapore: the financial industry, port facilities

- In Hong Kong: the financial sector, offering a hosting link for foreign investments in China

- In Ethiopia: 'off duty' manufactures for foreign firms; agrobusiness land-lease.

- In Rwanda: ICT (information and communication technologies); high-end tourism, conference hub, the processing of agricultural products (Gaudreault, 2019, pp. 191–219).

5.4.5 The Special Case of Rwanda

The special case of Rwanda as a developmental state has been made by Francis Gaudreault (2019) in a doctoral thesis at the University of Ottawa. First, there are preconditions for the establishment of a developmental state (Gaudreault, 2019, pp. 133–154; Leftwich, 2011, p. 396).

1) The presence of an external or internal threat, providing strong incentives for a concerted policy requiring the collaboration of the elites and the development of a nationalistic ideology (Leftwich, 2011, p. 396): in Taiwan (the threat posed by mainland China); in Singapore (the fear that Chinese citizens, who form the majority of the population in that city-state, would not take into account the interests of the other sections of the population); South Korea (under threat from North Korea); in Rwanda (the traditional rivalries between Hutus and Tutsis that led to the genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 and the four year civil war that ensued after) (see Gaudreault, 2019, pp. 94–120 for the Rwandan historical context).

2) The coherence of a coalition of internal elites, either based on a dominant player (the military or a single party rule, both present in Rwanda), or a broad coalition of competing elites ready to compromise around a new set of rules (Leftwich, 2011, p. 396).

3) The concentration of power and continuity of policy requiring a ''substantial concentration of political, military and ideological power in the hands of the state, at least in the formative stage'' of the transformation of the state (ibid., pp. 396).

4) A favourable international context (e.g.: from the 1950s on, Korea was militarily protected by the United States, and extraordinary trade and customs facilities were offered to it, such as an easier access to the American market - the same goes for Taiwan and Hong-Kong - in the context of the Cold War (Leftwich, 2011). For Rwanda, American and British ODA and foundations have been generous in the post-genocidal period. Western guilt, for not having intervened, was a factor, notably letting the Rwandan regime resort to unusual policy independence.

Then there are conditions for a viable DSG to be established (Gaudreault, 2019, pp. 155–265; Leftwich, 2011, p. 396):

1) To obtain a consensus between the political elite and the economic elite (called 'political settlement') as for the choice of development options of the country to prioritize. In other words, counting on a cohesive and powerful elite, strong and well-functioning (ibid., 2019, pp. 53-57, 224-242). In Rwanda, the regime in power has stressed the critically important values of non-sectarism, and the relentless pursuit of socio-economic development plus the firm enforcement of rules (ibid., pp. 156-166).

2) To count upon a meritocratic, honest and efficient public administration, capable and being able to advance coherent policies. For Gaudreault (2019), this is a weak link, in the case of contemporary Rwanda (ibid., pp. 167-173).

3) Encouragement by the State to promote industrial champions (ibid., pp. 183-220) (e.g.: the cultivation of captive salmon in Chile; the auto industry, shipyards in South Korea), generally, to have industrial policies, give subsidies, offer tax breaks. This implies giving priority to training experts for the future (Asians have long emphasized higher education), and to attract investors and experts. In Rwanda, there is a concentration of power in parastatal enterprises led by the RPF party in power and the military, that dominate the political, military and ideological spheres.

4) To have a pilot agency, filled with competent technocrats. In Rwanda, it is the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB), which is a central place of consultation between the parties concerned, and for setting privileged directions. The model for that is Singapore.

5) Embedded Autonomy (ibid., pp. 72-74, 221-242): to have an autonomous bureaucracy, to make sure that the state firmly drives the direction of the economy and succeeds in harnessing the social dynamisms according to the comparative advantages of the country. It imports also to avoid the threat of the omnipotence of lobbies, which predominate in several northern countries and often prevent them to take more fruitful directions for the future.

As for the special case of Rwanda, other factors are at play: Kagame's personality appears to be central - he is at the same time admired and feared. A homogeneous culture. Also, the country is used to be administratively centralized and there is a tendency for citizens to obey the authorities (as was shown sadly during the genocidal period).

However, Rwanda faces several challenges: it is a country far from the sea; it has few resources, a high demographic density, a painful history of ethnic conflict and poorly functioning neighbours.

Until now, Rwanda has relied on ICT, communication technologies, high-end tourism, the holding of international congresses (being a Hub), the transformation of agricultural products (such as coffee, tea). But the leaders have realized lately that ICTs don't create a lot of jobs, and that more importance should be given to agri-food processing.

Some other specific actions have been taken by the Rwandan government. New practices are enacted that take their sources in traditional customs (based on interviews with a participant to this study, whom we cannot unfortunately name):

- To give a cow to poor households (*Uniongo*). Then the young of the cow are redistributed.
- Politicians, such as mayors, make promises to their constituents (as was the case for the kings in previous centuries, who promised to improve this or that aspect of people's lives, a custom that encourages accountability) (*Imihigo*)
- Communal work at the local level: *Umuganda* (working in groups, for example, on Saturdays, for improving the roads), a custom that existed at the time of President Habyarimana Juvénal. (1973-1994)
- Socially re-engineering the minds of the citizens:
- Social engineering, to shape new citizen identities (e.g.: no longer making ethnic distinctions in passports, official documents)

- The names of towns have been changed; the former names were given by the Belgian colonizers (ex.: Butare has become Huye)

- The establishment of re-education camps, to provide young people with a civic and historical education (*Ingandos*).

The case of Rwanda is very particular. The conditions in this country are not found easily in other SSA countries (e.g., centralized control since centuries, the genocidal war of 1994, a shorter colonization period, few ethnies co-existing - Bahutus, Batutsis, Batwas). Many observers consider Rwanda as a model of governance to follow for other SSA countries, but others have more reserves and a very negative view of President Kagame. One thing is sure: if the Rwandan experience is still successful in 20-30 years, it could serve as a model for a region which highly needs it for inspiration.

5.5   Value of Research Outcome

5.5.1   Summary of Contributions

5.5.1.1   Conceptual

It is always challenging to assess the value-added by conceptual and theoretical contributions. This is even more in the context of a practice-oriented Doctor of Business Administration (DBA). Hence, the foregoing arguments should be understood within the critique carried in PM-related research areas, such as Information Systems (IS), where the argument for practice-relevant theory is underscored (Avison & Malaurent, 2014; Hirschheim, 2019).

The phenomenon of corruption is complex and multidimensional. For a researcher, it constitutes an intriguing subject to tackle. There are several ways to study corruption: types of corruption, such as petty and grand corruption; social factors conducive to corruption in human societies; and the impact of corruption, which can pose a threat to democracy and an obstacle to macroeconomic development in developing countries.

There are many epistemological angles to study corruption. We noted, on one hand, a lack of communication between the academic disciplines that address this phenomenon. As an example, in management science, we encounter a universal condemnation of corruption.

On the other hand, the anthropological approach asserts that there is no unique way of looking at what is called corruption in the Western world, and that researchers need to take into consideration the way people consider this phenomenon in various societies, by meeting these people to better understand their ways of considering this phenomenon (Torsello & Venard, 2016).

Among the theoretical contributions, we made a link between project management and four theories that can facilitate analytically a better understanding of this social process that intends to contribute at changing human societies and better organizing work.

Many dimensions play a role in the various manners international aid and project management contribute (or not enough) to the development of aid recipient countries. So, we have developed a model to synthesize these dimensions, to help the reader to better grasp them in one look.

Epistemologically, we relied on four theoretical frameworks to help us interpret the data and formulate a coherent model. Their purpose and interrelations are for the sake of ensuring relevance for practice by PM experts. Hence, these four theories are more interpretative tools than explanatory theories: Institutional Theory (IT), Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), and Culturalist Theory (CT). This is our modest contribution to respond to the actual demand of many academics (in project development and international aid) to open collaborative links with social scientists.

Institutional Theory (IT) is instrumental to consider the multi-dimensional aspects of a specific society - its institutions (such as education, health, justice systems among others), shared values, norms, beliefs, and stakeholders, at the medium and large levels of human society. It is thus a useful tool to approach the phenomenon of corruption.

Corruption is an important factor that degrades the development perspectives of many contemporary societies, putting millions of people at risk and condemning them to live under terrible conditions of poverty and despair. For anyone following current events, one can consider that many countries are crumbling nowadays under the yolk of corruption. Under corrupt regimes, many people are imprisoned, mistreated or worse.

It would even be possible for interested researchers to study corruption as an institution, with its usual suspects (politicians, cronies, businesspeople), its norms, values and networks.

Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), on the other hand, considers humans as being rational actors who have strategies, enter into power relations and coalitions, and strive to attain their objectives, within specific and constraining sets of circumstances. Such an approach resorts to a socio-political reading of the organizational situations encountered. For example, we found that neo-patrimonialism is an interesting and relevant way to better understand governance in SSA countries. OIT is an interesting theory for a researcher who would like to understand the struggles between the various factions who strive to gain more power at the expense of their rivals. This theory could reinforce the acuity of analysis for such objects of study with regard to governance and corruption.

The Principal-Agent Theory (PAT) can help analyzing the endeavours of development agencies and actors in their relations with their governments and citizens, and also the actors in aid recipient countries. PAT can also be instrumental to research various situations of project capture and state capture, in which some actors succeed at breaching contracts that formally constrain their supposed ways to take care of money provided by donors and international development institutions. Such a theory is useful to study agency costs related to monitoring, and control of the moneys spent in international aid.

The Culturalist Theory (CT) can be useful in such matters of study as the historical ways citizens consider and mainly trust their governments. Some authors consulted have noted the lack of trust African citizens have for their national state and politicians, which is only for them a continuation of the colonial powers that exploited their work and possessions in earlier times. CT is also a good

approach to study neo-patrimonialism, as a historical successor of the patrimonial way to govern, that was a respected custom for many Africans.

Sub-Saharan Africa today is influenced in many ways by the rest of the world, through the medias, emigrants living abroad, contacts with foreigners, direct foreign investments, etcetera. CT is a privileged way to study such influences.

We consider that the management of projects and programs, beyond their practical nature and technical orientation, offer many opportunities to prevent the impact of corruption on the actors of the project. On the other hand, though, we noted that project management in SSA countries is often superseded by the socio-political dimension, with its structured neo-patrimonialism system of governance and hybrid quasi-states, that are lacking to fulfill many duties that go with the exercise of power according to the rational-legal Weberian model.

It appears to us that more studies of the neo-patrimonialism system of governance will be useful, to better grasp how corruption works as a structured way of governance, to grasp resources for rent-taking purposes. Such a system appears to us to be fundamentally detrimental to the effectiveness of the fight against poverty and to attain the objectives of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030). It seems to us that corruption remains too abstract a concept in itself, if we want to organize the fight against it.

Otherwise, it seems to us that corruption will be partnering with other deep threats to our planet, such as climate change, lack of jobs and family planning in developing countries, pandemics,

extinction of the species, augmentation of the desertification of lands in many regions, rarefaction of the fish in the oceans, Islamist terrorism, organized crime, and other contemporary plagues we now face.

One of our conclusions is to agree with some authors on the fundamental importance of good governance in these countries, to be able to advance the prospect of a realistic agenda for development. Indeed, good governance is important.

The absence, in many developing countries, of a political leadership that prioritizes the development of the country and the improvement of the life prospects of its citizens, is a determining factor. Instead, several regimes take advantage of aid primarily for rent-taking purposes, for themselves and their supporters, and to stay in power as long as possible. This observation appears to us to constitute a fundamental and unavoidable reality, in terms of the impact and failures encountered in several international development projects (IDPs), for sixty years. The importance of good governance was emphasized all along the writing of this thesis.

So, the concepts of project capture and state capture are essential, according to us, to better understand the realities and obstacles encountered in official development assistance. The absence, in many developing countries, of a political leadership that prioritizes the development of the country and the improvement of the life prospects of its citizens, is a determining factor.

Methodologically, we have greatly appreciated using the grounded method and interviewing thirty experts in international aid, distributed equally from sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries and

Canada. It has allowed us to accumulate a rich account of their varied experiences lived and their appreciation of the potential of international aid and project management, but also of the obstacles encountered. We have extracted ninety-six excerpts of the interviews made, hoping that the reader will appreciate even in these brief passages, the thick descriptions obtained in our study.

Our thirty respondents came from two continents, had varied professional trainings, represented in the field either donor, international aid agencies (bilateral and multilateral), were in contact with users of the funds in the field. Some were diplomats (part-time or full time), others had to manage difficult situations in endangered regions and countries. Many were in contact with stakeholders and aid recipient countries' representatives and became privileged observers of projects and programs of development.

Another interesting aspect of their contribution was that often they had to deal with the environment and contexts surrounding the projects and programs, which gave them large perspectives of the situations encountered.

The ground method theory allowed us to ask semi-open questions to our international aid expert respondents, which allowed them a wide berth for the expression of their views about development aid and corruption, notably the consequences of corruption for development. Consequently, we found that they talked freely and deeply about various aspects of these issues.

Because of their deep and varied experience, this method allowed us to obtain a large display of ideas and opinions, with a global vision, compared to what could have been obtained through answers to specific census questions, with little space left to them for discussion.

5.5.1.2   Empirical

We propose the grounded theory method, based on thirty interviews conducted with international development experts, balancing the representation of donor and recipient countries, as well as project managers involved in various sectors of international aid (bilateral, multilateral, NGOs, etc.).

International development projects (IDPs) are complex and involve a wide variety of donor agencies and actors in the delivery of aid. One interesting aspect of our research was the privilege of having interviewed thirty respondents who came from many different backgrounds of experience. With their varied types of expertise, we avoided the possible biases of having them coming from the same professional area, with the same preconceptions and types of thinking.

At their contact, we touched various fields of action, and a variety of contexts surrounding projects and programs of development. It is rare to be able to count upon such a rich variety of professional experiences, leaving time to the respondents to go deeper in their appreciations of their experiences lived.

The empirical data accumulated are rich and allow to consider various contexts of project management, about the social, political and cultural aspects of the environment.

We also made links between project management and the neo-patrimonialist type of political reality found in most sub-Saharan African countries. Thus, we went further than sticking to the strict management of projects and looked further at the social and political implications of project management.

Our research could help both academics and practicians to better understand the phenomenon of corruption and the concomitant rent-taking behaviours that can affect the results obtained and the impact obtained by project management in the lives of people. We believe that a better appreciation of the causes and dimensions of the phenomenon of corruption can help to better appreciate its various forms, impacts and how to combat it, notably in the case of IDPs.

Corruption is linked with some specific structured ways to govern people. Improving the situation will mean in the future to adopt new ways to do things, culturally and politically.

Understanding better the 'what, how and when' of the phenomenon of corruption can make people more pragmatic and optimistic in their endeavours to fight corruption.

We believe that research of this type is relevant, and that governmental and non-governmental institutions have an interest in better considering, for the design, imple-mentation, monitoring and control of projects, new instruments, tools and contemporary project management processes.

However, the actors using these tools must also consider the societal and cultural realities in which the projects take place. International development projects (IDPs) are complex and involve a wide variety of actors in the design, delivery and control of aid.

The findings of this research may also help practitioners, found in aid agencies (bilateral, multilateral), NGOs, as well as private firms, to better understand the factors that contribute to the success and limitations of IDPs. It can help them to adopt more effective management methods, in order to better channel their efforts and resources towards the most promising performance paths and avoid some of the pitfalls encountered over the past decades in this sector of intervention.

The relative lack of success in development assistance is partly linked to corruption at various levels and misunderstanding the context of intervention. As for corruption, there is a lack of analysis of this phenomenon about IDPs, to ensure its prevention, and improve project management methods, and to better support PM actors during project implementation.

We remind the reader that this qualitative research is of an exploratory nature and aims at sensitizing researchers and practicians to the realities and consequences of the phenomenon of corruption in its various forms, in the field of international development projects and programs.

In addition, we think that we are making an original contribution, by presenting an explanatory model, which illustrates the actors involved in aid, governance, businesses, and the population; also, the events that occur involving corrupt practices, and finally, the contextual elements that

shape foreign aid projects and programs, such as politics, project management, institutions involved and culture.

It appears important to promote higher education in project and program management among foreign students and to encourage their return to their countries of origin. Most of them will become accomplished professionals and powerful vectors of change, who could apply the practices and tools of project management. Hopefully, this approach would favour processes leading to more empowerment to the populations.

The testimonies obtained from interviewees from two continents were both revealing of the workings of the projects, and enriching for the researcher, on a personal and intellectual side. For the purposes of this thesis, we considered sufficient to interview thirty international aid expert respondents, sharing their valuable experience, and respecting the research requirements of saturation.

Finally, we took note that corruption is a delicate subject to deal with. Several institutions are reluctant to over-develop the public's sensitivity to this foul-smelling reality. Western agencies do not want the population of rich countries to be too aware of this phenomenon, to preserve the funds to be received from taxpayers, and preserve their reputation for integrity. It took the frankness of World Bank President James D. Wolfensohn in 1996 to declare that corruption was a real cancer that prevents several World Bank development projects from being successful.

5.5.2 Implications for Project Management Practice

Our research, we hope, will allow theorists and practitioners to become aware of and apply practices that limit the risk of corruption in international cooperation projects and programs.

Empirically, our sampling by expertise made it possible to take advantage of the experience and lessons learned from respondents who have a long experience of projects in the field of international aid.

We were able to observe the wealth of experience accumulated by these respondents. Older or retired respondents often have a more critical view of institutional practices of international aid, while younger practitioners are often more idealistic and have a more technocratic approach.

It also allowed us to appreciate the historical stages through which Canadian aid has progressed, having been more humanistic in the 1960s and 1970s, more focused on effectiveness and efficiency via results-based management in the 1980s and 1990s, and finally more attached to the new principles of the Paris Declaration since the years 2000s.

On the other hand, the merger of CIDA with the Department of Global Affairs Canada seems, according to the testimonies obtained during the interviews, to have diluted CIDA's primary spirit of giving priority to the imperatives of responding above all to the development needs of countries. Nowadays, it seems that international aid officers must constantly deal with the preferences of their colleagues in diplomacy, international trade, and even immigration, whom they encounter daily, and who do not have the same priorities and training.

Moreover, we see that international aid is used not only for humanitarian and economic development purposes, but also for diplomatic connections, military alliances, commercial interests, etc.

As for research implications, we agree with other academics cited in this study (Ika et al., 2020a) that more analytical linkages should be made with social sciences. Our own original contribution was to suggest four social theories (Institutional Theory, Organizational Interests Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, and Culturalist Theory) that could be applied to the study of specific projects and programs in the field of international development. This would allow a better understanding of the human, organizational, and cultural situations in which they take place (Engwall, 2003).

Our interest in the phenomenon of corruption, notably in the sub-Saharan African region of the world, led us to think that more attention should be addressed to better understand the context surrounding projects and programs, such as the socio-political, cultural, economical dimensions in which they take place (Beekers & van Gool, 2012; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi, 2012; Collier, 2007).

Project management remains a relevant way to better harness the human, economic, political, and organizational resources striving to change for the better various situations encountered in the developing countries, in collaboration with the local populations (Ika & Donnelly, 2017).

As for the teaching and practice of project management in SSA countries, there is still a lot to do in that region to improve the situation (Rwelamila & Purushottam, 2012).

Concerning the actors getting ready to work overseas, either for international aid agencies or private or public organizations, a sufficient effort must be provided to prepare them well to grasp the cultural, social and political realities into which they will live (Hofstede, 1991; Muriithi & Crawford, 2003).

The phenomenon of corruption, as we have seen in this thesis, is an important factor to consider when managing projects and programs in developing countries. But it still has the status of 'the elephant in the porcelain shop' in development literature (Locatelli et al., 2017). It remains under-researched in international development literature and is not sufficiently addressed as such in development agencies' reports, where diplomatic words still predominate when confronted to it.

Project and program managers working in developing countries must be made aware of the importance to remain vigilant and apply the appropriate measures for controlling well the funds put at their disposal, notably in their contacts with state actors (Reinikka & Svensson, 2005; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Since the phenomenon of corruption is frequently encountered, they should be well informed before taking their position in a foreign country about the various ways this phenomenon is enacted in practice (Winters, 2014; World Bank, 2020).

Women issues are important, and donor countries should put a special emphasis to encourage and promote gender empowerment (Brière & Auclair, 2020) in developing countries, notably in Africa.

Also, more positions should be occupied by females in the field of international development, in aid agencies, notably NGOs (Golini & Landoni, 2013).

As an institution, UQO has the chance to receive many students from SSA countries. It should encourage them to practice their acquired skills in project management in Africa, keep contact with them, and even have 'antennas' on the continent for teaching project management.

5.5.3   Limitations

It was very interesting to interview international experts, who brought their large array of experiences about project management, international aid and occurrences of corruption encountered. But there were limitations related with this chosen method of semi-open questions, and our choice of following their large descriptions of experiences lived.

Among the limitations of this research, we must include first the small number of respondents (thirty), which nevertheless created sufficient variance and representativity of the whole value chain of development aid. It may be that a larger number of expert respondents would have brought new and more insights about corruption and its consequences about combating poverty and poor governance.

A more focused choice of questions could have brought more specific elements about the various phases of project management such as designing projects, monitoring and controlling projects as for their costs, and also the important question of answering the needs of the stakeholders.

Our research convinced us of the pervasiveness and large occurrence of corruption acts that afflict the perspectives of development in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. This convinced us of the importance of situating project management endeavours and international aid in the socio-political, economic, and cultural contexts in which they occur (Ika & Hodgson, 2014). Notably, more emphasis could have been brought in the research about the neo-patrimonialism type of governance that prevails in sub-Saharan Africa and its incidence to create many occurrences of corruption in this region.

Also, the lack of many civil servants' neutral professionalism (compared with the rational-legal Weberian model) creates many opportunities for many of them to commit corrupt acts in their contacts with citizens for rent-taking purposes. This could be more precisely covered in more ample research.

Moreover, we have touched only superficially on the state level, the limited services rendered by the African states to their citizens, in this region. It is only one of the dimensions that put these governments in situations of being hybrid quasi-states. ''Hybrid'' meaning that they only appear to play according to recognized rules of democracy, to be recognized by other nations.

But in fact, they do not play according to the rules of democratic alternance, to allow opposition eventually to take power. On the contrary, many heads of states in this region often cling to power for 20, 30, 40 years, as can be observed in the cases of many countries such as Gabon, Congo-Brazzaville, Cameroun, Equatorial Guinea, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and others. Such a situation creates sclerosis for the chances of a sane management of the state in these countries.

Research efforts could also have focused more specifically on some of the factors and actors presented in our reference model: aid policies, forms of governance, institutions involved and modalities of aid (such as national aid agencies, project management versus program management, multilateral versus bilateral aid projects, direct budgetary support versus sector-based support; recourse to NGOs in certain cases), the business sector, the various management layers of the aid sector, the types of populations reached, cultural mores related to regions or countries targeted.

It would also have been interesting, with more time and resources, to interview more international experts coming from the countries comprised in the sub-Saharan African region. Thus, our analysis could have been enriched, if we could have covered more countries, because each country presents specific opportunities for researchers to understand better the phenomenon of corruption.

Also, most of our respondents were professionals and knowledgeable about various situations found in a variety of countries, as we expected. Nevertheless, according to the anthropological approach, we would have liked to meet and interview "ordinary people", even poor people with a long-life experience, to better grasp their view of corruption and the harmful consequences of this plague among the various social classes. In a way, such people can be 'experts', in their own way, being able to give a valuable testimony about corruption.

Also, as advanced by heterodox project management thinkers consulted in our literature review, more efforts could have been put to analyze specific cases of project management and international aid, with the help of social sciences and specific theories, such as the ones that we introduced in

this thesis (Institutional Theory, Organizational Interests Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, Culturalist Theory). Such contributions would be highly appreciated epistemologically and could open the way to establish more collaborative efforts to work together between project management researchers and social scientists.

We have carried out an inventory of 133 concepts in the NVivo software. As it is difficult to make a model from so many data obtained, we proceeded to the selection of interview excerpts, gradually reducing the number of excerpts retained to 96, which does not reflect all the testimonies accumulated. Other researchers could proceed differently, from this well of data, that will be made in due time accessible for them.

As requested by grounded theory procedures, there was no theoretical interpretation performed prior to the interviews. Only basic social theories were identified as potential explanatory framework during data analysis. This provided us for a more rigorous integration of various respondents' inputs, but our meager resources did not allow us to pursue in this theoretical effort more thoroughly and deeply.

5.5.4   Future Research

In this section, we present some suggestions for further research that could be carried out by researchers on the phenomenon of corruption in relation to project management in the field of international development, and surrounding topics.

Despite the transfer of vast sums of official development assistance (ODA), to developing countries since 1960, a substantial part of the world population remains today mired in extreme poverty (Collier, 2007; Easterly, 2006; Easterly & Williamson, 2011; Moyo, 2009). A serious resetting of priorities for aid was announced through the principles of the Paris Declaration of 2005, advancing the following principles: aid alignment with the recipient country's development priorities; harmonization of interventions by the donor countries; focussing on program-based approaches; results-based project management.

In relation to the methods and principles suggested by the Paris Declaration of 2005: did the recourse to global budgetary support (from one developed country's Treasury directly to an aid recipient's Treasury) give good results? Many Scandinavian countries have favoured this option from the get-go, but those other countries, like Canada, were initially cautious that the aid-receiving countries concerned had a good enough reputation of integrity before going that way.

In the case of representatives of a donor country involved with the representatives of an aid-receiving country, when global budgetary support is used, how was their experience of collaboration in such cases? What are the best ways to verify if the money was well spent?

As for sector-based program management (a favoured conduit for aid since the Paris Declaration), what do countries' representatives who participated in the concertation tables between the countries involved say about their experience (about the representatives of the aid-receiving country, on one hand, control of the money, or on the other hand, the other participants representing the donor countries)?

About the ownership principle of the Paris Declaration, "partner countries must exercise a real control over their policies development strategies and ensure the coordination of development initiatives". What is the opinion of experts about how well the aid-receiving countries have gone along well with this principle?

About the Mutual Responsibility Principle "the donors and partners must share responsibility for the results obtained". In the instances where the results are not satisfying (or very unsatisfying), how did donors and partners respond to these instances?

About project management practices in SSA countries, in relation to project management methods and approaches used by African project managers in sub-Saharan African countries:

Are there specific ways used by them that distinguish their ways for managing projects from foreign Western project managers having to deal with a similar endeavour? Or, otherwise said, is there an 'African way' that works well, for managing projects in such settings? Or is project management a universal method to be used, no matter the terrain of practice and origin of the project managers?

Teaching project management in SSA countries: In relation with specialized schools or faculties that teach project management in sub-Saharan African countries, are there, in the sub-Saharan African region, specialized schools or faculties that can teach project management to allow African

to develop as professionals in that practice? And what is the knowledge level attained at these schools?

About lessons learned: Do aid agencies (multilateral, bilateral, NGOs, foundations or others) take the precaution to reflect about lessons learned after the completion of their projects, and use these lessons for the preparation of other project managers in the future?

About stakeholders in projects managed: Is the population and/or the local communities sufficiently consulted before, during and after the completion of a project? And how are they consulted?

About the functioning of the OECD's Development Aid Committee (DAC) group: Year after year, an international development agency is evaluated by its peers. On a period of ten years, for example, what are the main preoccupations and recommendations made by the group? It would be interesting to learn more about the subjects of concern prioritized by this community of experts.

About the conditionalities presented by donor countries in relation to diverse types of projects: As for development aid, are there conditionalities presented? Are they different from agency to agency, from country to country, are they applied or applicable?

About NGOs: In the literature, Western NGOs are viewed more and more by authors as just simple instruments used by the developed states' agents who consider them mainly as contractors to manage projects according to the objectives and methods prepared and imposed by the donor state.

Consequently, more and more western NGOs are now considered to have fewer and fewer links to the civil society in the aid-receiving countries where they manage projects. Is that true?

About the preparation of experts before going to work overseas in projects: How much are they informed, prepared about sensitive questions such as corruption in the country, the cultural mores, power relations, historical realities, the techniques of monitoring and control of projects and expenses made?

The phenomenon of corruption, which is prevalent in many sectors of activity and in many parts of the world, is almost not taken into consideration in the project management literature. On the other hand, the reality of having many sub-Saharan African states managed in a neo-patrimonial pattern, should be considered by scholars of project management and international cooperation.

There is no consensus about why development aid provided by donor countries through bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental channels have led to so few results for the improvement of the macroeconomic situation of recipient developing countries, nor the reduction of the high level of poverty in many of these countries. Research could be undertaken about the ways international public aid does not substantially reach the targeted groups. Relevant questions such as: where and how is the money diverted by the high, middle and lower levels of the aid-receiving states takes place?

Many factors have been identified by scholars about why aid has not given the expected fruits intended since the many decades that aid initiatives have been enacted. These factors refer to

various dimensions such as the lack of administrative capabilities in recipient countries, the high level of corruption in most sub-Saharan African countries, the non-adaptation of blueprint project management methods in developing countries, the geographical and cultural estrangement of the actors involved in the aid industry. Another research issue that could be undertaken is: what can be done at each phase of project management to ensure that an adequate level of monitoring and control over the money transferred is done? What are effective ways to proceed?

Ika and Hodgson (2014) have taken a critical approach toward the management and analysis of international development projects. They show the limits of the applicability of the classical blueprint type of PM tools and processes, with their entrenched inclination towards a managerialist, technocratic and instrumental approach, in the context of developing countries, notably in sub-Saharan Africa. According to them, more focus should be put by researchers and practitioners on power relations, influence, domination, exploitation, ethnocentrism, the macro-political context, and contingent approaches. A research issue to pursue could be a study of the ways that international public aid is transferred in the context of neo-patrimonialism, following a critical approach.

The factor of corruption is almost not considered in the international project management literature. Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012, p. 386) advance that in most sub-Saharan African countries, with rare exceptions, "rent extraction is a major source of personal enrichment for the political class as a whole as well as for private business". "Secondly, the political leadership is either unwilling or unable to deny access to rent-taking opportunities by their major supporters, because it is largely by distributing such opportunities that it remains in power".

Another research suggestion is about better understanding the socio-political ecosystem established around the governing elites, to better understand which parts (head of state, ministers, high-level public servants, top army officers, political operators) of this ecosystem succeed to grab much of the public international aid money, that finally does not sufficiently reach the targeted groups, thus handicapping the fight to reduce poverty.

Torsello and Venard (2016) consider that management studies of corruption have until now neglected to take into account the anthropological view of corruption. They consider that corruption can be influenced by the socio-cultural transformations of society. Finally, they consider important to start from the respondents' points of view. Consequently, another angle of research to be pursued is to better understand the new reality of sub-Saharan societies. Which cultural, socio-economic, and political factors influence the contemporary phenomenon of corruption?

Winters (2014) recalls that a minimum requirement for good governance is that the funding reaches its intended destination. This author shows that the well-defined targeting of recipients of aid can result in superior accountability, and improved identifiability of stakeholders (also when they can organize for collective action). Aid works better when recipients of aid can organize for collective action. *A contrario*, there is more likelihood of project capture in countries perceived as more corrupt. When aid recipients are well identified and defend their interests in development projects, it leads to create incentives for politicians and agents of government to avoid abusing public office by acts of corruption. Another research issue would be to identify and explain some

real cases of projects when social capital and collective action have succeeded to eliminate wholly or in part the corruption factor involved in these cases.

Many organizations and institutions such as Transparency International and the World Bank warn us about the recrudescence of corruption in many sectors of life, public and private. Accordingly, when projects are large, nationwide or more diffusely targeted, it becomes more difficult to follow (monitor) the funds, and there are then more cases of misappropriating the collective goods. As for development projects, there are three scenarios for the illicit capture of funds: bureaucratic corruption, biased selection of beneficiaries and the direct diversion of funding (Winters, 2014, p. 396). Their conclusion is that weak governance breeds several forms of donor selectivity. Another research study could examine if Canadian aid authorities are aware of these issues, and act accordingly, when conceiving, monitoring and evaluating the financed projects in collaboration with their developing countries' partners.

Winters and Martinez (2015) advance that there is some evidence that better governed countries receive aid through a greater number of sectors. They found that selective donors will use types of aid over which they have more control when aiding poorly governed countries. Better governed countries are more likely to receive industry aid relative to infrastructure aid from bilateral donors. On the other hand, multilateral donors allocate more technical assistance aid relative to project aid for donors with higher scores on the governance measure (idem., p. 527). There appears to be a trade-off between technical assistance and programmatic lending, and a trade-off between social sector and infrastructure projects. Another research issue could be: how do Canadian aid officials

proceed when planning the projects and programs of international development, by taking or not into consideration the level of integrity of the power elite in the aid-receiving country?

Some of our respondents talked about the phenomenon of corruption having reached such a high level in their native countries, that it becomes a 'cultural' factor, as many young people wish to get rich by joining a political party, and thus participate in networks of cronies to get rich. A research study could be about finding how much young people in SSA countries wish to join the corruption "bandwagon", because it has become a problem of collective action, or rather want to combat this phenomenon.

Also, as advanced by heterodox thinkers consulted in our research, more efforts should be put to analyze specific cases of project management and international aid, with the help of social sciences and specific theories (that we introduced lightly in this thesis), such as the principal-agent theory, the organizational interests theory, the institutional theory and the culturalist theory. Such contributions would be highly appreciated and would open more collaborative perspectives to work together between project management researchers and social scientists. A researcher could use one of these social theories to study, for instance, a specific project and appreciate the interest and pertinence of using such a tool of analysis in the field of project management. This would also constitute an opportunity to establish a link of collaboration between researchers in project management and social scientists.

When it will be authorized by the institution, our data obtained by interviewing various international experts, that were based on grounded theory and later processed through Nvivo, will

be made available for researchers, who would like to do their research with the help from such a rich sum of data accumulated and codified.

Are there efforts made in SSA countries, as it is done in Rwanda, to educate citizens about the dangers of corruption, that seriously hamper the perspectives of economic development and combatting the high levels of poverty? A research effort could be about which means could be taken to educate citizens to elevate their ethical sensibility toward the issue of corruption.

Some of our respondents told us that in the present situation in SSA countries, there are few chances that western style of democracy can fit the culture and needs of Africans. Research issue: are there other ways of governance more appropriate to the present cultural, socio-political and aspirations of Africans? What are alternative governance models that would work better? Is it applied some place; does it work? This could be a critical issue to pursue.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1   Overview

We present our main findings about the phenomenon of corruption as a critical factor that hinders the perspectives for development in the sub-Saharan region of Africa. We recall the four theories used for the analysis of our empirical corpus, and the use of the grounded theory methodology for making and analyzing the interviews.

We then make a summary of the work accomplished for the research and writing of the thesis. This is followed by a summary of the conceptual and empirical contributions of our endeavour. We advance some implications for project management practice. Finally, we talk about the limitations of our study, but also of the possibilities open for future research.

6.2   Findings

Our research question is: How does corruption in developing countries, combined with poor governance, prevent international development projects (IDPs) from significantly achieving their objectives, notably in sub-Saharan Africa?

We have found that most academics who write about project management and international development projects do not directly address the question of corruption. Nevertheless, some of the researchers who talked about that phenomenon, as is the case of Reinikka and Svensson (2004) about local capture of aid grant funds to primary schools in Uganda, Winters (2014) about the

importance of well targeting aid recipients, ensuring political accountability with regard to the dangers of project capture, Andersen et al. (2020) about substantial elite capture when receiving international aid, and Booth (2012) about the capital importance of dealing with rulers truly concerned about the development of their citizens, are pretty convincing that corruption has a meaningful impact about the channelling of aid funds to the intended recipients.

We have also resorted to the analytical tool constituted by the paradigm of neo-patrimonialism, to better understand structurally the phenomenon of corruption. It helps to analyze the current tendency of many sub-Saharan African regimes' leaders to count on rent-taking to maintain their grasp on power, and satisfy cronies, political operators, accomplice businesspeople and the military to stay in power. How to explain otherwise the enduring grasp to cling to power of so many African leaders, who stay in power for decades, and leave it near the end of their existence, only to transmit it to someone in their family or political ecosystem.

Moreover, Transparency International and Freedom House warn us of the contemporary rise of corruption in most sub-Saharan African countries, the region most prone to that plague, and the degradation of democracy and harassment of political competitors and pro-democracy militants.

Many of the concerned SSA states studied in our research do not sufficiently see to the needs of their population, as for education, health, political representation, and investment in infrastructures. These states, as we have seen in chapter 5, are 'hybrid states' giving a pale representation of the duties and mechanisms related to the rational-legal state, according to the Weberian model. Most of the time, for example, the bureaucracies and justice systems are

subordinated to the rent-taking whims of the political class. As a concomitant result, such an ecosystem is hardly conducive to a dynamic and competent support given to many aid projects, who risk not to fully attain the results expected, notably in the fight against poverty, as we have seen for the efforts of DFID in Kenya and Nigeria.

The phenomenon of corruption is an important factor hindering the possibilities for the macroeconomic development of sub-Saharan Africa. Petty and grand corruption prevail in many countries of the region and are at the root of numerous institutional weaknesses.

International aid and development must elevate the hopes and living conditions of people in various parts of the world, allowing them to reach decent standards of living, and extricate them out of abject poverty and despair. Development is a major bearer of hope for many to make this world more secure and build a more sustainable environment in which humans can live and toil.

Methodologically, we used the NVivo software to gather and code the empirical data accumulated. The grounded theory approach was used to help us explain how anti-corruption and project management methods can be better used and integrated to improve development aid quality and success. Our sampling method was based on finding and interviewing thirty African and Canadian experts, who have a relevant and long experience in project and program management in the field of Public International Aid.

This semi-structured interviewing method allows the researcher to dig deeper in the interviewees' lived experiences and allows the inclusion in the writing of what is called thick descriptions of that

reality. The data analysis led to a proposed model identifying nine factors and a dozen of interactions potentially serving to align anti-corruption and PM methods.

This qualitative research is of an exploratory nature and aims at sensitizing researchers and practicians to the realities and consequences of the phenomenon of corruption in its various forms, in the field of international development projects and programs.

In chapter 3, we have explained four theories that helped us to better understand the causes and impact of corruption: the Principal-Agent Theory (PAT), the Organizational Interests Theory (OIT), the Institutional Theory (IT) and the Culturalist Theory (CT). In chapter 4, we have presented ninety-six (96) excerpts of the interviews made with our respondents and linked some of our theories to the excerpts presented.

Among the limitations of this research must be included first the small number of respondents, which nevertheless created sufficient variance and representativity of the whole value chain of development aid. Future research could also deepen interviews in highly related institutional areas, such as sectoral program support (e.g., health and humanitarian, direct budgetary support, technical assistance, etc.). There is also a need to explore more complex theories that can be applied directly to align anti-corruption and development aid management in projects and programs, focused on key specific actors.

There are many types of corruption, small, of the everyday type, and big, at the level of high-ranking officials and deciders. This phenomenon is prevalent in many sectors of activity and in

many parts of the world but is almost not taken into consideration in both the project and program management field of research and international development research.

Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the region of the world most affected by corruption. Corruption is a multi-dimensional concept, often hidden to the eyes of observers, that takes various names, and is hard to fight. Ordinary citizens hear about it, they deplore it. But most of the time, they don't know what to do about it, and then they pass to other preoccupations.

The prevalence of rent-seeking regimes in most sub-Saharan African countries erodes the trust and faith of citizens in the democratic integrity of their governments and the effectiveness and efficacy of their institutions. It lowers the investments to be allocated to education, health, infrastructure. It is a negative factor in economic, moral, and democratic terms.

In the SSA region, neo-patrimonialism (NP) is the main conduit allowing corruption to take hold of the governance of countries. Corruption succeeds in strangling the perspectives for economic development of most citizens, profiting only to a minority located in the regime elite, enriching cronies, and being safeguarded by the military brass, which also profits of it.

If neo-patrimonialism (NP) in sub-Saharan Africa persists and is not tackled robustly, the perspectives for the rise of democracy, real economic development for all, and the substantial reduction of poverty are meager.

Some authors such as Booth (2012) and Booth and Golooba-Mutebi (2012) consider NP to be the 'Modal Pattern' in place in most SSA countries. The roots of NP are varied: historical, cultural, political and others. It is important to note that NP has been criticized as not empirically supported by macroeconomic studies, and therefore not effective at predicting cause and effect of corruption (Mkandawire, 2015). However, the conceptual framework provided by NP is primarily to articulate the theories used in this thesis as analytical tools, not as a measurement instrument.

From the practice viewpoint, in the conclusions of a recent World Bank report (2020, pp. 342–343), the following points were advanced to combat corruption:

- The necessity for a strong political leadership to lead reforms and resist the opposition from vested interests.

- To ensure the building of strong institutions for providing checks and balances and fostering accountability.

- Transparency, to promote greater compliance and improve human behaviour.

- Open government policies and access to information as levers to make corruption practices harder to hide.

- To make incentives to change social norms and focus more on the micro-levels of corruption, and its manifestations in specific sectors of society.

- The use of technology to minimize human corrupt manipulations to ensure accountability.

- To foster better collaboration among stakeholders, nationally and internationally, in the fight against corruption.

Combating corruption is not an easy endeavour, as can be seen by the resistances put by various regimes in SSA countries to change their ways of governing, as illustrated by the various World Bank (2020) anti-corruption efforts and the United Nations Organization Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) program (Senu, 2020). Also, the feeble efforts of donor countries to recognize the prevalence of corruption more fully in aid recipient countries, because of various diplomatic, commercial, geo-political considerations, does not help.

As for the literature about project management and international aid, we consider that more efforts should be put, in research, to better theorize the phenomenon of corruption, which is complex and multidimensional. Also, we suggest that more collaboration links should take place between researchers in project management and in social sciences.

There is also a need to explore more complex theories that can be applied directly to align anti-corruption and development aid management in projects and programs, focused on key specific actors.

It is not easy in theory to study corruption in aid projects. It is challenging due to the wide diversity of actors found across the project value chains. The present research confirms the difficulty of narrowing down the search for evidence to support any valid theory or model that can explain corruption and its actors. It is why the application of various social theories to project management challenged by corrupt practices will be highly appreciated for research agenda in the coming years.

Finally, about corruption, several taboos persist as to whether it is appropriate at all to raise the question, and whether any answer from anyone would be tainted by prejudice, rendering any conclusion unreliable. The proposed approach and model serve primarily to overcome these taboos and prejudice in studying corruption, as "mapping" actors and their interactions helps to refocus from "what, who and why" about corruption occurrences (ex-post), to ask instead 'what, where and how' it occurs and help understand methods to mitigate its effects on projects (ex ante).

6.3   Summary of Work Accomplished

This research required several steps and deliverables that we outline here as a synthesis report of the work successfully accomplished.

Ethics approval was requested to the UQO's CÉR (Comité pour l'éthique de la recherche / Institutional Review Board) a request for ethics certification on March 23, 2017. The project was authorized by the CÉR on June 19, 2017. According to our notes, it took effect on April 10, 2017, and the authorization was effective until April 30, 2017.

To allow the number of interviews to be completed, a request was presented by us to UQO to obtain an extension of the ethical authorization to carry out further interviews. A renewal was granted every time as requested by UQO ethics policies. The latest request has been submitted on July 14, 2021, and grants validity of the certificate until June 28, 2022.

We presented and obtained signature by each of our 30 respondents a Consent Form guaranteeing the confidentiality of the source of the data collected, and their exclusive use for research purposes.

This requirement did not create any problems with the respondents, who all accepted this ethical proposal.

The 30 interviews took place from June 22, 2017, to April 5, 2019. To contact the respondents, a public relations-type document was prepared by me, the doctoral student, one in French and another in English, to introduce myself to prospective interviewees, and inform them about the purpose of the process. Of all those contacted, only one person refused to participate to an interview.

Word-for-word transcriptions were made in French and English, of approximately 8 to 20 pages each, in the language used by the respondents interviewed (27 in French and 3 in English). This subsequently enabled the data feeding of the NVivo software.

We received NVivo software training by Dr. Martine Nadon, who obtained at UQO on October 28, 2019, her Doctorate in Educational Sciences. We met four times (between October 3, 2018, and June 4, 2019). I thank her for her patience and her competence. The training / coaching, coming from this expert has helped a lot to achieve quality coding and analysis. I have also followed several training tutorials on NVivo provided by the Australian firm QSR from May 1, 2017.

To be able to use the Nvivo software, I bought a right of use for one year, later renewed for another year. I contacted the Australian firm QSR International (651, Doncaster Road, PTY Ltd., 2nd Floor, Doncaster Victoria 3108 Australia. Tel: +61 3 9840 1100; F +61 3 9840 1500). Email: info@qsrinternational.com | www.qsrinternational.com

Thanks to the operations performed on the NVivo system, in June and July 2019, we were able to compile the interview segments into 133 coding categories, each identifying the segments corresponding to these categories.

To disseminate the results obtained so far, and to be able to share our experiences with other doctoral students, we participated in a competition for the presentation of theses by students from three universities in the Ottawa-Gatineau region, dated September 29, 2017, entitled *Two Cities, Curious Minds: Graduate Research at Three Universities - National Capital Region. Theses Competition and Poster Session*, https://uqo.ca/nouvelles/17485

There was a thesis proposal session in March 2018. People present at the proposal jury in March 2018 were Chairman: Dr. Tamas Koplyay; External: Dr. Davide Torsello; Internal: Dr. Ana Maria Davila Gomez; Supervisor: Dr. Stéphane Gagnon.

We can confirm that we have accomplished the work as agreed with the jury. This includes collection, analysis, and writing.

Constant interactions took place with my thesis supervisor, Professor Stéphane Gagnon. They have been invaluable to me. The final contents of the thesis have been revised by the thesis director, from May 2020 to September 2021.

In mid-December 2021, we received the thesis jury's decision to accept the thesis with minor corrections to be made. The defence before the jury (via Zoom) was done February 2, 2022. The thesis was accepted by the jury, with the mention Excellence. The jury members were Dr. Frederick Ahen, who teaches at the Eastern Finnish University (external evaluator, specialist on international corruption), Dr. Charmain Levy, Professor at UQO (internal evaluator and specialist on international development), and Dr. Emmanuelle de Verlaine, Professor at UQO and Jury Chair (also internal evaluator and specialist in social change, organizational complexity and methodology). Sincere thanks to all of them for their valuable comments to ameliorate the thesis. I also want to sincerely thank my thesis supervisor, Dr. Stéphane Gagnon, who is a specialist in information technologies, for his constant support and intellectual creativity.

We are grateful as well that a reduced version of our literature review has been published by the *Journal of Financial Crime* in July 2021, titled : Corruption and International Development : a Review of Project Management Challenges (Harnois & Gagnon, 2021).

6.4 Epilogue

The world now faces formidable challenges for its survival, such as the Covid-19 epidemic, climate change, extinction of animal and vegetal species, overpopulation in certain developing countries because of poor family planning and at the same time the graying of its population in developed countries, overfishing in the oceans, land desertification in certain regions, unconventional human migrations, etc.

Too many of these countries are gangrened by the phenomenon of corruption, that renders them inefficient to combat these problems. The result is that human governance in corrupt regimes is ill-equipped to counter efficiently these challenges.

To fight corruption, it must be more publicly recognized than is the case now. In the fields of project management and international development, intellectuals and practicians must be more conscious of that plague and take practical measures to combat it. Project management is an efficient tool for change

As for the operational aspects of our research: we consider ourselves lucky to have obtained the *in vivo* interviews, before the COVID-19 pandemic occurred. Apart from one interview by WhatsApp with a person from Niger, all interviews took place in person with the respondents. Such meetings are very rich in human and operational terms.

It was very interesting to interview Canadians and people from developing countries, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa. While Canadians have a more intellectual understanding of corruption, Africans have a more concrete and experiential experience of the harms caused by corruption on this continent.

We also came to appreciate more fully, for the study of corruption, both the results of multiple quantitative research studies, precise and objective, and qualitative research studies, creative and reflexive. Humans need both to better comprehend the contemporary challenges menacing humanity.

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